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Abstract: Currently, production and comprehension are regarded as quite distinct in accounts of language processing. In rejecting this
dichotomy, we instead assert that producing and understanding are interwoven, and that this interweaving is what enables people to
predict themselves and each other. We start by noting that production and comprehension are forms of action and action perception. We
then consider the evidence for interweaving in action, action perception, and joint action, and explain such evidence in terms of prediction.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that actors construct forward models of their actions before they execute those actions, and that perceivers of
others’ actions covertly imitate those actions, then construct forward models of those actions. We use these accounts of action, action
perception, and joint action to develop accounts of production, comprehension, and interactive language. Importantly, they incorporate
well-deﬁned levels of linguistic representation (such as semantics, syntax, and phonology). We show (a) how speakers and comprehenders
use covert imitation and forward modeling to make predictions at these levels of representation, (b) how they interweave production and
comprehension processes, and (c) how they use these predictions to monitor the upcoming utterances. We show how these accounts
explain a range of behavioral and neuroscientiﬁc data on language processing and discuss some of the implications of our proposal.
Keywords: comprehension; covert imitation; dialogue; forward model; language; prediction; production
1. Introduction
Current accounts of language processing treat production and
comprehension as quite distinct from each other. The split is
clearly reﬂected in the structure of recent handbooks and
textbooks concerned with the psychology of language (e.g.,
Gaskell 2007; Harley 2008). This structure does not merely
reﬂect organizational convenience but instead treats compre-
hension and production as two different questions to investi-
gate. For example, researchers assume that the processes
involved in comprehending a spoken or written sentence,
such as resolving ambiguity, may be quite distinct from the
processes involved in producing a description of a scene. In
neurolinguistics, the “classic” Lichtheim–Broca–Wernicke
model assumes distinct anatomical pathways associated with
production and comprehension, primarily on the basis of
deﬁcit–lesion correlations in aphasia (see Ben Shalom &
Poeppel 2008). This target article rejects such a dichotomy.
In its place, we propose that producing and understanding
are tightly interwoven, and this interweaving underlies
people’s ability to predict themselves and each other.
1.1. The traditional independence of production and
comprehension
To see the effects of the split, we need to think about
language use both within and between individuals, in
terms of a model of communication (Fig. 1).
This model includes “thick” arrows between message
and (linguistic) form, corresponding to production and
comprehension. The production arrows represent the fact
that production may involve converting one message into
form (serial account) or the processor may convert multiple
messages at once, then select one (parallel account). Within
production, the “internal” arrows signify feedback (e.g.,
from phonology to syntax), which occurs in interactive
accounts but not purely feedforward accounts. Note that
these arrows are consistent with any type of information
(linguistic or nonlinguistic) being used during production.
The arrows play an analogous role within comprehension
(e.g., the internal arrows could signify feedback from
semantics to syntax). In contrast, the arrows corresponding
to sound are “thin” because a single sequence of sounds is
sent forward between the speakers. If communication is
fully successful, then A’s message1=B’s message1. Similarly,
there is a “thin” arrow for thinking because such accounts
assume that each individual converts a single message
(e.g., an understanding of a question, message1) into
another (e.g., an answer, message2), and the answer does
not affect the understanding of the question.
The model is split vertically between the processes in
different individuals, who of course have independent
minds. But it is also split horizontally, because the pro-
cesses underlying production and comprehension within
each individual are separated. The traditional model
assumes discrete stages: one in which A is producing and
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B is comprehending an utterance, and one in which B is
producing and A is comprehending an utterance. Each
speaker constructs a message that is translated into sound
before the addressee responds with a new message.
Hence, dialogue is “serial monologue,” in which interlocu-
tors alternate between production and comprehension.
In conversation, however, interlocutors’ contributions
often overlap, with the addressee providing verbal or non-
verbal feedback to the speaker, and the speaker altering
her contribution on the basis of this feedback. In fact, such
feedback can dramatically affect both the quality of the
speaker’s contribution (e.g., Bavelas et al. 2000) and the
addressee’s understanding (Schober & Clark 1989). This of
course means that both interlocutors must simultaneously
produce their own contributions and comprehend the
other’s contribution. Clearly, an approach to language pro-
cessing that assumes a temporal separation between pro-
duction and comprehension cannot explain such behavior.
Interlocutors are not static, as the traditional model
assumes, but are “moving targets” performing a joint
activity (Garrod & Pickering 2009). They do not simply
transmit messages to each other in turn but rather nego-
tiate the form and meaning of expressions they use by inter-
weaving their contributions (Clark 1996), as illustrated in
(1a–1c), below (from Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011). In
(1b), B begins to ask a question, but A’s interruption (1c)
completes the question and answers it. B, therefore, does
not discretely encode a complete message into sound but,
rather, B and A jointly encode the message across (1b–c).
1a—–A: I’m afraid I burnt the kitchen ceiling
1b—–B: But have you
1c—–A: burned myself? Fortunately not.
The horizontal split is also challenged by ﬁndings from
isolated instances of comprehension or production. Take
picture-word interference, in which participants are told
to name a picture (e.g., of a dog) while ignoring a spoken
or written distractor word (e.g., Schriefers et al. 1990). At
certain timings, they are faster naming the picture if the
word is phonologically related to it (dot) than if it is not.
The effect cannot be caused by the speaker’s interpreting
dot before producing dog – the meaning of dot is not the
cause of the facilitation. Rather, the participant accesses
phonology during the comprehension of dot, and this
affects the construction of phonology during the pro-
duction of dog. So experiments such as these suggest that
production and comprehension are tightly interwoven.
Quite ironically, most psycholinguistic theories attempt to
explain either production or comprehension, but a great
many experiments appear to involve both. Single word
naming is typically used to explain comprehension but
involves production (see Bock 1996). Sentence completion
is often used to explain production but involves compre-
hension (e.g., Bock & Miller 1991). Similarly, the ﬁnding
that word identiﬁcation can be affected by externally con-
trolled cheek movement (Ito et al. 2009) suggests that pro-
duction inﬂuences comprehension.
In addition, production and comprehension appear to
recruit strongly overlapping neural circuits (Scott & Johns-
rude 2003; Wilson et al. 2004). For example, Paus et al.
(1996) found activation (dependent on the rate of
speech) of regions associated with speech perception
when people whispered but could not hear their own
speech. Listeners also activate appropriate muscles in the
tongue and lips while listening to speech but not nonspeech
(Fadiga et al. 2002; Watkins et al. 2003). Additionally,
increased muscle activity in the lips is associated with
increased activity (i.e., blood ﬂow) in Broca’s area,
suggesting that this area mediates between the comprehen-
sion and production systems during speech perception
(Watkins & Paus 2004). There is also activation of brain
areas associated with production during aspects of
comprehension from phonology (Heim et al. 2003) to nar-
rative structure (Mar 2004); see Scott et al. (2009) and
Pulvermüller and Fadiga (2010). Finally, Menenti et al.
(2011) found massive overlap between speaking and listen-
ing for regions showing functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) adaptation effects associated with repeat-
ing language at different linguistic levels (see also Segaert
et al. 2012). These results are inconsistent with separation
of neural pathways for production and comprehension in
the classical Lichtheim–Broca–Wernicke neurolinguistic
model.
In conclusion, the evidence from dialogue, psycholin-
guistics, and cognitive neuroscience all casts doubt on the
independence of production and comprehension, and
therefore on the horizontal split assumed in Figure 1. Let
us now address two theoretical issues relating to the aban-
donment of this split, and then ask what kind of model is
compatible with the interweaving of production and
comprehension.
1.2. Modularity and the cognitive sandwich
Much of psycholinguistics has sought to test the claim that
language processing is modular (Fodor 1983). Such
accounts investigate the way in which information travels
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between the boxes in a model such as in Figure 1. In par-
ticular, the arrows labeled thinking correspond to “central
processes” and contain representations in some kind of
language of thought. Researchers are particularly con-
cerned with the extent to which thinking arrows are separ-
ated from the production and comprehension arrows.
Modular theories assume that some aspects of production
or comprehension do not make reference to “central pro-
cesses” (e.g., Frazier 1987; Levelt et al. 1999). In contrast,
interactionist theories allow “central processes” to directly
affect production or comprehension (e.g., Dell 1986; Mac-
Donald et al. 1994; Trueswell et al. 1994). But both types of
theory maintain that production and comprehension are
separated from each other. In this sense, both types of
theory are modular and are compatible with Figure 1.
In fact, Hurley (2008a) argued that traditional cognitive
psychology assumes this type of modularity in order to keep
action and perception separate. She referred to this
assumption as the cognitive sandwich. Individuals perceive
the world, reason about their perceptions using thinking
(i.e., cognition), and act on the basis of those thoughts.
Researchers assume that action and perception involve sep-
arate representations and processes and study one or the
other but not both (and they are kept separate in textbooks
and the like). In Hurley’s terms, the cognitive “meat” keeps
the motor “bread” separate from the perceptual “bread.”1
She argued that perception and action are interwoven
and, therefore, rejected the cognitive sandwich.
Importantly, language production is a form of action and
language comprehension is a form of perception. Therefore,
traditional psycholinguistics also assumes the cognitive sand-
wich, with the thinking “meat” keeping apart the production
and comprehension “bread.” But if action and perception
are interwoven, then production and comprehension are
interwoven as well, and so accounts of language processing
should also reject the cognitive sandwich.
1.3. Production and comprehension processes
How can production and comprehension both be involved
in isolated speaking or listening? Within the individual, we
mean that production and comprehension processes are
interwoven. Production processes must of course be
used when individuals produce language, and comprehen-
sion processes must be used when they comprehend
language. However, production processes must also be
used during, for example, silent naming, when no utterance
is produced. Silent naming therefore involves some pro-
duction processes (e.g., those associated with aspects of for-
mulation such as name retrieval) but not others (e.g., those
associated with articulation; see Levelt 1989). Likewise,
comprehension processes must occur when a participant
retrieves the phonology of a masked prime word but not
its semantics (e.g., Van den Bussche et al. 2009). And so it
is also possible that production processes are used during
comprehension and comprehension processes used during
production.
How can we distinguish production processes from com-
prehension processes? For this, we assume that (1) people
represent linguistic information at different levels; (2) these
levels are semantics, syntax, and phonology2; (3) they are
ordered “higher” to “lower,” so that a speaker’s message
is linked to semantics, semantics to syntax, syntax to pho-
nology, and phonology to speech. We then assume that a
producer goes from message to sound via each of these
levels (message → semantics → syntax → phonology →
sound), and a comprehender goes from sound to message
in the opposite direction. Given this framework, we
Figure 1. A traditional model of communication between A and B. (comp: comprehension; prod: production)
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deﬁne a production process as a process that maps from a
“higher” to a “lower” linguistic level (e.g., syntax to phonol-
ogy) and a comprehension process as a process that maps
from a “lower” to a “higher” level.3 This means that produ-
cing utterances must involve production processes, but can
also involve comprehension processes; similarly, compre-
hending utterances must involve comprehension processes,
but can also involve production processes.
One possibility is that people have separate production
and comprehension systems. On this account, producing
utterances may make use of feedback mechanisms that
are similar in some respects to the mechanisms of compre-
hension, and comprehending utterances may make use of
feedback mechanisms that are similar in some respects to
the mechanisms of production. This is the position
assumed by traditional interactive models of production
(e.g., Dell 1986) and comprehension (e.g., MacDonald
et al. 1994). In such accounts, production and comprehen-
sion are internally nonmodular, but are modular with
respect to each other. They do not take advantage of the
comprehension system in production or the production
system in comprehension (even though the other system
is often lying dormant).
Very little work in comprehension makes reference to
production processes, with classic theories of lexical proces-
sing (from, e.g., Marslen-Wilson & Welsh 1978 or Swinney
1979 onward) and sentence processing (e.g., Frazier 1987;
MacDonald et al. 1994) making no reference to production
processes (see Bock 1996 for discussion, and Federmeier
2007 for an exception). In contrast, some theories of pro-
duction do incorporate comprehension processes. Most
notably, Levelt (1989) assumed that speakers monitor
their own speech using comprehension processes. They
can hear their own speech (external self-monitoring), in
which case the speaker comprehends his own utterance
just like another person’s utterance; but they can also
monitor a sound-based representation (internal self-moni-
toring), in which comprehension processes are used to
convert sound to message (see sect. 3.1).
In addition, some computationally sophisticated models
can use production and comprehension processes together
(e.g., Chang et al. 2006), use comprehension to assist in the
process of learning to speak (Plaut & Kello 1999), or
assume that comprehension and production use the same
network of nodes and connections so that feedback pro-
cesses during production are the same as feedforward pro-
cesses during comprehension (MacKay 1982). In addition,
Dell has proposed accounts in which feedback during pro-
duction is a component of comprehension (e.g., Dell 1988),
although he has also queried this claim on the basis of neu-
ropsychological evidence (Dell et al. 1997, p. 830); see also
the debate between Rapp and Goldrick (2000; Rapp &
Goldrick 2004) and Roelofs (2004).
But none of these theories incorporate mechanisms of
sentence comprehension (e.g., parsing or lexical ambiguity
resolution) into theories of production. We believe that this
is a consequence of the traditional separation of production
and comprehension (as represented in Fig. 1). In contrast,
we propose that comprehension processes are routinely
accessed at different stages in production, and that pro-
duction processes are routinely accessed at different
stages in comprehension.
The rest of this target article develops an account of
language processing in which processes of production and
comprehension are integrated. We assume that instances
of both production and comprehension involve extensive
use of prediction – determining what you yourself or your
interlocutor is likely to say next. Predicting your own utter-
ance involves comprehension processes as well as pro-
duction processes, and predicting another person’s
utterance involves production processes as well as compre-
hension processes.
As we have noted, production is a form of action, and
comprehension is a form of perception. More speciﬁcally,
comprehension is a form of action perception – perception
of other people performing actions. We ﬁrst consider the
evidence for interweaving in action and action perception,
and we explain such evidence in terms of prediction. We
assume that actors construct forward models of their
actions before they execute those actions, and that percei-
vers of others’ actions construct forward models of others’
actions that are based on their own potential actions.
Finally, we apply these accounts to joint action.
We then develop these accounts of action, action percep-
tion, and joint action into accounts of production, compre-
hension, and dialogue. Unlike many other forms of action
and perception, language processing is clearly structured,
incorporating well-deﬁned levels of linguistic represen-
tation such as semantics, syntax, and phonology. Thus,
our accounts also include such structure. We show how
speakers and comprehenders predict the content of levels
of representation by interweaving production and compre-
hension processes. We then explain a range of behavioral
and neuroscientiﬁc data on language processing, and
discuss some of the implications of the account.
2. Interweaving in action and action perception
For perception and action to be interwoven, there must be
a direct link between them. If so, there should be much evi-
dence for effects of perception on action, and there is. In
one study, participants’ arm movements showed more var-
iance when they observed another person making a differ-
ent versus the same arm movement (Kilner et al. 2003; see
also Stanley et al. 2007). Conversely, there is good evidence
for effects of action on perception. For example, producing
hand movements can facilitate the concurrent visual dis-
crimination of deviant hand postures (Miall et al. 2006),
and turning a knob can affect the perceived motion of a
perceptually bistable object (Wohlschläger 2000). Such evi-
dence immediately casts doubt on the “sandwich” architec-
ture for perception and action.
What purpose might such a link serve? First, it could
facilitate overt imitation, but overt imitation is not
common in many species (see Prinz 2006). Second, it
could be used postdictively, with action representations
helping perceivers develop a stable memory for a percept
or a detailed understanding of it (e.g., via rehearsal), and
perceptual representations doing the same for actors. But
we propose a third alternative: people compute action rep-
resentations during perception and perception represen-
tations during action to aid prediction of what they are
about to perceive or to do, in a way that allows them to
“get ahead of the game” (see Wilson & Knoblich 2005).4
To explain this, we turn to the theory of forward modeling,
which was ﬁrst applied to action but has more recently been
applied to action perception. We interpret the theory in a
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way that then allows us to extend it to account for language
processing.
2.1. Forward modeling in action
To explain forward modeling, we draw on Wolpert’s propo-
sals from computational neuroscience (e.g., Davidson &
Wolpert 2005; Wolpert 1997), but reframed using psycho-
logical terminology couched in the language of perception
and action (see Fig. 2). We use the simple example of
moving a hand to a target. The actor formulates the
action (motor) command to move the hand. This
command initiates two processes in parallel. First, it
causes the action implementer to generate the act, which
in turn leads the perceptual implementer to construct a
percept of the experience of moving the hand. In Wolpert’s
terms, this percept is used as sensory feedback (reafference)
and is partly proprioceptive, but may also be partly visual (if
the agent watches her hand move).
Second, it sends an efference copy of the action
command to cause the forward action model to generate
the predicted act of moving the hand.5 Just as the act
depends on the application of the action command to the
current state of the action implementer (e.g., where the
hand is positioned before the command), so the predicted
act depends on the application of the efference copy of the
action command to the current state of the forward action
model (e.g., a model of where the hand is positioned before
the command). The predicted act then causes the forward
perceptual model to construct a predicted percept of the
experience of moving the hand. (This percept would not
form part of a traditional action plan.) Note that this pre-
dicted percept is compatible with the theory of event
coding (Hommel et al. 2001), in which actions are rep-
resented in terms of their predicted perceptual
consequences.
Importantly, the efference copy is (in general) processed
more quickly than the action command itself (see Davidson
& Wolpert 2005). For example, the command to move the
hand causes the action implementer to activate muscles,
which is a comparatively slow process. In contrast, the
forward action model and the forward perceptual model
make use of representations of the position of the hand,
state of the muscles, and so on (and may involve simpliﬁca-
tions and approximations). These representations may be in
terms of equations (e.g., hand coordinates), and such
equations can (typically) be solved rapidly (e.g., using a
network that represents relevant aspects of mathematics).
So the predicted percept (the predicted sensations of the
hand’s movement and position) is usually “ready” before
the actual percept. The action then occurs and the pre-
dicted percept is compared to the actual percept (the sen-
sations of the hand’s actual movement and position).
Any discrepancy between these two sensations (as deter-
mined by the comparator) is fed back so that it can modify
the next action command accordingly. If the hand is to the
Figure 2. A model of the action system, using a snapshot of executing an act at time t. Boxes refer to processes, and terms not in boxes
refer to representations. The action command u(t) (e.g., to move the hand) initiates two processes. First, u(t) feeds into the action (motor)
implementer, which outputs an act a(t) (the event of moving the hand). In turn, this act feeds into the perceptual (sensory) implementer,
which outputs a percept s(t) (the perception of moving the hand). Second, an efference copy of u(t) feeds into the forward action model, a
computational device (distinct from the action implementer) which outputs a predicted act a^(t) (the predicted event of moving the hand);
the carat indicates an approximation. In turn, a^(t) feeds into the forward perceptual model, a computational device (distinct from the
perceptual implementer) which outputs a predicted percept s^(t) (the predicted perception of moving the hand). The comparator can
be used to compare the percept and the predicted percept.
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left of its predicted position, the next action command can
move it more to the right. In this way, perceptual processes
have an online effect on action, so that the act can be
repeatedly affected by perceptual processes as well as
action processes. (Alternatively, the actor can correct the
forward model rather than the action command, depending
on her conﬁdence about the relative accuracy of the action
command and the efference copy.) Such prediction is
necessary because determining the discrepancy on the
basis of reafferent feedback would be far too slow to
allow corrective movements (see Grush [2004], who
referred to forward models as emulators).
We assume that the central role of forward modeling is
perceptual prediction (i.e., predicting the perceptual out-
comes of an action). However, it has other functions.
First, it can be used to help estimate the current state,
given that perception is not entirely accurate. The best esti-
mate of the current position of the hand combines the esti-
mate that comes from the percept and the estimate that
comes from the predicted percept. For example, a person
can estimate the position of her hand in a dark room by
remembering the action command that underlay her
hand movement to its current location. Second, forward
models can cancel the sensory effects of self-motion (reaf-
ference cancellation) when these sensory effects match the
predicted movement. This enables people to differentiate
between perceptual effects of their own actions and those
reﬂecting changes in the world, for example, explaining
why self-applied tickling is not effective (Blakemore et al.
1999).
A helpful analogy is that of an old-fashioned sailor navi-
gating across the ocean (cf. Grush 2004). He starts at a
known position, which he marks on his chart (i.e., model
of the ocean), and determines a compass course and
speed. He lays out the corresponding course on the chart
and traces out where he should be at noon (his predicted
act, a^ tð Þ), and determines what his sextant should read at
this time and place (his predicted percept, s^ tð Þ). He then
sets off through the water until noon (his act, a(t)). At
noon, he uses his sextant to estimate his position from
the sun (his percept, s(t)), and compares the predicted
and observed sextant readings (using the comparator). He
can then use this in various ways. If he is not conﬁdent of
his course keeping, he pays more attention to the actual
reading; if he is not conﬁdent of his sextant reading (e.g.,
it is misty), he pays more attention to the predicted
reading. If the predicted and actual readings match, he
assumes no other force (this is equivalent to reafference
cancellation). But if they do not match and he is conﬁdent
about both course keeping and sextant reading, he assumes
the existence of another force, in this case the current.
Forward modeling also plays an important role in motor
learning (Wolpert 1997). To be able to pick up an object
you need a model that maps the object’s location onto an
action (motor) command to move the hand to that location.
This is called an inverse model because it represents the
inverse of the forward model. Learning a motor skill
requires learning both an appropriate forward model and
an appropriate inverse model.
Motor control theories that are more sophisticated use
linked forward-inverse model pairs to explain how actors
can adapt dynamically to changes in the context of an
unfolding action. In their Modular Selection and Identiﬁ-
cation for Control (MOSAIC) account, Haruno et al.
(2001) proposed that actors run sets of model pairs in par-
allel, with each forward model making different predictions
about how the action might unfold in different contexts. By
matching actual movements against these different predic-
tions, the system can shift responsibility for controlling the
action toward the model pair whose forward model predic-
tion best ﬁts that movement. For example, a person starts
to pick up a small (and apparently light) object using a
weak grip but subsequently ﬁnds the grip insufﬁcient to
lift the object. According to MOSAIC, the person would
then shift the responsibility for controlling the action to a
new forward-inverse model pairing, which produces a
stronger grip.
The same principles apply to structured activities that are
more complex, such as the process of drinking a cup of tea.
Here the forward model provides information ahead of
time about the sequence and overlap between the different
stages in the process (moving the hand to the cup, picking it
up, moving it to the mouth, opening the mouth, etc.) and
represents the predicted sensory feedback at each stage
(i.e., the predicted percept). Controlling such complex
sequences of actions has been implemented by Haruno
et al. (2003) in their Hierarchical MOSAIC (HMOSAIC)
model. HMOSAIC extends MOSAIC by having hierarchi-
cally organized forward-inverse model pairings that link
“high level” intentions to “low level” motor operations – in
our terms, from high-level to low-level action commands.
In conclusion, forward modeling in action allows the
actor to predict her upcoming action, in a way that allows
her to modify the unfolding action if it fails to match the
prediction. In addition, it can be used to facilitate esti-
mation of the current state, to cancel reafference, and to
support short- and long-term learning. In doing so,
forward modeling closely interweaves representations
associated with action and representations associated with
perception, and can therefore explain effects of perception
on action.
2.2. Covert imitation and forward modeling in action
perception
When you perceive inanimate objects, you draw on your
perceptual experience of objects. For example, if an
object’s movement is unclear, you can think about how
similar objects have appeared to move in the past (e.g.,
obeying gravity). When you perceive other people (i.e.,
action perception), you can also draw on your perceptual
experience of other people. We refer to this as the associ-
ation route in action perception. For example, you
assume someone’s ambiguous arm movement is compati-
ble with your experience of perceiving other people’s arm
movements. People can clearly predict each other’s
actions using the association route, just as they can
predict the movement of physical objects on the basis of
past experience (e.g., Freyd & Finke 1984).
However, you can also draw on your experience of your
own body – you assume that someone’s arm movement is
compatible with your experience of your own arm move-
ments. We refer to this as the simulation route in action
perception. The simplest possibility is that the perceiver
determines what she would do under the circumstances.
In the case of hand movement, the perceiver would see
the start of the actor’s hand movement and would then
determine how she would move if it were her hand,
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thereby determining the actor’s intention. Informally, she
would see the hand and the way it was moving, and then
think of it as her own hand and use the mechanisms that
she would use to move her own hand to predict her part-
ner’s hand movement. In other words, she would covertly
imitate her partner’s movements, treating his arm positions
as though they were her own arm positions. However, the
perceiver cannot simply use the same mechanisms the
actor would use but must “accommodate” to the differ-
ences in their bodies (the context, in motor control
theory) – for example, applying a smaller force if her body
is lighter weight than her partner’s.6 In any case, her repro-
duction is unlikely to be perfect – she is in the position of a
character actor attempting to reproduce another person’s
mannerisms.
In theory, the perceiver could simulate by using her own
action implementer (and inhibiting its output). However,
this would be too slow –much of the time, she would deter-
mine her partner’s action after he had performed that
action. Instead, she can use her forward action model to
derive a prediction of her partner’s act (and the forward
perceptual model to derive a prediction of her percept of
that act). To do this, she would identify the actor’s intention
from her perception of the previous and current states of
his arm (or from background information such as knowl-
edge of his state of mind) and use this to generate an effer-
ence copy of the intended act. If she determined that the
actor was about to punch her face, she would have time
to move. She can also compare this predicted percept
with her actual percept of his act when it happens. We illus-
trate this account in Figure 3.
This simulation account uses the mechanisms involved in
the prediction of action (as illustrated in Fig. 2), but it adds
a mechanism for covert imitation. This mechanism also
allows for overt imitation of the action itself or a continu-
ation of that action (the overt imitation and continuation
are what we call overt responses). In fact, the strong link
between actions and predictions of those actions means
that perceivers tend to activate their action implementers
as well as forward action models. Note that Figure 3
ignores the association route to action prediction, which
uses the percept sB(t) and knowledge about percepts that
Figure 3. A model of the simulation route to prediction in action perception in Person A. Everything above the solid line refers to the
unfolding action of Person B (who is being observed by A), and we underline B’s representations. For instance, aB tð Þ can refer to B’s initial
hand movement (at time t) and aB tþ 1ð Þ to B’s ﬁnal hand movement (at time t+1). A predicts B’s act aB tþ 1ð Þ given B’s act aB tð Þ. To do
this, A ﬁrst covertly imitates B’s act. This involves perceiving B’s act aB tð Þ to derive the percept sB (t), and from this using the inverse
model and context (e.g., information about differences between A’s body and B’s body) to derive the action command (i.e., the
intention) uB(t) that A would use if A were to perform B’s act (without context, the inverse model would derive the command that B
would use to perform B’s act – but this command is useless to A) and from this the action command that A would use if A were to
perform the subsequent part of B’s act uB(t+1). A now uses the same forward modeling that she uses when producing an act (see
Fig. 2) to produce her prediction of B’s act a^B tþ 1ð Þ, and her prediction of her perception of B’s act s^B tþ 1ð Þ. This prediction is
generally ready before her perception of B’s act sB tþ 1ð Þ. She can then compare s^B tþ 1ð Þ and sB tþ 1ð Þ using the comparator.
Notice that A can also use the derived action command uB(t) to overtly imitate B’s act and the derived action command uB(t+1) to
overtly produce the subsequent part of B’s act (see “Overt responses”).
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tend to follow sB(t) to predict the percept of the act. (The
perceiver may of course be able to combine the action-
based and perceptual predictions into a single prediction.)
Additionally, we have glossed over the computationally
complex part of this proposal – the mapping from the
percept sB(t) to the action commands uB(t) and uB(t+1).
How can the perceiver determine the actor’s intention?
In fact, Wolpert et al. (2003) showed how to do this using
HMOSAIC, which can make predictions about how differ-
ent intentional acts unfold over time. In their account, the
perceiver runs parallel, linked forward-inverse model pair-
ings at multiple levels from “low-level” movements to
“high-level” intentions. By matching actual movements
against these different predictions, HMOSAIC determines
the likelihood of different possible intentions (and dynami-
cally modiﬁes the space of possible intentions). This in turn
modiﬁes the perceiver’s predictions of the actor’s likely be-
havior. For example, a ﬁrst level might determine that a
movement of the shoulder is likely to lead to a movement
of the arm (and would draw on information about the
actor’s body shape); a second level might determine
whether such an arm movement is the prelude to a prof-
fered handshake or a punch (and would draw on infor-
mation about the actor’s state of mind). At the second
level, the perceiver runs forward models based on those
alternative intentions to determine what the actor’s hand
is likely to do next. If, for example, I predict you are
more likely to initiate a handshake but then your ﬁst
starts clenching, I modify my interpretation of your inten-
tion and now predict that you will likely throw a punch.
At this point, I have determined your intention and conﬁ-
dently predict the upcoming position of your hand, just as
I would do if I were predicting my own hand movements.
Good evidence that covert imitation plays a role in pre-
diction comes from studies showing that appropriate
motor-related brain areas can be activated before a per-
ceived event occurs (Haueisen & Knösche 2001). Similarly,
mirror neurons in monkeys can be activated by perceptual
predictions as well as by perceived actions (Umiltá et al.
2001); note there is recent direct evidence for mirror
neurons in people (Mukamel et al. 2010).7 Additionally,
people are better at predicting a movement trajectory
(e.g., in dart-throwing or handwriting) when viewing a
video of themselves versus others (Knoblich & Flach
2001; Knoblich et al. 2002). Presumably, prediction-by-
simulation is more accurate when the object of the predic-
tion is one’s own actions than when it is someone else’s
actions. This yoking of action-based and perceptual pro-
cesses can therefore explain the experimental evidence
for interweaving (e.g., Kilner et al. 2003).
Notice that such covert imitation can also drive overt imi-
tation. However, the perceiver does not simply copy the
actor’s movements, but rather bases her actions on her
determination of the actor’s intentions. This is apparent
in infants’ imitation of caregivers’ actions (Gergely et al.
2002) and in the behavior of mirror neurons, which code
for intentional actions (Umiltá et al. 2001). Importantly,
mirror neurons do not exist merely to facilitate imitation
(because imitation is largely or entirely absent in
monkeys), and so one of their functions may be to drive
action prediction via covert imitation (Csibra & Gergely
2007; Prinz 2006). In conclusion, we propose that action
perception interweaves action-based and perceptual pro-
cesses in a way that supports prediction.
2.3. Joint action
People are highly adept at joint activities, such as ballroom
dancing, playing a duet, or carrying a large object together
(Sebanz et al. 2006a). Clearly, such activities require two
(or more) agents to coordinate their actions, which in
turn means that they are able to perceive each other’s
acts and perform their own acts together. In many of
these activities, precise timing is crucial, with success
occurring only if each partner applies the right force at
the right time in relation to the other. Such success there-
fore requires tight interweaving of perception and action.
Moreover, people must predict each other’s actions,
because responding after they perceive actions would
simply be too slow. Clearly, it may also be useful to
predict one’s own actions, and to integrate these predic-
tions with predictions of others’ actions.
We therefore propose that people perform joint actions
by combining the models of prediction in action and action
perception in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 4 shows how A and B
can both predict B’s upcoming action (using prediction-by-
simulation). A perceives B’s current act and then uses covert
imitation and forward modeling; B formulates his forthcom-
ing act and uses forward modeling based on that intention. If
successful, A and B should make similar predictions about
B’s upcoming act, and they can use those predictions to coor-
dinate. Note that they can both compare their predictions
with B’s forthcoming act when it takes place.
Joint action can involve overt imitation, continuation
of other’s behavior, or complementary behavior. Overt
imitation and continuation follow straightforwardly from
Figure 3 (see the large arrow leading from “Covert imita-
tion” to “Overt responses”). There is much evidence that
people overtly imitate each other without intending to or
being aware that they are doing so, from studies involving
Figure 4. A and B predicting B’s forthcoming action (with B’s
processes and representations underlined). B’s action command
uB tð Þ feeds into B’s action implementer and leads to B’s act
aB tð Þ. A covertly imitates B’s act and uses A’s forward action
model to predict B’s forthcoming act (at time t+1). B
simultaneously generates the next action command (the dotted
line indicates that this command is causally linked to the
previous action command for B but not A) and uses B’s forward
action model to predict B’s forthcoming act. If A and B are
coordinated, then A’s prediction of B’s act and B’s prediction of
B’s act (in the dotted box) should match. Moreover, they may
both match B’s forthcoming act at time t+1 (not shown). A and
B also predict A’s forthcoming action (see text).
Pickering & Garrod: An integrated theory of language production and comprehension
336 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:4
the imitation of speciﬁc movements (e.g., Chartrand &
Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003) or involving the
synchronization of body posture (e.g., Shockley et al.,
2003). For example, pairs of participants tend to start
rocking chairs at the same frequency, even though the
chairs have different natural frequencies (Richardson
et al., 2007), and crowds come to clap in unison (Neda
et al., 2000). Such imitation appears to be on a percep-
tion-behavior expressway (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001),
not mediated by inference or intention. Many of these ﬁnd-
ings demonstrate close temporal coordination and appear
to require prediction (see Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). For
instance, in a joint go/no-go task, Sebanz et al. (2006b)
found enhanced N170 event-related potentials (ERPs),
reﬂecting response inhibition, for the nonresponding
player when it was the partner’s turn to respond. They
interpreted this as suggesting that a person suppresses his
or her own actions at the point when a partner is about
to act. In addition, people continue each other’s behavior
by overtly imitating their predicted behavior (in contrast
to overt imitation of actual behavior). For example, early
studies showed that some mirror neurons ﬁred when the
monkey observed a matching action (i.e., one that would
cause that neuron to ﬁre if the monkey performed that
action) and others ﬁred when it observed a nonmatching
action that could precede the matching action (di Pelle-
grino et al., 1992).
Complementary behavior occurs when the co-actors use
their same predictions to derive different (but coordinated)
behaviors. For example, in ballroom dancing, both A and B
predict that B will move his foot forward; B will then move
his foot, and A will plan her complementary action of
moving her foot backward. Graf et al. (2010) reviewed
much evidence for complementary motor involvement in
action perception (see Häberle et al. 2008; Newman-
Norlund et al. 2007; van Schie et al. 2008).
So far, we have described how A and B predict B’s
action. To explain joint activity, we ﬁrst note that A and B
predict A’s action as well (in the same way). They then inte-
grate these predictions with their predictions of B’s action.
To do this, they must simultaneously predict their own
action and their partner’s action. They can determine
whether these acts are compatible (essentially asking them-
selves, “does my upcoming act ﬁt with your upcoming
act?”). If not, they can modify their own upcoming
actions accordingly (so that such modiﬁcations can occur
on the basis of comparing predictions alone, without
having to wait for the action). (If I ﬁnd out that I am
likely to collide with you, I can move out of the way.)
This account can therefore explain tight coupling of joint
activity, as well as the experience of “shared reality” that
occurs when A and B realize that they are experiencing
the world in similar ways (Echterhoff et al. 2009).
Importantly, the participants in a joint action perform
actions that are related to each other. It is of course
easier for A to predict both A and B’s actions if their
actions are closely related (as is the case in tightly
coupled activities such as ballroom dancing). If A’s predic-
tions of her own action (a^A tþ 1ð Þ) and her prediction of B’s
action (a^B tþ 1ð Þ) were unrelated, she would ﬁnd both pre-
dictions hard; if the predictions are closely related, A is able
to use many of the computations involved in one prediction
to support the other prediction. In other words, it is easier
to predict another person’s actions when you are
performing a related action than when you are performing
an unrelated action. (Notice also that A and B are likely to
overtly imitate each other and that such overt imitation will
make their actions more similar, hence the predictions
easier to integrate.) In conclusion, joint action can be suc-
cessful because the participants are able to integrate their
own action with their perception of their partner’s action.
3. A uniﬁed framework for language production
and comprehension
We have noted that language production is a form of action
and comprehension is a form of action perception; accord-
ingly, we now apply the above framework to language. This
is of course consistent with the evidence for interweaving
that we brieﬂy considered in section 1: the tight coupling
between interlocutors in dialogue, the evidence for
effects of comprehension processes on acts of production
and vice versa in behavioral experiments, and the overlap
of brain circuits involved in acts of production and compre-
hension. We now argue that such interweaving occurs pri-
marily to facilitate prediction, which in turn facilitates
production and comprehension.
We ﬁrst propose that speakers use forward production
models of their utterances in the same way that actors
use forward action models, by constructing efference
copies of their predicted utterance and comparing those
copies with the output of the production implementer.
We then propose that listeners predict speakers’ upcoming
utterances by covertly imitating what they have uttered so
far, deriving their underlying message, generating effer-
ence copies, and comparing those copies with the actual
utterances when they occur, just as in our account of
action perception. Dialogue involves the integration of
the models of the speaker and the listener. These proposals
are directly analogous to our proposals for action, action
perception, and joint action, except that we assume struc-
tured representations of language involving (at least)
semantics, syntax, and phonology.
3.1. Forward modeling in language production
In acting, the action command drives the action implemen-
ter to produce an act, which the perceptual implementer
uses to produce a percept of that act (see Fig. 2). But typi-
cally, before this process is complete, the efference copy of
the action command drives the forward action model to
produce a predicted act, which the forward perceptual
model uses to produce a predicted percept. The actor
can then compare these outputs and adjust the action
command (or the forward model) if they do not match.
In language production (see Fig. 5), the action command
is speciﬁed as a production command. The action implemen-
ter is speciﬁed as the production implementer, and the per-
ceptual implementer is speciﬁed as the comprehension
implementer. Similarly, the forward action model is speci-
ﬁed as the forward production model, and the forward per-
ceptual model is speciﬁed as the forward comprehension
model. The comparison of the utterance percept and the
predicted utterance percept constitutes self-monitoring.
In Figure 5, the production command constitutes the
message that the speaker wishes to convey (see Levelt
1989) and includes information about communicative
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force (e.g., interrogative), pragmatic context, and a nonlin-
guistic situation model (e.g., Sanford & Garrod 1981). In
addition, Figure 5 does not merely differ from Figure 2
in terminology, but it also assumes structured linguistic rep-
resentations, such as p [sem,syn,phon] (t) rather than a(t).
As we have noted, language processing appears to involve
a series of intermediate representations between message
and articulation. So Figure 5 is a simpliﬁcation: We
assume that speakers construct representations associated
with the semantics, syntax, and phonology of the actual
utterance, with the semantics being constructed before
the syntax, and the syntax before the phonology (in
accord with all theories of language production, even if
they assume some feedback between representations).8
We can therefore refer to these individual representations
as p[sem](t), p[syn](t), and p[phon](t). Note that the map-
pings from p[sem](t) to p[syn](t) and p[syn](t) to p[phon](t)
involve aspects of the production implementer, but
Figure 5 places the production implementer before a
single representation p[sem,syn,phon](t) for ease of presen-
tation. Assuming Indefrey and Levelt’s (2004) estimates
(based on single-word production), semantics (including
message preparation) takes about 175 ms, syntax (lemma
access) takes about 75 ms, and phonology (including sylla-
biﬁcation) takes around 205 ms. Phonetic encoding and
articulation takes an additional 145 ms (see Sahin et al.
2009, for slightly longer estimates of syntactic and phonolo-
gical processing).
Finally, speakers use the comprehension implementer to
construct the utterance percept. Again, we assume that this
system acts on each production representation individually,
so that p[sem](t) is mapped to c[sem](t), p[syn](t) to
c[syn](t), and p[phon](t) to c[phon](t); therefore, Figure 5
is a simpliﬁcation in this respect as well. Importantly, the
speaker constructs her utterance percept for semantics
before syntax before phonology. Unlike Levelt (1989), we
therefore assume that the speaker maps between represen-
tations associated with production and comprehension at
all linguistic levels.
The forward production model constructs p^ sem½  tð Þ,
p^ syn
 
tð Þ, and p^ phon  tð Þ, and the forward comprehension
model constructs c^ sem½  tð Þ, c^ syn  tð Þ, and c^ phon  tð Þ. Most
important, these representations are typically ready before
the representations constructed by the production imple-
menter and the comprehension implementer. The
speaker can then use the monitor to compare the predicted
utterance percept with the (actual) utterance percept at
each level (see Fig. 5) when those actual percepts are
ready. Thus, the monitor can compare predicted with
actual semantics ﬁrst, then predicted with actual syntax,
then predicted with actual phonology. The production
implementer makes occasional errors, and the monitor
detects such errors by noting mismatches between
outputs of the production implementer and outputs of
the forward model. It may then trigger a correction (but
does not need to do so). To do this, the monitor must of
Figure 5. A model of production, using a snapshot of speaking at time t. The production command i(t) is used to initiate two processes.
First, i(t) feeds into the production implementer, which outputs an utterance p[sem,syn,phon](t), a sequence of sounds that encodes
semantics, syntax, and phonology. Notice that t refers to the time of the production command, not the time at which the
representations are computed. In turn, the speaker processes this utterance to create an utterance percept, the perception of a
sequence of sounds that encodes semantics, syntax, and phonology. Second, an efference copy of i(t) feeds into the forward
production model, a computational device which outputs a predicted utterance. This feeds into the forward comprehension model,
which outputs a predicted utterance percept (i.e., of the predicted semantics, syntax, and phonology). The monitor can then compare
the utterance percept and the predicted utterance percept at one or more linguistic levels (and therefore performs self-monitoring).
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course be fairly accurate and use predictions made inde-
pendently of the production implementer itself.
Let us now consider the content of these predictions and
the organization of the forward models in more detail using
examples. In doing so, we address the obvious criticism that
if the speaker is computing a forward model, why not just
use that model in production itself? The answer is that
the predictions are not the same as the implemented pro-
duction representations, but are easier-to-compute “impo-
verished” representations. They leave out (or simplify)
many components of the implemented representations,
just as a forward model of predicted hand movements
might encode coordinates but not distance between index
ﬁnger and thumb, or a forward model for navigation
might include information about the ship’s position and
perhaps fuel level but not its response to the heavy swell.
Similarly, the forward model does not form part of the
production command. The production command incorpor-
ates a conceptual representation that describes a situation
model and communicative force. It cannot represent infor-
mation such as the ﬁrst phoneme of the word the speaker is
to use, because such information is phonological, not con-
ceptual. In addition, the production command does not
involve perceptual representations (what it “feels like” to
perform an act), unlike the forward comprehension model.
Additionally, the forward model represents rather than
instantiates time. For example, a speaker utters The boy
went outside to ﬂy… and has decided to produce a word
corresponding to a conceptual representation of a kite. At
this point, she has predicted that the next word will be a
deﬁnite determiner with phonology /ðe/, and that its articu-
lation should start in 100 ms. (She does not wait 100 ms to
make this prediction.) She may also have predicted some
aspects of the following word (kite) and that it should
start in 300 ms.
But apart from the timing, in what sense is this forward
model impoverished? The phonological prediction
(p^ phon
 
tð Þ) might indicate (for example) the identities of
the phonemes (/k/, /a/, /I/, /t/) and their order, but not
how they are produced. So when the speaker decides to
utter kite, she might simply look up the phonemes in a
table and associate them with the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Importantly, she does not necessarily have the prediction
of /k/ ready before the prediction of /t/. Alternatively, she
might look up the ﬁrst phoneme, in which case the
forward model would include information about /k/ only.
Similarly, the syntactic prediction (p^ syn
 
tð Þ) might
include the grammatical category of noun, but not
whether the noun is singular or plural (or its gender, in a
gender-marking language). The speaker might simply
look up the information that a ﬂyable object is likely to
be a noun. This information then suggests that the word
should occur at particular positions: for instance, following
a determiner. In addition, it is not necessary that the pre-
dicted representations are computed sequentially.
Although the implemented syntax (p[syn](t)) must be
ready before the implemented phonology (p[phon](t)),
the syntactic prediction need not be ready before the pho-
nological prediction. For example, the speaker might
predict that the kite concept should have the ﬁrst
phoneme /k/ and predict that it should be a noun at the
same time, or indeed predict the ﬁrst phoneme without
making any syntactic prediction at all. In summary, we
assume that the production system “intervenes” between
the implemented semantics and the implemented syntax,
and between the implemented syntax and the implemented
phonology, but we do not assume intervention in the
forward production model.
For example, a speaker might decide to describe a transi-
tive event. At this point, she constructs a forward model of
syntax, say [NP [V NP]VP]s, where NP refers to a noun
phrase, V a verb, VP a verb phrase, and S a sentence. This
forward model appears appropriate if the speaker knows
that transitive events are usually described by transitive con-
structions, a piece of information assumed in construction
grammar (Goldberg 1995), which associates constructions
with “general” meanings. The speaker can therefore make
this prediction before having decided on other aspects of
the semantics of the utterance, thus allowing the syntactic
prediction to be ready before the implemented semantics.
At a more abstract level, consider when the speaker
wishes to refer to something in common ground (but not
highly focused). On the basis of extensive experience, she
can predict that the utterance will have the semantics deﬁ-
nite nominal, the syntax [Det N]NP –where Det refers to a
determiner,N a noun, andNP a noun phrase – and the pho-
nology starting with /ðe/; she may also predict that she will
start uttering the noun in 200 ms.
This approach might underlie choice of syntactic struc-
ture during production. For example, speakers of English
favor producing short constituents before long ones (e.g.,
Hawkins 1994). To do this, they might start constructing
short and long constituents at the same time but tend to
produce short ones ﬁrst because they are ready ﬁrst (see
Ferreira 1996). However, this appears to be inefﬁcient
because it would lead to sharp increases in processing dif-
ﬁculty at speciﬁc points (here, when producing the short
phrase), and would therefore work against a preference
for uniform information density during production
(Jaeger 2010, p. 25). It would mean that the long phrase
would often be ready much too early, and would incorrectly
predict that blend errors should be very common.
Alternatively, the speaker could decide to describe a
complex event and a simple event. She uses forward mod-
eling to predict that the complex event will require a heavy
phrase and the simple event a light phrase. She then evokes
the “short before long” principle, and uses it to convert the
simple event into a light phrase (using the production
implementer). She can then wait till quite near the end
of the phrase before beginning to produce the heavy
phrase (again, using the implementer). In this way, she
keeps information density fairly constant, prevents blend-
ing errors, and reduces memory load.
Just as in action, the speaker “tunes” the forward model
based on experience speaking. If she has repeatedly formu-
lated the intention to refer to a kite concept and then
uttered the phoneme /k/, she will start to construct an
accurate forward model (p^ phon
 
tð Þ ¼ =k=) when she
next decides to refer to such a concept. If she then con-
structs an incorrect phonological representation (e.g.,
p phon
 
tð Þ ¼ =g=), the monitor will likely immediately
notice the mismatch between these two representations.
If she believes the forward model is accurate, she will
detect a speech error, perhaps reformulate, and modify
her production implementer for subsequent utterances;
if she believes that it may not be accurate, she will not
reformulate but will alter her forward model accordingly
(cf. Wolpert et al. 2001).
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Evidence from speech production. There is good evi-
dence for use of forward perceptual models during
speech production. In a magnetoencephalography (MEG)
study, Heinks-Maldonado et al. (2006) found that the
M100 was reduced when people spoke and concurrently
listened to their own unaltered speech versus a pitch-
shifted distortion of the speech. We assume that they con-
struct a predicted phonological percept, c^ phon
 
tð Þ. This
typically matches their phonological percept (c[phon](t))
and thus suppresses the M100 (i.e., via reafference cancel-
lation). But when the actual speech is distorted, the percept
and the predicted percept do not match, and thus the
M100 is enhanced. (The M100 could not reﬂect distorted
speech itself as it was not enhanced when distorted
speech was replayed to the speakers.) The rapidity of the
effect suggests that speakers could not be comprehending
what they heard and comparing this to their memory of
their planned utterance. Additionally, Tian and Poeppel
(2010) had participants produce or imagine producing a syl-
lable, and found the same rapid MEG response in auditory
cortex in both conditions. This suggests that speakers con-
struct a forward model incorporating phonological infor-
mation under conditions when they do not speak (i.e., do
not use the production implementer).
Tourville et al. (2008) had participants read aloud mono-
syllabic words while recording fMRI. On a small proportion
of trials, participants’ auditory feedback was distorted by
shifting the ﬁrst formant either up or down. Participants
compensated by shifting their speech in the opposite direc-
tion within 100 ms. Such rapid compensation is a hallmark
of feedforward (predictive) monitoring (as correction fol-
lowing feedback would be too slow). Moreover, the fMRI
results identiﬁed a network of neurons coding mismatches
between expected and actual auditory signals. These three
studies therefore provide clear evidence for forward
models in speech production. In fact, Tourville and
Guenther (2011) described a speciﬁc implementation of
such forward-model-based monitoring in the context of
their Directions into Velocities of Articulators (DIVA)
and Gradient Order DIVA (GODIVA) models of speech
production. However, these data and implementations do
not relate to the full set of stages involved in language
production.
Language production and self-monitoring. In psycholin-
guistics, well-established accounts of language production
(e.g., Bock & Levelt 1994; Dell 1986; Garrett 1980; Hart-
suiker & Kolk, 2001; Levelt 1989; Levelt et al. 1999) make
no reference to forward modeling, and instead debate the
operations of the production implementer (see top line in
Fig. 4). They tend to assume that self-monitoring uses
the comprehension system. Levelt (1989) proposed that
people can monitor what they utter (using an external
loop) and thus repair errors. But he noted that they also
make many repairs before completing the word, as in to
the ye– to the orange node, where it is clear that they
were going to utter yellow (Levelt 1983), and show
arousal when they are about to utter a taboo word but do
not do so (Motley et al. 1975). Levelt therefore proposed
that speakers construct a sound-based representation (orig-
inally phonetic, but phonological in Wheeldon & Levelt
1995) and input that representation directly into the com-
prehension system (using an internal loop). Note that
other accounts have assumed monitoring that is more
limited (e.g., suggesting that some evidence for monitoring
is in fact due to feedback in the production system; Dell
1986). The accounts do not, however, deny the existence
of a comprehension-based monitor.
However, alternative accounts have assumed that at least
some monitoring can be “internal” to language production
(e.g., Laver 1980; Schlenck et al. 1987; Van Wijk &
Kempen 1987; see Postma 2000). Such monitoring could
involve the comparison of different aspects of implemented
production – for example, if the process is redundantly orga-
nized and a problem is noted if the outputs do not match
(see Schlenck et al. 1987). Alternatively, it could register a
problem if there is high conﬂict between potential words
or phonemes (Nozari et al. 2011). Our account makes the
rather different claim that the monitor compares the
output of implemented production (the utterance percept)
with the output of the forward model (the predicted utter-
ance percept).9
Of course, speakers clearly can perform comprehension-
based monitoring using the external loop and indeed may
be able to perform it using the internal loop as well. But a
purely comprehension-based account cannot explain the
data from Heinks-Maldonado et al. (2006) and Tourville
et al. (2008). In addition, such an account has difﬁculty
explaining the timing of error detection. To correct to
the ye– to the orange node, the speaker prepares for
p[phon](t) for yellow, converts it into c[phon](t), uses com-
prehension to construct c[sem](t), judges that c[sem](t) is
not appropriate (i.e., it is incompatible with p[sem](t) or it
does not make sense in the context), and manages to stop
speaking, before she articulates more than ye–. Given Inde-
frey and Levelt’s (2004) estimates, the speaker has about
145 ms plus the time to utter ye–, which is arguably less
than the time it takes to comprehend a word (e.g., Levelt
1989). Speakers might therefore make use of a “buffer” to
store intermediate representations and delay phonetic encod-
ing and articulation (e.g., Blackmer & Mitton 1991), but this
is unlikely given that they speed up the process of monitoring
and repair when speaking faster (see Postma 2000).
Such ﬁndings appear incompatible with a purely com-
prehension-based approach to monitoring.10 In addition,
Nozari et al. (2011) argued that nonspeakers may be able
to use the internal loop (as in Wheeldon & Levelt 1995),
but that speakers would face the extreme complexity of
simultaneously comprehending different parts of an utter-
ance with the internal and the external loops (see also Vig-
liocco & Hartsuiker 2002). They also noted that there is
much evidence for a dissociation between comprehension
and self-monitoring in aphasic patients.
Huettig and Hartsuiker (2010) monitored speakers’ eye
movements while speakers referred to one of four objects
in an array. The array contained an object whose name was
phonologically related to the name of the target object. In
comprehension experiments, people tend to look at such
phonological competitors more than unrelated objects (Allo-
pena et al. 1998). Huettig and Hartsuiker found that their
speakers also tended to look at competitors after they had
produced the target word. This suggests that they monitored
their speech using the comprehension system. They did not,
however, look at competitors while producing the target
word, which suggests that they did not use a comprehen-
sion-based monitor of a phonological representation.
Huettig andHartsuiker’s ﬁndings therefore imply that speak-
ers ﬁrst monitor using a forward model (as we propose) but
can later perform comprehension-based monitoring.
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Accounts using an internal loop imply that phonological
errors should be detected before semantic errors (assuming
that both forms of detection are equally difﬁcult). In con-
trast, our account claims that speakers construct the pre-
dicted semantic, syntactic, and phonological percepts
early. Speakers then construct the semantic percept and
compare it with the predicted semantic percept; then
they construct the syntactic percept and compare it with
the predicted syntactic percept; ﬁnally, speakers construct
the phonological percept and compare it with the predicted
phonological percept. Thus, they should detect semantic
errors before syntactic errors, and detect syntactic errors
before phonological errors.11,12
3.2. Covert imitation and forward modeling in language
comprehension
We now propose an account of prediction during language
comprehension that incorporates the account of prediction
during language production (see Fig. 5) in the same way
that the account of prediction during action perception
(see Fig. 3) incorporates the account of prediction during
action (see Fig. 2). This account of prediction during
language comprehension assumes that people make use
of their ability to predict aspects of their own utterances
to predict other people’s utterances. Of course, language
comprehension involves structured linguistic represen-
tations (semantics, syntax, and phonology), and different
predictions can be made at different levels. Hence predic-
tion is very powerful, because it is often the case that
language is highly predictable at one linguistic level at
least. An upcoming content word is sometimes predictable.
Often, a syntactic category can be predicted when the word
itself cannot. On other occasions, the upcoming phoneme
is predictable. We propose that comprehenders make
whatever linguistic predictions they can.
We assume that people can predict language using the
association route and the simulation route. The association
route is based on experience in comprehending others’
utterances. A comparable mechanism could be used to
predict upcoming natural sounds (e.g., of a wave crashing
against rocks). The simulation route is based on experience
producing utterances. As in action perception, the simplest
possibility is that the comprehender works out what he
would say under the circumstances more quickly than the
producer speaks, using a forward model. But just as with
action perception, he needs to be able to represent what
the speaker would say, not what he himself would say,
and to do this, he needs to take into account the context.
We illustrate the model in Figure 6, in which the compre-
hender A covertly imitates B’s unfolding utterance (at
time t) and uses forward modeling to derive the predicted
utterance percept, which can then be compared with
A’s percept of B’s actual utterance (at time t + 1). Note
that this account differs from Pickering and Garrod
(2007), in which the comprehender simply predicts what
he would say (and where these representations are not
impoverished). Other-monitoring can take place at differ-
ent linguistic levels, just like self-monitoring.
We now illustrate this account using a situation in which
A (a boy) and B (a girl) have been given presents of an air-
plane and a kite respectively. B utters I want to go out and
ﬂy the. It is of course highly likely that B will say kite, which
has p[sem,syn,phon]B (t+1) = [KITE, noun, /kaIt/]. The
utterance at time t is the semantics, syntax, and phonology
of I want to go out and ﬂy the. To predict the situation at
time t + 1, A covertly imitates B’s production of I want to
go out and ﬂy the, and derives the production command
that A would use to produce this utterance. A then
derives the production command that A would use to
produce the word that B would likely say (kite) and runs
his forward models to derive his predicted utterance
percept. If A feels sufﬁciently certain of what B is likely
to say, A can act on this prediction – for example, looking
for a kite before B actually says kite. In addition, A can
compare his prediction of what B will say with what B actu-
ally says using the monitor. In this case, A has no access to
B’s representations during production, and therefore
derives the utterance percept from B’s actual utterance.
This means that A will access B’s phonology before B’s
semantics. In this respect, other-monitoring is different
from self-monitoring.
Importantly, A derives the production command of what
A assumes B is likely to say (i.e., kite), rather than what A
himself would be likely to say (i.e., airplane). This is the
effect of using context together with the inverse model. It
is consistent with the ﬁnding that comprehenders often
pay attention to the speaker’s state of knowledge (e.g.,
Hanna et al. 2003; Metzing & Brennan 2003). However,
comprehenders also show some “egocentric biases” (e.g.,
Keysar et al. 2000), a ﬁnding which is expected given that
the comprehender’s use of context cannot be perfect.
Note also that predictions are driven by the forward pro-
duction model, not by the production system itself. The
production system would normally be too slow, given that
the speaker should be at least as aware of what she is
trying to say as the listener is. Use of the forward model
also tends to cause some co-activation of the production
system (as is typically the case when forward models are
constructed). Such activation is not central to prediction-
by-simulation, but can lead to interference between pro-
duction and comprehension, and serves as the basis for
overt imitation (see “Overt responses” in Fig. 6).
Note that Glenberg and Gallese (2012) recently pro-
posed an Action Based Language (ABL) model of acqui-
sition and comprehension that also uses paired inverse
and forward models as in MOSAIC. The primary goal of
ABL is to account for the content (rather than form) of
language understanding, with language comprehension
leading to the activation of action-based (embodied) rep-
resentations. To do this, they speciﬁcally draw on evidence
from mirror-neuron systems (see sect. 4).
To assess our account, we discuss the evidence that com-
prehenders make predictions, that they covertly imitate
what they hear, and that covert imitation leads to prediction
that facilitates comprehension.
3.2.1. Evidence for prediction. A great deal of evidence
shows that people predict other people’s language (see
Kutas et al. 2011 and Pickering & Garrod 2007, for
reviews). This evidence is compatible with probabilistic
models of language comprehension (e.g., Hale 2006;
Levy 2008), models of complexity that incorporate predic-
tion (Gibson 1998), and accounts based on simple recur-
rent networks (Elman 1990; see also Altmann & Mirkovic
2009). But much of the evidence also provides support
for aspects of the account in Figure 6.
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First, prediction occurs at different linguistic levels.
Some research shows prediction of phonology (or associ-
ated visual or orthographic information). Delong et al.
(2005) recorded ERPs while participants read sentences
such as The day was breezy so the boy went outside to
ﬂy… They showed an N400 effect when the sentence
ended with the less predictable an airplane than the
more predictable a kite. The striking ﬁnding was that this
effect occurred at a or an. It could not relate to ease of inte-
gration but must have involved prediction of the word and
its phonological form (i.e., that it began with a consonant).
Vissers et al. (2006) found evidence of disruption when a
highly predictable word was misspelled, presumably
because it clashed with the predicted orthographic rep-
resentation of the correct word.
Other experiments show prediction of syntax. Van
Berkum et al. (2005) found disruption when Dutch
readers and listeners encountered an adjective that did
not agree in grammatical gender with an upcoming,
highly predictable noun. Staub and Clifton (2006) found
that people read or the subway faster after The team took
either the train …than after The team took the train …
In fact, either makes the sentence more predictable by
ruling out an analysis in which or starts a new clause. Simi-
larly, early syntactic anomaly effects in the ERP record are
affected by whether the linguistic context predicts a par-
ticular syntactic category for the upcoming word or
whether the linguistic context is compatible with different
syntactic categories (Lau et al. 2006), and reading times
are affected by predicted syntactic structure associated
with ellipsis (Yoshida et al. 2013).
Clear evidence for semantic prediction comes from eye-
tracking studies in which participants listened to sentences
while viewing arrays of objects or depictions of events. They
started looking at edible objects more than at inedible
objects while hearing the man ate the (but not when ate
was replaced with moved; Altmann & Kamide 1999).
These predictive eye movements do not just depend on
the meaning (or lexical associates) of the verb, but are
affected by properties of the prior context (Kaiser & Trues-
well 2004; Kamide et al. 2003) or other linguistic infor-
mation such as prosody (Weber et al. 2006). People also
predict the upcoming event as well as the upcoming refer-
ent (Knoeferle et al. 2005).
Figure 6. A model of the simulation route to prediction during comprehension in Person A. Everything above the solid line refers to B’s
unfolding utterance (and is underlined). A predicts B’s utterance p[sem,syn,phon]B (t+1) (i.e., its upcoming semantics, syntax, and
phonology) given B’s utterance (i.e., at the present time t). To do this, A ﬁrst covertly imitates B’s utterance. This involves deriving a
representation of the utterance percept, and then using the inverse model and context (e.g., information about differences between
A’s speech system and B’s speech system) to derive the production command iB(t) that A would use if A were to produce B’s
utterance and from this the production command iB(t+1) associated with the next part of B’s utterance (e.g., phoneme or word). A
now uses the same forward modeling as she does when producing an utterance (see Fig. 4) to produce her predictions of B’s
utterance and of B’s utterance percept (at different linguistic levels). These predictions are typically ready before her comprehension
of B’s utterance (the utterance percept). She can then compare the utterance percept and the predicted utterance percept at
different linguistic levels (and therefore performs other-monitoring). Notice that A can also use the derived production command
iB(t) to overtly imitate B’s utterance and the derived production command iB(t+1) to overtly produce the subsequent part of
B’s utterance (see “Overt responses”).
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Some of these studies do not clearly demonstrate that
the predictions are used more rapidly than would be poss-
ible with the production implementer. The eye-tracking
studies reveal faster predictions, but they may show predic-
tion of semantics (e.g., edible things) rather than a word
(e.g., cake). However, recent MEG evidence shows sensi-
tivity to syntactic manipulations in little over 100 ms, in
visual cortex (Dikker et al. 2009; 2010). For example, the
M100 was affected by predictability when the upcoming
word looked like a typical noun (e.g., soda) but not when
it did not (e.g., infant). Presumably, these results cannot
be due to integration, because activation of the grammati-
cal category of this word (as part of the process of lexical
access) could not occur so rapidly or in an area associated
with visual form. Instead, the comprehender must predict
both syntactic categories and the form most likely associ-
ated with those categories, then match those predictions
against the upcoming word. Given that syntactic processing
does not take place in the visual cortex (or indeed so
quickly), these results reﬂect the visual correlates of syntac-
tic predictions. They suggest that the comprehender con-
structs a forward model of visual properties (presumably
closely linked to phonological properties) on the basis of
sentence context and can compare these predicted visual
properties with the input within around 100 ms.
Dikker and Pylkkänen (2011) found evidence for form
prediction on the basis of semantics. Participants saw a
picture followed by a noun phrase that matched (or mis-
matched) the speciﬁc item in the picture (e.g., an apple)
or the semantic ﬁeld (e.g., a collection of food). They
found an M100 effect in visual cortex associated with
matching the speciﬁc item but not the semantic ﬁeld,
suggesting that participants predicted the form of the
speciﬁc word.
Kim and Lai (2012) conducted a similar study to Vissers
et al. (2006) and found a P130 effect for contextually sup-
ported pseudowords (e.g.,… bake a ceke) but not for non-
supported pseudowords (e.g., bake a tont). In contrast, an
N170 effect occurred for nonsupported pseudowords
(and nonwords). The N170 may relate to lexical access,
but the P130 occurs before lexical access can have occurred
and again appears to reﬂect a forward model, in which the
comprehender predicts the form of the word (cake) and
matches the input to that form.13 In conclusion, these
four studies support forward modeling, but they do not dis-
criminate between prediction-by-simulation and predic-
tion-by-association.
3.2.2. Evidence for covert imitation. Much evidence
suggests that comprehenders activate mechanisms associ-
ated with aspects of language production. As we have
noted, there appear to be integrated circuits associated
with production and comprehension (Pulvermüller &
Fadiga 2010). For example, the lateral part of the precen-
tral cortex is active when listening to /p/ and producing /p/,
whereas the inferior precentral area is active when listening
to /t/ and producing /t/ (Pulvermüller et al. 2006; see also
Vigneau et al. 2006; Wilson et al. 2004). We have also
noted that tongue and lip muscles are activated during lis-
tening to speech but not other sounds (Fadiga et al. 2002;
Watkins et al. 2003). More speciﬁcally, Yuen et al. (2010)
found that listening to incongruent /t/-initial distracters
leaves articulatory traces on simultaneous production of
/k/ or /s/ phonemes, in the form of increased alveolar
contact. Furthermore, this effect only occurred with incon-
gruent distracters and not with distinct but congruent dis-
tracters (e.g., /g/-initial distracters when producing /k/).
These results suggest that perceiving speech results in
selective, covert, and automatic activation of the speech
articulators. Note that these ﬁndings show activation of
the production implementer (not a forward model).
There is also much evidence for both overt imitation and
overt completion. Speakers tend to imitate the speech of
other people after they have comprehended it (see Picker-
ing & Garrod 2004), and to repeat each other’s choice of
words and semantics (Garrod & Anderson 1987), syntax
(Branigan et al. 2000), and sound (Pardo 2006). Such imi-
tation can be rapid and apparently automatic; for instance,
speakers are almost as quick imitating a phoneme as they
are making a simple response to it (Fowler et al. 2003).
Speakers also tend to complete others’ utterances. For
example, Wright and Garrett (1984; see also Peterson
et al. 2001) found that participants were faster at naming
a word that was syntactically congruent with prior context
than a word that was incongruent (even though neither
word was semantically appropriate). Moreover, people reg-
ularly complete each other’s utterances during dialogue
(e.g., 1a-c presented in sect. 1.1); see, for example, Clark
and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986). Rapid overt imitation and overt
completion are of course compatible with prior covert imi-
tation (see “Overt responses” in Fig. 6).
3.2.3. Evidence that covert imitation facilitates compre-
hension via prediction. The previous sections presented
evidence that comprehenders make rapid predictions and
that they covertly imitate what they hear. But are imitating
and predicting causally linked in the way suggested in
Figure 6? The evidence for prediction could involve the
association route. In addition, covert imitation of language
could be used postdictively, to facilitate memory (as a com-
ponent of rehearsal) or to assist when comprehension leads
to incomplete analyses or fails to resolve an ambiguity (see
Garrett 2000).
Recent evidence, however, suggests that covert imitation
drives predictions that facilitate comprehension. Adank and
Devlin (2010) used fMRI to show that during adaptation to
time-compressed speech there was increased activation in
the left ventral premotor cortex, an area concerned with
planning articulation. This suggests that participants cov-
ertly imitated the compressed speech as part of the adap-
tation process that facilitates comprehension. Adank et al.
(2010) found that overt imitation of sentences in an unfami-
liar accent facilitated comprehension of subsequent sen-
tences in that accent, in the context of noise. This
suggests that overt imitation adapts the production system
to an unfamiliar accent and therefore that the production
system plays an immediate causal role in comprehension.
Ito et al. (2009) manipulated listeners’ cheeks as they
heard words on a continuum between had and head.
When the skin of the cheek was stretched upward, listeners
reported hearing head in preference to had; when the skin
was stretched downward, they reported hearing had in pre-
ference to head. Because production of had requires an
upward stretch of cheek skin and production of head a down-
ward stretch, the results suggest that proprioceptive feed-
back from the articulators causally affected comprehension
(see also Sams et al. 2005). These results could conceivably
be postdictive, perhaps relating to reconstruction occurring
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during self-report. Clearer evidence comes from Möttö-
nen and Watkins (2009), who used repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to temporarily disrupt
speciﬁc articulator representations during speech percep-
tion. Disrupting lip representations in left primary motor
cortex impaired categorical perception of speech sounds
involving the lips (e.g., /ba/-/da/), but not the perception
of sounds involving other articulators (e.g., /ka/-/ga/). Fur-
thermore, D’Ausilio et al. (2009) found that double-pulse
TMS administered to the part of the motor cortex control-
ling lip movements speeded up and increased accuracy of
responses to lip-articulated phonemes, whereas TMS
administered to the part of the motor cortex controlling
tongue movements speeded up and increased accuracy
of responses to tongue-articulated phonemes. More
recently, D’Ausilio et al. (2011) had participants repeat-
edly hear a pseudoword (e.g., birro) and used TMS to
reveal immediate appropriate articulatory activation
(associated with rr) if they heard the ﬁrst part of the
same word (bi, when co-articulated with rro) than if
they heard the ﬁrst part of a different word (bi, when
co-articulated with ffo). Thus, covert imitation facilitates
speech recognition as it occurs and before it occurs.
A different type of evidence comes from Stephens et al.
(2010), who correlated cortical blood-oxygen-level-depen-
dent (BOLD) signal changes between speakers and listen-
ers during the course of a narrative. There was aligned
neural activation in many cortical areas at different lags.
Sometimes the speaker’s neural activity preceded that of
the listener, but sometimes the listener’s activity preceded
that of the speaker. Importantly, listeners whose activity
preceded that of the speaker showed better comprehen-
sion, suggesting that covert imitation led to prediction
and that this prediction facilitated comprehension.
Finally, speakers may use the production system to
predict upcoming words (and events) in relation to
scenes. In “visual world” experiments, participants activate
the phonology associated with the names of the objects (see
Huettig et al. 2011). For example, Huettig and McQueen
(2007) had participants listen to a sentence and found that
they looked at a picture whose name was phonologically
related to a target word (cf. Allopena et al. 1998) when
they viewed the pictures for 2–3 s before hearing the target
word but not when they viewed the pictures for 200 ms. In
the former case, they presumably had enough time to
access the phonological form of the name of the picture.
These studies therefore show that the results of covert imi-
tation have immediate effects on comprehension as a result
of prediction.Moreover, we have shown that covert imitation
and prediction take place at many linguistic levels. Together,
all of these ﬁndings provide support for the model of predic-
tion-by-simulation in Figure 6. Of course, comprehenders
may also perform prediction-by-association, just as they can
for predicting nonlinguistic events.
3.3. Interactive language
Interactive conversation is a highly successful form of joint
activity. It appears to be very complex, with interlocutors
having to switch between production and comprehension,
perform both acts at once, and develop their plans on the
ﬂy (Garrod & Pickering 2004). Just as we explained joint
actions by combining the accounts of action and action
perception (see Fig. 4), so we explain conversation by com-
bining the accounts of language production and compre-
hension (as in Figs. 5 and 6).
Figure 7 shows how both A and B can predict B’s
upcoming utterance (using prediction-by-simulation). A
comprehends B’s current utterance and then uses covert
imitation and forward modeling; B formulates his forth-
coming production command and uses forward modeling
based on that command. If A and B are successful, they
should make similar predictions about B’s upcoming utter-
ance, and they can use those predictions to coordinate (i.e.,
have a well-organized conversation). Note that they can
both compare their predictions with B’s forthcoming
Figure 7. A and B predicting B’s forthcoming utterance (with B’s processes and representations underlined). B’s production command
iB(t) feeds into B’s production implementer and leads to B’s utterance p[sem,syn,phon]B (t). A covertly imitates B’s utterance and uses A’s
forward production model to predict B’s forthcoming utterance (at time t+1). B simultaneously constructs the next production command
(the dotted line indicates that this command is causally linked to the previous action command for B but not A) and uses B’s forward
production model to predict B’s forthcoming utterance. If A and B are coordinated, then A’s prediction of B’s utterance and B’s
prediction of B’s utterance (in the dotted box) should match. Moreover, they may both match B’s forthcoming (actual) utterance at
time t+1 (not shown).
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utterance when produced, with A using other-monitoring
and B using self-monitoring. In addition, A and B can
also predict A’s forthcoming utterance (so both A and B
predict both A and B). Of course, these predictions will
be related to A’s and B’s predictions of B’s utterance
(e.g., both of them might predict both A’s upcoming
word and B’s response following that word), in a way that
will reduce the difﬁculty of making two predictions.
Our account can explain how interlocutors can be so well
coordinated – for example, why intervals between turns are
so close to 0 ms (Sacks et al. 1974; Wilson & Wilson 2005)
and why interlocutors are so good at using the content of
utterances to predict when they are likely to end (de
Ruiter et al. 2006). Moreover, it accords with the treatment
of dialogue as coordinated joint activity, in which partners
are able to take different roles as appropriate (Clark
1996). It can also explain the existence and speed of com-
pletions, overt imitation (e.g., Branigan et al. 2000;
Fowler et al. 2003; Garrod & Anderson 1987), and (assum-
ing links between intentions) rapid complementary
responses (as in answers to questions).
We illustrate with the following extract (adapted from
Howes et al. 2011):
2a – A:… and then we looked along one deck, we were high up,
and down below there were rows of, rows of lifeboats in case,
you see,
2b –B: –there was an accident
2c – A: –of an accident
In (2b–c), B speaks at the same time as A and has a similar
understanding to A. B interrupts A, and it is clear that B
must be as ready to contribute as A. Because B completes
A’s utterance without delay, it would not be possible for B
to produce (2b) by comprehending (2a) and then preparing
a response “from scratch,” as traditional “serial monologue”
accounts assume (see Fig. 1). Instead, we assume that B cov-
ertly imitates A’s utterance, determines A’s current pro-
duction command, determines A’s forthcoming production
command, and produces an overt completion (see “Overt
responses” in Fig. 6). Thus B’s response is time-locked to
A’s contribution. In fact, (2b) is different from A’s own con-
tinuation (2c). The two continuations are syntactically differ-
ent (though both grammatical) but semantically equivalent,
thereby indicating that prediction can occur differently at
different linguistic levels. Note that prediction-by-associ-
ation might allow B to predict A’s continuation, but would
not explain the rapidity of B’s response, as B would also
have to produce the continuation “from scratch.”
During conversation, interlocutors tend to become
aligned with each other at different linguistic levels, and
such alignment appears to underlie mutual understanding
(Pickering & Garrod 2004). Our account can help explain
this process, because the close link between production
and comprehension leads to tightly yoked representations
for comprehension and production, and allows those rep-
resentations to be used extremely rapidly (see Garrod &
Pickering 2009). Note, however, that the relationship also
works the other way: Prediction during comprehension is
facilitated when the interlocutors are well-aligned,
because the comprehender is more likely to predict the
speaker accurately (and the speaker is more likely to
predict the comprehender’s response, as in question-
answering). One effect of this is that B’s prediction of
what A is going to say is more likely to accord with what
B would be likely to say if B spoke at that point. In other
words, B’s prediction of B’s completion becomes a good
proxy for B’s prediction of A’s completion, and so there is
less likelihood of an egocentric bias.14 In fact, linguistic
joint action is more likely to be successful and well-coordi-
nated than many other forms of joint action, precisely
because the interlocutors communicate with each other
and share the goal of mutual understanding.
4. General Discussion
Our accounts of comprehension and dialogue assign a
central role to simulation. We discuss three aspects of
simulation: the relationship between “online” and “ofﬂine”
simulation, between prediction-by-simulation and predic-
tion-by-association, and between simulation and embodi-
ment. We conclude by explaining how our account provides
an integrated theory of production and comprehension.
We have focused on online simulation, when the com-
prehender wishes to predict the speaker in real time.
However, our notion of simulation is compatible with the
simulation theory of mind-reading (Goldman 2006; see
Gordon 1986), which is primarily used to explain ofﬂine
understanding of others. In our account, the comprehen-
der “enters” the simulation during covert imitation, and
“exits” after constructing the predicted utterance percept
(see Fig. 6). As in our account, Goldman assumed that
people covertly imitate as though they were character
acting – attempting to resemble their target as much as
possible, and then running things forward as well as they
can. This means that the derived action command is “sup-
posed” to be the action command of the target, but it incor-
porates any changes that are required because of bodily
differences. (I can walk like Napoleon by putting my hand
inside my jacket and seeing how this affects my gait, but I
cannot shrink.) In addition, the perceiver may fail to
derive the actor’s action command correctly, in which case
her covert imitation is biased toward her own proclivities.
The important difference between such accounts and ours
is that they do not assume forward models and therefore
assume that covert imitation uses the action implementer
(but inhibiting overt responses). This may be appropriate
for ofﬂine reasoning but is too slow for prediction (see
Goldman 2006, pp. 213–17; Hurley 2008b). Goldman’s
account uses simulation as an alternative to constructing a
theory of the other person’s mind. In contrast, our account
uses simulation to facilitate processing, which is particularly
important when behavior is rapid (as in Grush 2004; Prinz
2006). Clearly, this is the case for language processing.
However, prediction-by-simulation can also be applied
ofﬂine as part of the process of thinking and planning (as
indeed can prediction-by-association). For example, a
speaker might think about the likely consequences of pro-
ducing a particular utterance, both for her own subsequent
utterances and perhaps more important for the responses
that addressees are likely to produce. She might do this
by constructing a predicted utterance percept, using
forward modeling. She could also construct an utterance
percept (without articulating), using the production imple-
menter and comprehension implementer (see top right of
Fig. 5 and discussion in sect. 3.1), as she would typically
have enough time to do so. Assuming co-activation,
ofﬂine predictions may often involve both the production
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implementer and forward modeling. See Pezzulo (2011a)
for a related discussion.
Our account assigns a central role to prediction-by-simu-
lation, but it assumes that language comprehension and
dialogue also involve prediction-by-association. We
propose that comprehenders will emphasize simulation
when they are (or appear to be) similar to the speaker
because simulation will tend to be accurate. These simi-
larities might relate to cultural or educational background
or dialect, or, alternatively, to speed or style of language pro-
cessing. In addition, simulation will be emphasized during
dialogue because the interlocutors will tend to become
aligned (Pickering & Garrod 2004), and simulation will
tend to persist among those in close relationships (who con-
tinue to be aligned). In addition, simulation may also be
primed during dialogue, because the fact that the compre-
hender also has to speak may activate mechanisms associated
with production. In contrast, prediction-by-association will
be emphasized when the comprehender is less similar to
the producer, as for example when the comprehender is a
native adult speaker of the language and the producer is a
nonnative speaker or a child, or when the comprehender
does not have the opportunity to speak (as in reading).
We therefore assume that comprehenders emphasize
whichever route is likely to be more accurate (given that
they should both be fast enough). It may also be that pre-
diction-by-association is more accurate for simple, “one-
step” associations between a current and a subsequent
state. For example, people can straightforwardly predict
that a person who looks confused is likely to respond
slowly. In contrast, prediction-by-simulation is likely to be
more complex, because it makes use of the structure
inherent in the speaker’s own production mechanisms.
Of course, comprehenders may combine prediction-by-
simulation and prediction-by-association. They make use
of the same representational vocabulary and hence the
mental states are the same; the association route simply
involves a different (and more straightforward) set of map-
pings than the simulation route. Informally, for example, if
I see that you are about to speak, I can predict your utter-
ances by combining my experiences of how people like you
have spoken and my experiences of how I have spoken
under similar circumstances.
There is a lot of current interest in the extent to which
language is embodied (see Barsalou 1999; Fischer &
Zwaan 2008). Such literature focuses on embodiment of
content, in which the conceptual content of language is
represented in “modal” (i.e., action-based or perceptual)
terms (e.g., kick is represented in terms of the movements
associated with kicking). It is supported by strong evidence
from behavioral experiments (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak
2002) and cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Desai et al. 2010).
In contrast, our account is concerned with embodiment
of form, which Gallese (2008) called the vehicle level. It
assumes that comprehension involves aspects of pro-
duction, which is a form of action; by deﬁnition, production
is embodied at the form level. Interestingly, Glenberg and
Gallese (2012) used covert imitation and prediction in an
account primarily concerned with content embodiment.
They explained why representational gesture tends to co-
occur with speech by arguing that speaking activates the
corresponding action and that the need to perform the
action of articulation prevents the inhibition of related ges-
tural actions (see Hostetter & Alibali 2008).
Both our account and embodied accounts seek to
abandon the “cognitive sandwich” (Hurley 2008a). Our
account assumes that producers use comprehension pro-
cesses and comprehenders use production processes,
whereas embodied accounts assume that producers and
comprehenders use perceptual and motor representations
associated with the meaning of what they are communicat-
ing. Our account does not require such embodiment but is
compatible with it.
5. Conclusion
Traditional accounts of language assume separate proces-
sing “streams” for production and comprehension. They
adopt the “cognitive sandwich,” a perspective that is incom-
patible both with the demands of communication and with
extensive data indicating that production and comprehen-
sion are tightly interwoven. We therefore propose an
account of language processing that abandons the cognitive
sandwich. This account assumes a central role to prediction
in language production, comprehension, and dialogue. By
building on research in action and action perception, we
propose that speakers use forward models to predict
aspects of their upcoming utterances and listeners covertly
imitate speakers and then use forward models based on
their own potential utterances to predict what the speakers
are likely to say. The account helps explain the rapidity of
production and comprehension and the remarkable
ﬂuency of dialogue. It thereby provides the basis for a
psychological account of human communication.
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NOTES
1. The meat is “amodal” in the sense that its representations
are couched in terms of abstract symbols rather than in terms of
bodily movements (see section 4).
2. Nothing hinges on this particular “traditional” set of levels.
For example, it may be correct to distinguish logical form from
semantics, or phonetics from phonology.
3. Note that a mapping from semantics to phonology would be
a production process, and a mapping from phonology to semantics
would be a comprehension process. Some researchers argue that
levels can be “skipped” in comprehension (e.g., Ferreira 2003).
But mappings between phonology and semantics also occur for
other reasons: for example, to express the relationship between
emphasis (represented in the message level) and phonological
stress, or between meaning and sound in sound symbolism.
4. We assume that prediction is separate from action or per-
ception – that the processes involved in predicting action or per-
ception can at least in principle be distinguished from action or
perception itself. In this respect, our account differs from some
theories such as that by Elman (1990).
5. Our forward action model corresponds toWolpert’s forward
dynamic model, and our forward perception model corresponds to
his forward output model.
6. The perceiver also has to accommodate differences in per-
spective (e.g., when the actor is facing the perceiver). This type
of accommodation is less relevant to (spoken) language, so we
do not refer to it again.
7. Mirror neurons ﬁre during both action and perceiving an
action (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992), and they are of course
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compatible with covert imitation during perception. Most evi-
dence for mirror neurons is indirect in humans (e.g., activation
of action areas during perception), but Mukamel et al. (2010)
used intercranial electrodes to demonstrate widespread mirror
activity in Broca’s area of an epileptic patient.
8. We assume that speakers implement a level of semantics
during production that is distinct from the production command.
The production command includes a situation model that incorpor-
ates nonlinguistic information, whereas semantics is more akin to an
“LF” level of representation (e.g., incorporating quantiﬁer scope).
9. In fact, Wijnen and Kolk (2005) brieﬂy speculated about the
possible use of forward and inverse models in monitoring, making
reference to Wolpert’s proposals.
10. Note that Levelt (1989) assumed that there is appropriate-
ness monitoring that takes place over semantic representations,
and that there is no loop based on syntactic representations.
11. The predicted utterance percept must be represented
similarly to the utterance percept, in order that they can be com-
pared. Thus, we might expect speakers to have some awareness of
the predicted utterance percept as well as the utterance percept.
One possibility is that tip-of-the-tongue states constitute aware-
ness of the forward model (in cases when the production imple-
menter fails) rather than incompletely implemented production.
For example, the speaker may compute the forward model for
the ﬁrst phoneme (e.g., Brown & McNeill 1966) or grammatical
gender (Vigliocco et al. 1997).
12. Some evidence suggests that inner speech may be impo-
verished (Oppenheim & Dell 2008; 2010; though cf. Corley
et al. 2011). An intriguing possibility is that such impoverishment
reﬂects forward modeling rather than an abstract phonological
representation constructed by the production implementer.
13. Note that Kim and Lai interpreted their results as involving
interaction during early stages of lexical access, but this is not
necessary.
14. In fact, our account can explain why completions can be
compatible with the perspective of either of the interlocutors.
In (1), B said But have you … and A completed with burned
myself?, A’s completion takes A’s perspective (myself). However
A could have alternatively said burned yourself?, thus taking B’s
perspective (see sect. 1.1).
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Abstract: Knowledge of the complexity of human communication comes
from three main sources – (i) studies of the linguistics and
neuropsychology of dysfunction after brain injury; (ii) studies of the
development of social communication in infancy, and its dysfunction in
developmental psychopathologies; and (iii) the evolutionary history of
human communicative interaction. Together, these suggest the need for
a broad, integrated theory of communication of which language forms a
small but critical component.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) are correct in pointing out problems
with treating expressive and receptive language as the only separ-
able, distinct, and sufﬁcient components to human communi-
cation. Their own discussion of communication as a more
elaborated system involving personal action, action perception,
and joint action as inextricably linked and continuously interacting
components is a useful extension to this model. It is an advance on
the Markov-type linear analyses to which transcribed language
lends itself. Their proposal only begins to touch on the complex-
ities inherent in human communication and its evolution.
P&G have previously proposed that humans are “designed” for
dialogue, not for monologue (Garrod & Pickering 2009). Their
suggested model moves communicative analysis in this direction
but provides a rather simplistic approach that they have con-
trasted, somewhat quixotically, with an even simpler one.
Recent work on the functional neuroanatomy of language
suggests at the least that the expressive and receptive phonologi-
cal, syntactic, and semantic systems, although closely interlinked,
can be disambiguated (see, e.g., Ben Shalom & Poeppel 2008;
D’Ausilio et al. 2009; Sidtis & Sidtis 2003). Communicative inter-
action may also involve many nonlinguistic processes, including
proprioception (Sams et al. 2005) and interpersonal timing
(Richardson et al. 2007), not inherently linked to communicative
intent or content.
Some of the richness and complexity in the systems of human
communication have been highlighted through neuropsychological
analyses of what have been called disconnection syndromes (see
Catani & ffytche 2005). The approach has illuminated the impor-
tance of many nonlinguistic features as in the analysis of “emotional
dysprosodias” (Ross 1981; Van Lancker & Breitenstein 2000).
Functional neuroimaging is demonstrating the roles of distrib-
uted neural networks in human communication (Vigneau et al.
2006). The utility of this approach is being extended through
the development of explanatory models for conditions such as
the autistic spectrum disorders (ASDs; Geschwind & Levitt 2007).
Our capacity to understand the complex neural systems in
human communication at both the individual and the dyadic
level was limited until the development of functional magnetic
resonance imaging. Progress has been a function of the develop-
ment of technologies sufﬁcient to the task rather than through
advances in understanding per se. Methods to enable such inves-
tigation of the brain in interaction are being actively developed
(Schilbach et al. 2012; Schippers et al. 2010).
The need for a developmental perspective. The human infant
communicates with caregivers in part because of a range of evol-
utionary adaptations that are successful in engaging with those
around them to ensure their survival and in part because of
being reared in an environment that has co-evolved to nurture
their use of these adaptations. Language is a relatively recent
addition to this process that subsequently enables the rapid trans-
mission of knowledge and culture. This rapid transmission of
learning to the infant through acculturation by the caregiver is a
process seldom observed in other primates (Tomasello 2008).
The human infant is born largely neotenous but with an altricial
capacity to engage with caregivers in nonlinguistic forms of reci-
procal interaction. Examples are “interactional synchrony”
(Condon & Sander 1974); the bidirectional inﬂuence seen in
the patterning of interaction (Cohn & Tronick 1988); selective
preference for maternal voice (e.g., Hepper et al. 1993); imitation
of facial expressions (Meltzoff & Moore 1977), and the infant’s
ability to track the objects of others’ eye movements (Beier &
Spelke 2012; Navab et al. 2011). Many sensory systems are well
developed and involved in communication from tactile (Stack
2007) to the olfactory (Doucet et al. 2009).
It is becoming clear that these processes are neurobiological in
origin with individual variations in function arising in part through
transgenerational differences in early experience (see Barrett &
Fleming 2011).
Timing and prosody are essential features of communicative
interaction, and concepts such as vitality contours of interaction
and proto-narrative envelopes are helpful in better describing
both verbal and nonverbal interaction (see Stern 2010). Prosody
in speech is both language and culture dependent, as is neonatal
crying (Mampe et al. 2009), presumably through in utero vocal
exposure to maternal inﬂection patterns.
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In describing any contingent linguistic system of communi-
cation, we need to characterise the dyadic nonverbal mechanisms
that are its prerequisite base.
The evolution of human communication. The development of
more-complex communication in early Homo sapiens is likely to
have paralleled the selection pressure for the earlier birth of
less-mature infants that enabled more brain growth to occur
after birth and reduced the risks of mortality and morbidity to
mother and infant through childbirth (see Falk 2004). In conse-
quence, mothers were required to spend more time in caregiving
and became more dependent on other adults to support this
process. This was also made easier by the division of labour in
the production of food, clothing, and shelter, and by the use of
ﬁre for warmth and cooking (see Wrangham 2009).
Human communication cannot be simply reduced to a linguistic
means for epistemic exchange. Its ontological (Bråten 1998; Ger-
hardt 2004) and phylogenetic (Arbib 2012; Denton 2005; Panksepp
2004) origins are in the communication of basic affect such as
hunger, thirst, discomfort, threat, and affection (Feldman 2007).
The breadth of differing forms of human communication
suggests that it is the functional signiﬁcance of being able to com-
municate that is critical, and the speciﬁc form that this takes is of
secondary signiﬁcance. In terrestrial species, human language may
be unique in its complexity and its ability to convey certain types of
information, but there is tremendous variation in what can be con-
veyed. Similar discussions are also found regarding human music
(see, e.g., Fitch 2006), but for the same reasons evolutionary argu-
ments remain speculative.
To deconstruct communication into expressive and receptive
language and their associated actions is to deal only with a small
aspect of this far more complex but fundamental process
(Aitken 2008; Aitken & Trevarthen 1997; Trevarthen & Aitken
2001). Greater understanding of the processes involved in decon-
struction is likely to require more detailed analysis with, at the
least, the triadic modelling of communication’s functional com-
ponents (Fivaz-Depeursinge & Favez 2006; McHale et al.
2008), and the development of a robust methodology for what is
being called “second-person neuroscience” (Przyrembel et al.
2012; Schilbach et al. 2012). Incorporating these broader
aspects to communication will also require a broader appreciation
of human communication’s various components including the
contributions of the tactile, the olfactory, and the pansensory.
Many different assessment and assimilation approaches will be
needed to facilitate such analyses. Some have been developed and
can form the basis for a more comprehensive framework for the
understanding of human communication (see Anders et al.
2011; Delaherche et al. 2012).
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) put forward the interesting idea that
language production relies on forward modeling operating at multiple
processing levels. The evidence currently available to substantiate this
idea mostly concerns sensorimotor processes and not more abstract
linguistic levels (e.g., syntax, semantics, phonology). The predictions that
follow from the claim seem too general, in their current form, to guide
speciﬁc empirical tests.
A central aspect of Pickering &Garrod’s (P&G’s) target article is that
language production relies on forward modeling processes. These
are explicitly described as involving semantic, syntactic, and phono-
logical representations. Here we will attempt to challenge this aspect
of their proposal on two grounds: the evidence available for such a
claim, and the predictions that may follow from it.
P&G state that there is good evidence for the use of forward
models during speech production. This statement must be quali-
ﬁed or clariﬁed. The experimental evidence put forth relies on
quite speciﬁc language production situations (e.g., vowel articula-
tion or repeated production of very few simple and similar-sound-
ing words). Such linguistic speciﬁcity in the stimuli means that the
resulting data may not apply to evidence processes other than
articulatory motor control. It is dubious that the evidence provides
much information about semantic, syntactic, and possibly phono-
logical processes, either in the speech production implementer or
in the feedforward model.
Neurophysiological evidence supporting forward modeling in
speech production comes from intracranial-EEG studies
showing auditory cortex suppression during vocalization (Flinker
et al. 2010; Towle et al. 2008). In the visual system, well-identiﬁed
motor-visual pathways subserve a similar suppression of sensory
activity during eye movements (Sommer & Wurtz 2008). Conse-
quently, auditory suppression during speech is attributed to an
efference copy which exerts its inﬂuence from Broca’s area to
the auditory cortex via the inferior parietal lobe (Rauschecker &
Scott 2009; Tourville & Guenther 2011). Although there is ana-
tomical evidence for such a pathway (Frey et al. 2008), attempts
to test the functionality of this connection during speech have
proved inconclusive (Flinker et al. 2010; Towle et al. 2008). The
largely unclear matter of which motor-auditory pathway could
carry such an efference copy is not considered in the target
article. More generally, it is difﬁcult to foresee which pathways
may underlie the transmission of an efference copy, should linguis-
tic information be involved (semantics, phonology, and syntax).
P&G also refer to previous theoretical work to support their
generalization of feed-forward models beyond sensorimotor pro-
cesses into linguistic levels. They use as an example the previous
generalization of a motor control theory (MOSAIC) to a hierarch-
ical version (HMOSAIC) that controls complex sequences of
actions. This parallel has not helped to clarify matters. “The
HMOSAIC model suggests that there are multiple levels of rep-
resentation within the sensorimotor system” (Haruno et al.
2003, p. 11). Hence, the HMOSAIC model seems speciﬁc to
the sensorimotor system, and not necessarily applicable to more
abstract levels of representation and processing, which is a core
assumption of P&G’s proposal.
Scalp-EEG evidence consistent with the hypothesis that
language production is monitored by a general-purpose mechan-
ism can be found in Riès et al. (2011). Using a grammatical gender
decision task (a proxy for lexical access) and a standard picture
naming task, those authors reported postresponse EEG waves
very similar to those linked to response monitoring in nonlinguis-
tic tasks (e.g., error-related negativity). In the speech task, the
onset of these waves preceded the onset of overt response.
Although this timing feature has sometimes been taken as a signa-
ture of efference copy (Gehring et al. 1993), it could also reﬂect
the engagement of internal loop monitoring (Riès et al. 2011).
In the absence of strong evidence for some of P&G’s claims on
forward modeling in language production, it is appropriate to
examine the predictions that follow from them, and to gauge
how they might guide future empirical tests.
The only explicitly stated prediction regarding forward modeling
in language production is worded in broad terms: “[speakers] should
detect semantic errors before syntactic errors, and should syntactic
errors before phonological errors” (target article, sect. 3.1, para. 23).
Although this statement is clear, there are two requirements for
testing the relative ordering of error occurrence: that the errors
are unambiguously classiﬁed, and that a moment of error detection
can be deﬁned and measured. These requirements seem difﬁcult to
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meet in the absence of (some form of) overt response. Yet the pro-
duction of such an overt response would complicate the attribution
of the detection to forward modeling versus external loop processes.
For timing, a common reference time point is required that is avail-
able across utterances. A reasonable proxy in experimental setups is
stimulus onset, but for narrative speech or dialogue such an event is
not easily deﬁned. Testing this prediction is further complicated
because “it is not necessary that the predicted representations are
computed sequentially […] the syntactic prediction need not be
ready before the phonological prediction” (sect. 3.1, para. 10).
This clearly opens the possibility of reordering the sequence in
which the parallel outputs of the implemented production and
the forward model are compared.
A different tentative prediction can be constructed from P&G’s
proposal. The feedforward model is hypothesized to involve “impo-
verished representations [that] leave out (or simplify) many com-
ponents of the implemented representations” (sect. 3.1, para. 6).
P&G provide various examples of components that “might” (sect.
3.1, para. 9 onwards) be left out. It is not stated whether such
opt-out is circumstantial (i.e., whether a component is left out or
not depends on the speech act) or systematic (i.e., a component
is always omitted from the feedforward model). In the latter case,
omitted components would be susceptible only to external error
detection and monitoring, whereas included components should
be internally detectable and correctable. Checking whether these
general statements are amenable to a speciﬁc testable hypothesis,
contrasting feedforward with inner and overt speech-monitoring
performance (e.g., Oppenheim & Dell 2010), would require
more space than this commentary can accommodate.
In short, we submit that the evidence presented by P&G for
forward models in language production concerns only limited
aspects of this behavior, these being primarily sensorimotor pro-
cesses (i.e., articulatory processes for speech). No currently avail-
able evidence calls for a generalization to more abstract levels.
On the other hand, the predictions that may follow from this
aspect of P&G’s proposal are, in their current form, too general
or unconstrained to guide speciﬁc empirical tests. These speciﬁc
points notwithstanding, P&G’s proposal provides a stimulating
impetus for combining psychological and neurophysiological evi-
dence more closely.
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Abstract: The project of coordinating perception, comprehension, and
motor control is an exciting one, but I found it hard to follow some of
Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) arguments as presented. Consequently,
my comment is not so much a disagreement with P&G but a query
about the logic of forward models: It is not clear how they are supposed
to work, nor why they are needed in this (or many other) contexts, and
toward that end I present an alternative idea.
According to Pickering & Garrod (P&G), a key feature of forward
models is that they are fast; they allow a system to correct itself
much more quickly than is possible on the basis of reafferent feed-
back. I understand how a forward model allows fast feedback
when the feedback is based on the output of the forward model
itself (as opposed to conditions in which the output of the
forward model is compared to real feedback). But to better under-
stand how this approach works, it needs to be made clearer what
additional information is included in the forward model that is not
in the production or comprehension systems themselves. Other-
wise, there is no point. Furthermore, if indeed forward models
have extra information, how is this reconciled with the claim
that forward models are “impoverished” compared to the pro-
duction and comprehension implementers.
I also ﬁnd it unclear how a forward model speeds things up
when the output of a forward model and actual feedback (e.g.,
proprioceptive, visual, auditory, etc.) are compared. The speed
with which the forward model can compute seems useless in
these conditions, as the model has to wait for the actual feedback
before the comparison process can begin. Furthermore, when-
ever feedback is involved in correcting motor control for future
actions (as opposed to the current action), it is not immediately
clear why a slow feedback loop is not supposed to work.
At the same time, it is possible to imagine feedback between
levels of a production (or a comprehension) system that would
be fast enough to correct errors before overt errors are produced
(or before comprehension is compromised). Consider the “predic-
tive coding” model introduced by Grossberg (1980). In his Adap-
tive Resonance Theory (ART) model, a single unit in layer 2 of the
network learns to code for a pattern of activation in layer 1. Criti-
cally, the learning between the two layers takes place in both
bottom-up connections (such that a pattern of activation in layer
1 learns to activate a given unit in layer 2 –what Grossberg calls
“instar learning”) – and in top-down connections (such that an
activated layer 2 units learns to activate a pattern in layer 1;
what Grossberg calls “outstar learning”). These top-down connec-
tions in fact support “prediction,” that is, the layer 2 unit learns to
activate those layer 1 units that activated it in the past.
The process of identifying an input involves comparing the
bottom-up (input) signal with the top-down (predicted) signal: If
the two patterns match (in layer 1) the model, the model goes
into a state of resonance (with bottom-up and top-down signals
reinforcing one another), and this is taken as evidence that the
correct node in layer 2 was indeed activated. If not, there is a
mistake that needs to be corrected. The identiﬁcation of a
mistake happens quickly, before any learning takes place (in
order to solve the stability-plasticity dilemma, otherwise known as
“catastrophic interference”). The important point for present pur-
poses is that ART includes fast prediction within a single system,
with no need to posit a separate, parallel forward model. (In fact,
the ART system does have a separate parallel system that is
engaged in cases of bottom-up/top-down mismatch, but this
system does not carry any information about a prediction – it just
turns off the layer 2 unit and tells the network to “try again.”)
Could something similar work in the case of speech pro-
duction? Perhaps a semantic input could activate a lemma unit,
and the lemma could feed back to the semantic system, and the
model could be conﬁdent that the correct lemma was selected if
its top-down and bottom-up signals matched. Similar top-down/
bottom-up interactions across levels in the speech production
system could lead to quick corrections at each stage. And, ulti-
mately, feedback from the actual output (a spoken word in the
case speech production) could play a role in correcting errors
(after the fact). Given that predictions are made between levels
of the speech production system (and possibly between pro-
duction and comprehension systems), corrections could presum-
ably be made quickly, and at different stages of the process.
Of course, this sketch of an outline of an idea does not even
attempt to address the complexities that are addressed by P&G,
and any proposal without a forward model may well be
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inadequate. But I’m struggling to see why separate fast forward
models are needed (as opposed to feedback between levels
within and between production and comprehension systems),
and to understand how forward models are thought to be fast
whenever they rely on actual feedback.
Prediction in processing is a by-product of
language learning
doi:10.1017/S0140525X12002518
Franklin Chang,a Evan Kidd,b and Caroline F. Rowlanda
aUniversity of Liverpool, Institute of Psychology, Health and Society, Liverpool
L69 7ZA, United Kingdom. bThe Australian National University, Research
School of Psychology, The Australian National University, Canberra 0200,
Australia.
Franklin.Chang@liverpool.ac.uk evan.kidd@anu.edu.au
crowland@liverpool.ac.uk
http://www.liv.ac.uk/psychology-health-and-society/staff/franklin-chang/
http://psychology.anu.edu.au/_people/people_details.asp?recId=594
http://www.liv.ac.uk/psychology-health-and-society/staff/caroline-
rowland/
Abstract: Both children and adults predict the content of upcoming
language, suggesting that prediction is useful for learning as well as
processing. We present an alternative model which can explain
prediction behaviour as a by-product of language learning. We suggest
that a consideration of language acquisition places important constraints
on Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) theory.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) have done the ﬁeld a huge favour by
conceptualising language processing in terms of an integrated
action-perception system, which highlights the centrality of pre-
diction. It seems to us that taking a similar approach to the ﬁeld
of language acquisition would be equally productive. After all,
the task of learning a language requires a close integration of
oral motor action and sound perception. P&G’s model adopts a
theory of acquisition from motor learning, in which forward
models learn to bridge between action and perception. In this
commentary, we explore the implications of P&G’s forward
model for our understanding of psycholinguistic processes, with
a particular focus on language acquisition.
There is now substantial evidence that children use prediction
in comprehension in much the same way as adults. For
example, Lew-Williams and Fernald (2007) reported that
Spanish-learning 3-year-old children can use the grammatical
gender of the article (la/el) to predict the referent of the next
word (la pelota vs. el zapato) in a looking-while-listening task.
Mani and Huettig (2012) have shown that 2-year-olds can use a
verb’s semantic affordances in a similar manner to adults (e.g.,
eat predicts cake), and Borovsky et al. (2012) have reported
similar ﬁndings in older children and adults. Importantly, the
acquisition studies have demonstrated that children’s predictive
abilities correlate with their knowledge of language. In all of
these studies, children (and adults) with bigger productive (and/
or receptive) vocabularies tend to be faster and more accurate
at prediction during online sentence comprehension. Faster pre-
diction correlates with positive language outcomes longitudinally:
Marchman and Fernald (2008) reported that the speed at which
25-month-olds process lexical information correlates with linguis-
tic knowledge 6 years later. These ﬁndings suggest that prediction
is not only part of the language processing system, but is tightly
linked to language acquisition mechanisms.
Scrutinizing the mechanism underlying prediction therefore
appears an important priority. Here we compare P&G’s model
to an alternative language production model, Chang’s (2009)
Dual-path model, concentrating on how each model explains pre-
diction. By way of example, we consider verb-object affordances
(e.g., eat-cake), where both children and adults have been found
to predict a verb’s object before the object is encountered in
speech (Altmann & Kamide 1999). These results are particularly
interesting, because Mani and Huettig (2012) found a signiﬁcant
relationship between expressive vocabulary and prediction behav-
iour in children, which supports both P&G’s and the Dual-path
model’s hypothesis that production representations support
prediction.
P&G’s model places prediction within a forward model that
implements constraints on word order (prediction-as-processing).
The model explains verb-object affordances in the following
manner: a production command EAT(CAKE) can be derived
from hearing the word eat and seeing the cake in the visual
scene. The command passes through the production forward
system to activate the triplet p[cake, NP, /cake/]. Crucially, the
model predicts that only syntactically and semantically appropri-
ate predictions will be generated. In the eat-cake example, the
prediction is correct, but is not borne out in every instance. For
instance, Kamide et al. (2003) reported that participants made
predictive looks to a cabbage after the processing the fragment
The hare will be eaten …, where the passivized verb should
have restricted looks to an animate agent (e.g., a fox).
In contrast to P&G’s model, the Dual-path model acquires syn-
tactic representations within a network that contains separate
meaning and sequencing pathways (Elman 1990). Its learning
algorithm compares the predicted next word with the actual com-
prehended next word, and the mismatch or error is used to adjust
the model’s internal representations (error-based learning,
Rumelhart et al. 1986). The Dual-path model is able to explain
the phenomena of structural priming as error-based learning
(Chang et al. 2006), and this ability requires that prediction-for-
learning is constantly taking place during language comprehen-
sion. For the eat-cake prediction, the input word eat activates
the concept CAKE because the model’s meaning pathway
learns associations between words in utterances and elements in
messages. Critically, the same word-concept mechanism learns
to associate eaten with cabbage. This associative word-concept
prediction mechanism is different from the structure-sensitive
prediction mechanism in the sequencing system, which can
explain why eaten increases predictive looks to likely agents like
the fox in Kamide et al. (2003). Thus, the pathways in the
model can explain the different types of prediction. Crucially,
the similarity in prediction in children and adults can be explained
by the idea that humans are constantly doing prediction-for-learn-
ing to adjust their language representations to the input (Kidd
2012; Rowland et al. 2012).
Learning processes can explain prediction in processing, but
language acquisition constraints are also critical for learning the
syntactic and semantic representations that support prediction
in P&G’s model. P&G’s theory is based on Wolpert et al.’s
(2011) theory of motor planning and perception, which uses
error-based learning for motor and forward model learning
(Jordan & Rumelhart 1992; Plaut & Kello 1999). According to
Wolpert et al.’s theory, the forward model is learned by
mapping from muscle commands to the perception of one’s arm
in three-dimensional space. These algorithms work because
humans can directly perceive their arm’s position. In P&G’s
theory, the forward model maps from a message-like production
command to a triplet including syntax and semantics. This is pro-
blematic: We cannot directly perceive syntax and semantics, and
hence the learning mechanism in the motor theory cannot
explain how P&G’s forward model learns to make these language
predictions. When error-based learning is used to map from pro-
duction commands to sentences, Chang (2002) demonstrated that
abstract syntax was not always learned unless the model had
language acquisition constraints like those in the Dual-path archi-
tecture. Therefore, P&G’s forward model may need a similar
architecture to yield the appropriate predictions.
Language processing theories like P&G’s account treat
language learning as a peripheral process. We argue that
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prediction in processing is actually a by-product of learning. Pre-
diction is a critical component of error-based learning, which is
one of the most successful accounts of both motor and language
learning.
Forward modelling requires intention
recognition and non-impoverished predictions
doi:10.1017/S0140525X1200252X
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Abstract: We encourage Pickering & Garrod (P&G) to implement this
promising theory in a computational model. The proposed theory
crucially relies on having an efﬁcient and reliable mechanism for early
intention recognition. Furthermore, the generation of impoverished
predictions is incompatible with a number of key phenomena that
motivated P&G’s theory. Explaining these phenomena requires fully
speciﬁed perceptual predictions in both comprehension and production.
We heartily congratulate Pickering & Garrod (P&G) on their
outline of a new cognitive architecture that integrates language
production and comprehension. What is particularly impressive
in their sketch is that it is a comprehensive approach that
addresses entire classes of interrelated psycholinguistic phenom-
ena (as opposed to a selected subset of empirical ﬁndings) and
that it provides natural explanations for especially the time-critical
phenomena which have been difﬁcult to explain plausibly and
elegantly with our “standard models” (e.g., Dell 1986; Levelt
1989).
Therefore, it is, in our view, all the more urgent that this sketch,
or at least its central parts, be further developed into a real com-
putational implementation, one that actually generates the
complex behavior that we can now only simulate in our minds
on the basis of verbal accounts. Only with such an implementation
will we be able to assess the adequacy and accuracy of the pro-
vided account, and be able to generate nontrivial and testable pre-
dictions that can subsequently be tested using the large arsenal of
behavioural and neurocognitive methods now available. We are
aware that implementing models is not an easy task, and that
implementing this particular architecture will prove to be a chal-
lenging exercise. But it is possible to use a piecemeal approach: An
obvious simpliﬁcation is to ﬁrst develop the model on a miniature
language, in a restricted context, using simulated time. Also, it is
possible and probably advantageous to employ division of labour
by delegating parts of the implementation to different research
groups that have complementary expertise.
There are two central aspects of the proposed theory that we
would like to comment on, and suggest improvements to.
The ﬁrst concerns the role of intentions. As P&G note, when
predicting the utterance of an interlocutor (i.e., in comprehen-
sion), it is essential to have an (early) estimate of the underlying
intention. In the HMOSAIC model, this is done by running par-
allel inverse models. But in modelling verbal interaction, one of
the most intractable problems is the complex, seemingly arbitrary,
many-to-many mapping of utterances and intentions (see, e.g.,
Levinson 1983; 1995). We suspect, therefore, that in a model of
language production and comprehension (i.e., dialogue proces-
sing) this problem is much harder than in the recognition of inten-
tions underlying functional motor behaviour. There are
computational models that use Bayesian machine learning pro-
cedures to capture the utterance-intention mapping from multi-
modal interaction corpora (see, e.g., DeVault et al. 2011), but
this approach involves computationally expensive and time-
consuming ofﬂine learning procedures, and the resulting models
are limited to the domain they have been trained on (for an
alternative Bayesian approach to attacking this problem that
does not involve ofﬂine training procedures, see De Ruiter &
Cummins 2012 ). We would urge P&G to prioritize this aspect,
as we believe that the success of the proposed approach will be
to a large degree dependent on its ability to model intention rec-
ognition in dialogue.
The second comment we have involves the use of “impover-
ished” representations for the efferent copies, and especially the
nature of this impoverishment. In P&G’s exposition of the
theory, the stated reason that the system does not simply use
the efferent copies as motor programs is their impoverished
nature (target article, sect. 3.1, para. 6). However, as the efferent
copy represents the perceptual consequences of the motor
program (and not the motor program itself), not using them
directly as motor programs, in our view, does not need to be
motivated at all. It is simply a different type of representation,
not suited as a motor program.
A potentially more serious problem with the proposed impover-
ished nature of the efferent copies is that they do not adequately
explain the phenomena they are supposed to. This holds for both
comprehension and production. In production, for instance, the
cited ﬁndings by Heinks-Maldonado et al. (2006), and especially
those by Tourville et al. (2008), can only be explained if the effer-
ent copy is fully speciﬁed, not merely phonologically but also pho-
netically. If a speaker knows only which phonemes he is going to
produce in what order but not how (in terms of phonetic detail),
then the proposed theory would predict that changing the ﬁrst
formant in the auditory feedback (as Tourville et al. did) would
have no effect at all.
In language comprehension, the proposed theory assumes that
listeners predict what their interlocutor is going to say. Indeed,
this appears to be essential for explaining the phenomenon of
close shadowing (Marslen-Wilson 1973), with delays as short as
250 ms. Also, predictions of utterance content probably underlie
the listener’s highly accurate anticipation of the end of the speak-
er’s turn as found, for instance, by De Ruiter et al. (2006) and
Stivers et al. (2009). But here too, the accuracy obtained from
having access to an early but impoverished prediction would not
be able to explain the levels of accuracy observed in end-of-turn
anticipation in experiments and natural data. Magyari and De
Ruiter (2012) found evidence that people are able to predict
when a turn ends by predicting how it ends – that is, with which
speciﬁc words the turn will end. This suggests that the forward
model cannot be lexically impoverished, as suggested by P&G in
section 3.1 (para. 9).
This is why we would strongly urge P&G to adopt the assump-
tion that the representations of the predictions, both in pro-
duction and comprehension are fully speciﬁed (perceptual)
representations, as Pickering and Garrod (2007) suggested for
comprehension.
Finally, we again want to express our support for the exciting
approach that P&G have taken with their highly original and
thought-provoking outline, and look forward to discussing these
issues further.
Cascading and feedback in interactive models
of production: A reﬂection of forward
modeling?
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Abstract: Interactive theories of lexical retrieval in language production
assume that activation cascades from earlier to later processing levels,
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and feeds back in the reverse direction. This commentary invites Pickering
& Garrod (P&G) to consider whether cascading and feedback can be seen
as a form of forwarding modeling within a hierarchical production system.
Over the past 20 years, one of the most contentious issues in
language production has concerned the degree to which lexical
access occurs in discrete stages. Theorists agree that words are
retrieved ﬁrst as semantic-syntactic entities, and then later
spelled out in terms of their phonological forms (e.g., Garrett
1975; Kempen & Huijbers 1983). But is the ﬁrst of these
steps – lemma or word-access – entirely separate from the
second one – phonological access? Three possibilities are
debated. The discrete-stage or modular view (Levelt et al. 1999)
holds that the ﬁrst step must be completed before any activation
of phonological forms takes place. During the ﬁrst step of retrieval
of the word “cat,” the lemmas for CAT and DOG may both be
active, but the phonological forms of these will not be. Not until
the ﬁrst step has completed its selection of CAT can /k/, /æ/,
and /t/ gain activation. The cascade hypothesis blurs the distinction
between the steps by allowing for activation of phonological forms
of potential lemmas (e.g., the forms of both “cat” and “dog”)
before the ﬁrst step has been completed. The interactive hypoth-
esis permits cascading, but also bottom-up feedback (e.g., Dell
1986). Activated phonological units send activation upwards to
lexical units. This loop of cascading and feedback between units
at adjacent levels of the system is assumed to operate regardless
of whether the lexical access process is engaged in word or phono-
logical access. Currently, there is a considerable amount of evi-
dence for cascading (e.g., Cutting & Ferreira 1999), but little
consensus on the degree to which the system is interactive (see
Harley 2008, for review).
I suggest that Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) proposed use of
forward modeling and the predicted perceptions that result
from it map onto the notions of cascading and feedback in
interactive models of production. Cascading consists of a pre-
diction by processing level i of what needs to be active on the
next lower level i+1, and feedback from that level delivers the
anticipated “sensory” consequences of that prediction back to
level i.
In P&G’s view, the advance prediction of representational com-
ponents of an utterance and their sensory consequences allow for
each production decision to be coordinated with other decisions.
They illustrate by showing how heavy noun phrase (NP) shift and
phonological error monitoring could result from this system. Gen-
erally speaking, forward modeling during production helps make
the many parts of an utterance mesh for accurate ﬂuent speech.
That is also the function of cascading and feedback in hierarchical
production models, except that representational levels rather than
utterance parts are what are being meshed. Cascading of acti-
vation to lower levels prepares the way for the construction of rep-
resentations at those levels. The resulting feedback allows for
decisions at the higher representational level to be sensitive to
information at the lower level. For example, feedback from pho-
nological forms to the word/lemma level allows for word selection
at the higher level to reﬂect the retrievability of the form (Dell
et al. 1997). A phonological form that is more easily available
will feed back more activation to its lemma than a form that is dif-
ﬁcult to retrieve will. Hence, the system will be biased to select
lemmas whose forms will be available. Feedback also enables rep-
resentations at a lower level to mesh with higher-level infor-
mation, as seen when feedback from phonological to lexical
levels biases the phonological level activations toward lexical
outcomes, functioning as a lexical editor (e.g., Nozari & Dell
2009).
P&G emphasize that forward predictions are not actual pro-
duction representations. They are “easier-to-compute ‘impover-
ished’ representations” (target article, sect. 3.1, para. 6). This is
also true of cascading in interactive models. Units that are active
through cascading are less active than they would be if they
were committed parts of a representation. Furthermore, unlike
committed representational elements, they have yet to be
bound to structural frames, at least in activation-based models
that use such frames (e.g., Dell 1986). So, although units activated
through cascading may soon be fully part of an utterance’s rep-
resentation at a particular level, they are not there yet.
P&G have outlined a compelling integrated theory of pro-
duction and comprehension, showing how each contributes to
the other. With this commentary, I invite them to consider
whether the notions of cascading and feedback in production
are part of the picture, and particularly whether they can be con-
sidered to be reﬂections of the forward modeling system operating
between processing levels.
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The neurobiology of receptive-expressive
language interdependence
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Abstract: With a focus on receptive language, we examine the
neurobiological evidence for the interdependence of receptive and
expressive language processes. While we agree that there is compelling
evidence for such interdependence, we suggest that Pickering &
Garrod’s (P&G’s) account would be enhanced by considering more-
speciﬁc situations in which their model does, and does not, apply.
The classical Lichtheim–Broca–Wernicke neurobiological model
of language proposed distinct neuroanatomical pathways for
language comprehension and production. Recent evidence
suggests abandoning this model’s classical form, and although
there is not yet an established replacement (Dick & Tremblay
2012; Price 2010; 2012 for review), we think much of the data
support P&G’s proposal. However, we also think P&G could be
clearer about whether there are situations in which their model
does not apply. For example, they state that “comprehenders
make whatever linguistic predictions they can” (target article,
sect. 3.2, para. 1), but this is so broad as to be unfalsiﬁable.
Neurobiological evidence suggests production and perception
system interdependence occurs in speciﬁc situations. By high-
lighting emerging models and ﬁndings in the neurobiology of
receptive language, we suggest that P&G’s proposal could be
ﬁne-tuned to make more-speciﬁc, testable predictions.
Neurobiological evidence for the interdependence of receptive-
expressive language in speech perception. The most widely
adopted model of language neurobiology is a dual-stream model
analogous to the visual system (Ungerleider & Haxby 1994).
Within this model, during receptive language, auditory speech
sounds map to articulatory (motor) representations in a dorsal
stream and to meaning in a ventral stream (Hickok 2009b;
Hickok & Poeppel 2000; 2004; 2007; Rauschecker 2011;
Rauschecker & Scott 2009; Rauschecker & Tian 2000; Rogalsky
& Hickok 2011). If this is correct, models like P&G’s must
account for the way these processing streams interact with the
motor system involved in language production.
This problem is easier to solve within the dorsal stream, as many
of the same brain regions are active during speech planning and
execution, and during speech perception (Callan et al. 2004;
Eickhoff et al. 2009; Hickok & Poeppel 2007; Pulvermüller
et al. 2006; Vigneau et al. 2006; Wilson et al. 2004). In fact, a
primary contention is not whether the motor system is recruited
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during speech perception but in what situations it occurs. Some
argue the motor system is essential (D’Ausilio et al. 2009; Iacoboni
2008; Meister et al. 2007), whereas others argue that it is only
involved when auditory-only speech is difﬁcult to parse (e.g.,
during noisy situations, or when discriminating between similar
phonemic units; Hickok 2009a; Hickok et al. 2011; Sato et al.
2009; Tremblay & Small 2011).
The latter situation appears to be the case for audiovisual
speech perception, when visual information from the lips and
mouth is present. Moreover, a forward-modeling architecture
consistent with P&G’s proposal has been suggested to explain
the neurobiology of audiovisual speech perception (Callan et al.
2004; Skipper et al. 2005; Skipper et al. 2007b; van Wassenhove
et al. 2005; Wilson & Iacoboni 2006). Here, visual information,
temporally preceding the auditory signal by several hundred
milliseconds (Chandrasekaran et al. 2009), provides a “forward
model” of the speech sound. These models draw on the listener’s
articulatory representations to provide possible phonetic targets
of the talker’s speech (Callan et al. 2004; Skipper et al. 2007b;
van Wassenhove et al. 2005). Findings that visual speech inﬂu-
ences the auditory neural response’s latency and amplitude (van
Wassenhove et al. 2005), and recruits motor-speech regions
(Callan et al. 2004; Dick et al. 2010; Hasson et al. 2007; Sato
et al. 2010; Skipper et al. 2005; 2007b; Watkins et al. 2003),
support predictive coding via forward models of the kind P&G
propose.
Neurobiological evidence for the interdependence of receptive-
expressive language in language and gesture comprehension.
Although the neurobiological evidence for receptive-expressive
language interdependence is compelling in speech perception, it
is mixed for higher-level language comprehension, which involves
brain regions along a ventral language pathway (Binder et al. 2009;
Hickok & Poeppel 2007; Vigneau et al. 2006). There is evidence –
for example, in processing verbs – that the motor system contrib-
utes to understanding, and this is cited to support “motor
simulation” theories (Cappa & Pulvermüller 2012; Fischer &
Zwaan 2008; Glenberg 2011; Glenberg & Gallese 2012).
Notably, some authors interpret these ﬁndings without adhering
to motor simulation theories (Bedny & Caramazza 2011; Mahon
& Caramazza, 2009). Indeed, motor (production) system contri-
bution to language comprehension is a contentious issue (e.g.,
this was a topic of an organized debate at the 2011 Neurobiology
of Language Conference).
Additional evidence suggests that involvement of the motor
system is speciﬁc to the task. For example, Tremblay et al.
(2012) applied repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
(rTMS) to the ventral premotor cortex during a sentence compre-
hension task. The rTMS interfered with sentences describing
manual actions, but not with other types of sentences, suggesting
that predictive motor encoding is not always called upon. Another
example is gesture comprehension. Some studies have shown that
the act of viewing gestures recruits areas associated with a putative
“mirror neuron” system thought to covertly simulate others’
actions (Green et al. 2009; Holle et al. 2008; Skipper et al.
2007a; 2009; Willems et al. 2007; Xu et al. 2009), but others
show no evidence that this correlates with comprehension
(Andric & Small 2012; Dick et al. 2009; 2012; Straube et al.
2011; Willems et al. 2009).
In closing, we note that within P&G’s model it may not be
necessary to elicit motor activation. For example, P&G state
that “embodied accounts assume that producers and com-
prehenders use perceptual and motor representations associated
with the meaning of what they are communicating. Our
account does not require such embodiment but is compatible
with it” (sect. 4, para. 9). Hence, the model seems able to
account for motor activity, or lack of it, during receptive language.
If this is the case, P&G should clarify what neurobiological
ﬁndings could help decide between competing accounts that
call upon interdependent receptive and expressive language
systems.
Intermediate representations exclude
embodiment
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Abstract: Given that Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) account integrates
language production and comprehension, it is reasonable to ask whether
it is compatible with embodied cognition. I argue that its dependence
on rich intermediate representations of linguistic structure excludes
embodiment. Two options are available to supporters of embodied
cognition: They can adopt a more liberal notion of embodiment or they
can attempt to replace these intermediate representations with robustly
embodied ones. Both of these options face challenges.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) maintain that their integrated
approach to language production and comprehension is compati-
ble with, but does not require, embodiment. I argue that it is
incompatible. The fundamental role played by intermediate rep-
resentations that capture phonological, syntactic, and semantic
structure rules out embodiment and preserves important
aspects of classical cognitive science.
Integration and embodiment. There is a clear afﬁnity between
P&G’s project and that of embodied cognition. The basic idea
behind embodied cognition is that cognitive processes are partly
constituted by wider bodily structures and processes. Glenberg
(2010, p. 586) characterized it as the claim that “all psychological
processes are inﬂuenced by body morphology, sensory systems,
motor systems, and emotions.” Such inﬂuence clearly requires an
intimate relationship between action, perception, and cognition.
Traditionally, researchers have assumed that language proces-
sing is inherently modular; they have been committed to what
Hurley (2008a) calls the classical sandwich. On this view,
central cognition (the meat) intercedes between action and per-
ception (the slices of bread). P&G argue that language production
and comprehension are forms of action and action perception
respectively. As they see it, receivers of linguistic messages
actively compute action representations during perception to
help them predict what they are about to perceive. Similarly, pro-
ducers of a linguistic message actively compute perception rep-
resentations to help them predict sensory feedback from their
ongoing action. In violation of the classical sandwich, comprehen-
sion often involves production processes and production often
involves comprehension processes.
One of P&G’s primary theoretical innovations is their use of
forward and inverse modeling to account for the dynamic
nature of language processing. This clearly ﬁts with the central
role played by perceptual and motor simulation in many accounts
of embodied cognition (for reviews, see Barsalou 2008; Kem-
merer 2010; Martin & Zwaan 2008). It also ﬁts with the more
recent suggestion that prediction is important to guiding action
and perception (Gallese 2009).
The problem posed by intermediate representations. A core
aspect of P&G’s theory does not ﬁt with embodied cognition: its
reliance on disembodied representations. The problem begins
with their acknowledgement that language is special: “Unlike
many other forms of action and perception, language processing
is clearly structured, incorporating well-deﬁned levels of linguistic
representation such as semantics, syntax, and phonology” (target
article, sect. 1.3, para. 9).To handle the linguistic structure at
these three levels, they posit “a series of intermediate represen-
tations between message and articulation” (sect. 3.1, para. 3).
These intermediate representations are central to their account.
Indeed, P&G deﬁne production processes as those that map
“higher” linguistic representations to “lower” ones and compre-
hension processes as those that map “lower” linguistic represen-
tations to “higher” ones.
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One of the difﬁculties facing any attempt to assess embodied cog-
nition is that it has been associated with several distinct theses
(Anderson 2003; Shapiro 2011; Wilson 2002). There is, however,
good reason to think that P&G’s intermediate representations are
incompatible with most versions of embodiment. Obviously, any
appeal to representations excludes radical anti-representational
forms of embodied cognitive science (Chemero 2009). Less
radical forms of embodied cognitive science generally assume that
embodiment requires, at a minimum, grounding inmodality-speciﬁc
input/output systems. Pezzulo et al. (2011, p. 3) outline a core
feature of this grounding: “Perhaps the ﬁrst and foremost attribute
of a grounded computational model is the implementation of cogni-
tive processes… as depending on modal representations and associ-
ated mechanisms for their processing… rather than on amodal
representations, transductions, and abstract rule systems.” P&G’s
intermediate representations clearly fail to meet this criterion.
Traditional cognitive science posits amodal representations for
a reason: They provide a means of integrating information associ-
ated with distinct perceptual and motor modalities. Psycholin-
guists often argue that amodal representations are needed for
language processing because linguistic structure transcends the
particulars of the various modalities associated with production
and comprehension (e.g., Jackendoff 2002; 2007; Pinker 2007).
On the syntactic front, the well-known structural similarity of
signed and spoken languages is taken to provide further support
for this claim (Goldin-Meadow 2005; Poizner et al. 1987).
Although the need for amodal representations has typically
been formulated against the assumption that production and com-
prehension are separate processes, this background assumption is
not necessary. Indeed, as P&G show, amodal representations can
serve as a bridge for the ongoing interaction between production
and comprehension. To mangle a cliché, P&G provide a way to
avoid throwing the meat out with the sandwich by identifying an
important role for the sort of amodal representations posited by
traditional cognitive science within a non-modular account of
language processing.
Conclusion. P&G’s appeal to intermediate representations
leaves supporters of embodied cognition with something of a
dilemma. On the one hand, they could try to liberalize the notion
of embodiment in order to encompass such representations. This
move is not without precedent. Meteyard et al. (2012), for
example, argue that researchers need to consider the possibility
that cognition is weakly embodied because it involvessupramodal
representations that capture associations between distinct sensori-
motor systems (Barsalou et al. 2003; Damasio & Damasio 1994;
Gallese & Lakoff 2005). The obvious danger of this strategy is
that it could erode the force and novelty of the thesis that cognition
is embodied. On the other hand, they could try to offer more
robustly embodied accounts of phonological, syntactic, and seman-
tic knowledge. This strategy faces a general challenge: In order to
eliminate the need for amodal representations at a given level, it
is not enough to show that some phenomena at that level can be
handled in an embodied fashion. Instead, what needs to be
shown is that all of the phenomena at that level can be handled
in this way (Toni et al. 2008). This sets the bar very high, and we
can reasonably doubt that it is achievable. As matters stand,
neither of these options seems particularly promising.
The role of action in verbal communication and
shared reality
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Abstract: In examining the utility of the action view advanced in the
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) target article, I ﬁrst consider its contribution
to the analysis of language vis-à-vis earlier language-as-action
approaches. Second, I assess the relation between coordinated joint
action, which serves as a blueprint for dialogue coordination, and the
experience of shared reality, a key concomitant and product of
interpersonal communication.
The theory of language production and comprehension (TLPC),
laid out in impressive keenness in the Pickering & Garrod
(P&G) target article, rests on an analogy between language and
action. It musters a throng of cutting-edge research on forward
modeling and covert simulation to ﬂesh out the analogy. In the fol-
lowing, I examine the utility of the present action view for the
understanding of verbal communication and interpersonal align-
ment. I will ﬁrst consider the distinct contribution to the analysis
of language vis-à-vis earlier language-as-action approaches. Then I
will turn to the relation between coordinated joint action, which
serves as a blueprint for dialogue coordination, and a key conco-
mitant and product of interpersonal communication, that is, the
experience of a shared reality between interlocutors.
One merit of the TLPC lies in its extension of the action-
language analogies that have been championed by a prominent
lineage of approaches epitomized by Austin (1962) and Grice
(1975). These approaches characterized language use as purpose-
ful contextualized action (Holtgraves 2002). However, much of
the research inspired by the language-as-action perspective did
not study issues that are now addressed by the TLPC, primarily
the online processes that permit the seamless and instantaneous
mutual attunement to the current topic (Holtgraves 2002, pp.
180–82). In this respect, the integration of action simulation by
the TLPC marks a novel and promising contribution.
However, the focus of the TLPC on co-present interweaving of
action, based on prediction processes, outshines key insights from
language-as-action work and hence comes at a cost. First of all, the
role of context and communicative intentions, essential to any
view of language use as action, is mentioned rather parenthetically
and relegated to subsidiary information contained in one of the
processing modules (viz., the production command). More
speciﬁcally, it seems that the emphasis on prediction processes
underappreciates postdictive processes, that is, the search for an
adequate interpretation after utterances have been perceived.
Recipients often enough straggle and struggle to infer what is
meant by, for instance, nonliteral utterances, ﬁgures of speech,
or complex (scientiﬁc or literary) formulations. According to
language-as-action approaches, these efforts are driven by prag-
matic assumptions of cooperativeness and mutual adherence to
communication rules (Higgins 1981).
Furthermore, the view of action execution and perception,
which serves as the blueprint for the meticulous modeling of
language production and comprehension, restricts the action-
language analogy to co-present, oral dialogue. Given the
primacy of face-to-face conversation (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs
1986), such a focus of the theory design is reasonable. However,
the role of action in other forms of verbal communication
remains an open issue. For instance, writers want to accomplish
purposes with what they write; readers attempt to identify these
purposes. (Processes underlying reading, speciﬁcally prediction-
by-association, are addressed only once at the end of P&G’s
article.) To what extent can the action-view embraced by the
TLPC account for the processes that operate, for instance, in
typing a tweet or blog commentary, and in reading and interpreting
it? In reading, there are no immediate sensory perceptions of an
interlocutor’s movements or the current interaction context that
can help a recipient to infer the intended action or purpose under-
lying a piece of text; but there are other resources, such as assump-
tions of conversational rules or background knowledge, that allow
recipients to make such inferences. It seems that the role of
action outside of co-present conversation can be more readily
accounted for by other approaches from the “language-as-action”
family (for the reception of literary texts, see, e.g., Ricœur 1973).
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A second issue I want to examine concerns the relation between
coordinated joint action and the experience of a shared reality
between the interlocutors. Shared reality is of potentially high rel-
evance to verbal communication because interpersonal communi-
cation is a key arena of social sharing. In section 2.3, the models of
prediction and simulation are applied to action coordination in
joint activities such as ballroom dancing or carrying a bulky
object. P&G claim that the joint-action model can explain “the
experience of ‘shared reality’ that occurs when A and B realize
that they are experiencing the world in similar ways” (target
article, sect. 2.3, para. 5).
From the perspective of shared-reality theory, however, the
commonality or alignment involved in the coordination of action
does not necessarily involve the experience of shared reality.
According to a current deﬁnition (Echterhoff et al. 2009),
shared reality is the product of the motivated process of experien-
cing an interpersonal commonality of inner states about the world.
The creation of a shared reality allows us, for example, to form
political or moral convictions, or to evaluate other people or
groups. For instance, when people meet a new employee at
their workplace, they tend to form shared impressions of the new-
comer with their colleagues. As such, and consistent with extant
applications of the theory (e.g., Echterhoff et al. 2008), shared
reality essentially reﬂects an evaluative alignment between com-
municator and audience regarding a target entity or state of
affairs.
Given this conceptualization, the experience of shared reality
and action coordination can be dissociated. Having common rep-
resentations of an activity and each other’s actions does not mean
that the actors have a shared reality regarding how to evaluate the
activity. For example, two high-school graduates may perform a
seamlessly coordinated ballroom dance at a prom, but the two
may feel about and evaluate the dance differently: Whereas one
of them may experience it as the exciting beginning of a romantic
affair, the other could view it as the mere fulﬁllment of an obli-
gation, or could even fear subsequent harassment.
This distinction may not come as a surprise because the TLPC
is designed to address the key explanandum of psycholinguistic
research, that is, the success of conversational interaction, with
an emphasis on the rapidity and smoothness of coordination. It
is not designed to address higher-level commonalities, such as
the sharing of attitudes, evaluations, and judgments. Still, for
the sake of further integration and synergy, it may be worthwhile
to consider the possible interplay of conversation and shared
reality from the perspective of the TLPC.
The complexity-cost factor in bilingualism
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Abstract: Language processing changes with the knowledge and use of
two languages. The advantage of being bilingual comes at the expense
of increased processing demands and processing costs. I suggest
considering bilingual complexity including these demands and costs. The
proposed model claims effortless monolingual processing. By integrating
individual and situational variability, the model would lose its idealistic
touch, even for monolinguals.
Because most people today are bilingual, that is, they are language
producers and comprehenders of at least two languages, the pro-
posed model by Pickering & Garrod (P&G) cannot be generalized
in its current version; it accounts only for a small minority of
language users. Compared to earlier language-processing
models, it is more complex – in particular, by integrating pro-
duction and comprehension –with regard to predicting actions
and the embodiment of language. However, it fails to account
for the important aspects of increased processing demands and
processing costs in bilingual language interaction. These
additional demands and costs are observed even for bilinguals
with native-like knowledge of the language (so-called highly
proﬁcient bilinguals) and cannot be attributed to a low level of
proﬁciency. I consider these aspects most relevant for a truly inte-
grated, up-to-date, and generalizable theory of language pro-
duction and comprehension.
When comparing the performance of monolinguals and bilin-
guals on the same task, we can trace increased processing
demands and processing costs with different measures, two of
which I will describe. Such studies investigate the language pro-
duction in only one language at a time, not during switching
between languages and do not make claims about switch costs.
First, increased processing demands for bilinguals can be
observed in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies in terms of modulation of the blood-oxygen-level-depen-
dent (BOLD) signal. A recent study (Parker Jones et al. 2011)
compared performance of monolinguals and highly proﬁcient
bilinguals on naming pictures and reading words aloud. They
demonstrated that the same ﬁve left hemisphere areas sensitive
to increasing demands on speech production in monolinguals
showed higher activation in bilinguals. More speciﬁcally, during
word retrieval and articulation, higher activation was found in
dorsal precentral gyrus, pars triangularis, pars opercularis,
superior temporal gyrus, and planum temporale. Word retrieval
was more demanding for bilinguals than for monolinguals.
Second, processing costs for highly proﬁcient bilinguals are also
reported from simple word retrieval tasks. Reaction time latencies
are longer for bilinguals than for monolinguals when they were
naming pictures or producing a list of tokens from a common
semantic category (e.g., Gollan et al. 2002; 2005).
Increased language-processing demands are attributed to the
speaker’s necessity of dealing with two languages. Parallel acti-
vation of both languages was observed at all stages of bilingual
speech production (e.g., Guo & Peng 2006). Consequently, task
performance in one of two available languages involves compe-
tition of words of the unwanted language with those of the
intended language. Therefore, lexical selection is a more demand-
ing process for bilinguals than for monolinguals. As a result, retrie-
val of words is slower even in highly proﬁcient bilinguals of all ages
than in monolinguals (Sorace 2011).
Unbalanced bilinguals are better in one language compared
with the other. Hence, they have a stronger and a weaker
language. Usually their mother tongue is the stronger language
whereas a second, later learned language is the weaker language,
characterized by incomplete acquisition of lexicon and grammar.
If the ﬁrst language undergoes attrition (that is, language loss
due to infrequent use of that language as a consequence of
migration), this language becomes the weaker language and the
second language develops to be the stronger language. In both
cases, if language proﬁciency is rather low, it is even more
demanding to produce that weak language. It requires more
resources to inhibit the stronger, unwanted language (Meuter &
Allport 1999). This means that using a weak language involves
much language control to avoid unintentional switching to the
stronger language. Several processing models for bilingualism
(e.g., Green 1986) capitalize on the concept of language control
and emphasize the problem of limited resource and processing
capacities. Applying the proposed theory to a communicative
setting with unbalanced bilinguals, I seriously question, in particu-
lar, the suggested obligatory action predictions and the effortless
involvement in interactive language.
P&G acknowledge one condition under which predictions of
one’s own and other’s actions can be difﬁcult, namely, if they
are “unrelated” (an example for a related action would be
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ballroom dancing; see target article, sect. 2.3, Joint Action). In my
view, in the domain of language, the ease of prediction depends
not only on relatedness, but also, and much more, on familiarity.
Not only are predictions easier and more likely to be correct when
communicative participants are familiar with each other and their
communicative habits, but also the interlocutors must be familiar
with the language they are using for the interaction, and with the
culture of that language. It is certainly rather easy to predict
actions of communication in a long-standing relationship (e.g.,
the best friend), but for an exchange student – age 16, foreign to
a country, new to a host family, and with little knowledge either
of the language spoken or of the family’s speech habits – the
success rate of other’s action prediction is most probably low.
Similarly, in foreign-language reading, cultural familiarity has
been found to be crucial for comprehension. Studies on non-
native reading revealed that if readers lack the relevant cultural
knowledge, reading activities could not fully compensate for the
discrepancy or help readers comprehend a text (Erten & Razı
2009).
With all this in mind, it becomes clear that the language produ-
cer in the proposed model is ideal, even as a monolingual. There
are moments when we suffer a snub from another person’s action:
we are so surprised that words fail us. Some seem to have the gift
of gab, and are more quick-witted than others. For such situa-
tional or inter-individual variability known from everyday life,
the current model does not account. It holds the view that inter-
locutors are perfectly coordinated and that there is no time gap
between interlocutors’ turns. Nonetheless, P&G have been
aware of differences between native and non-native speakers or
of the difference between speaking to an adult or a child (see
sect. 4, General Discussion) to some degree, but they did not inte-
grate these differences into their model. The authors might want
to elaborate on situations and conditions when the construction of
forward models, covert imitations, joint actions, and continuous
prediction generation are not ideal, not even for the monolingual.
An ecological alternative to a “sad response”:
Public language use transcends the
boundaries of the skin
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Abstract: Embedding theories of language production and comprehension
in theories of action-perception is realistic and highlights that production
and comprehension processes are interleaved. However, layers of internal
models that repeatedly predict future linguistic actions and perceptions
are implausible. I sketch an ecological alternative whereby perceiver/
actors are modeled as dynamical systems coupled to one another and to
the environment.
In investigating between-person language use, Pickering &
Garrod (P&G) have taken a road less traveled. Psychology of
language has been dominated by studies of private language pro-
cessing within individuals, respecting the view of Noam Chomsky
that public language, “however construed, appears to have no sig-
niﬁcance” (1986, p. 31). I particularly admire Garrod and Picker-
ing’s (2004) paper in which they invoked between-person
alignments at multiple linguistic levels to explain why, for most
of us, conversation is easier than monologue even though conver-
sation requires coordination with others.
The approach presented in the target article is important and
valuable in other ways. One is the recognition that language pro-
duction and comprehension at its various descriptive levels are
species of action and perception that, accordingly, require expla-
nations consistent with those of nonlinguistic acting and perceiv-
ing. A second is the recognition that, in contrast to typical
theoretical treatments, language production and comprehension
are thoroughly interleaved. To reﬂect that, Pickering & Garrod
(P&G) weaken the “horizontal split” in their Figure 1 that separ-
ates processes of comprehension and production within an
individual.
However, in my view, the particular integration of production
and comprehension processes that the authors propose is unrealis-
tic in consisting of a complex cognitive tiling of predictive model-
ing processes (that is, predictions at multiple levels that occur
repeatedly over time). The proposal falls into the category of
theoretical accounts that Bentley (1941) identiﬁed as “sad
responses,” that are sad in unrealistically ascribing responsibility
for behavioral systematicities in the world almost exclusively to
processes “in the head” or “in the brain” (p. 13).
I recommend a different route to understanding language use
that involves weakening separations not only along the horizontal
dimension of P&G’s Figure 1, but also along the vertical dimen-
sion, the one that separates entities bounded, as Bentley (1941)
put it, by the skin. Warren (2006) offered an integrated theory
of perception and action along these lines, and Marsh et al.
(e.g., Marsh et al. 2006) provided a compatible ecological
approach that encompasses social interactions.
Warren (2006) explicitly rejected the model-based approaches
adopted by P&G on grounds that, (a) in them, implausibly,
actor/perceivers are supposed to interact directly with their
internal models, but indirectly with the world itself, and (b) inter-
acting with the models means using representations whose origins
must appeal “in circular fashion to the very perception and action
abilities they purport to explain” (p. 361). He offered instead an
approach in which perceiver/actors and their environments
are modeled as dynamical systems that are coupled both mechani-
cally and informationally. Adaptive behavior emerges from con-
straints arising from the structure of the environment, the
biomechanics of the body, perceptual information about the
coupled system, and task demands. In the approach of Marsh
et al. to social perception and action (e.g., Marsh et al. 2006;
2009), the coupled dynamical systems relevant to understanding
social activity include more than one perceiver/actor. In the
context of this account, the kinds of alignments among inter-
locutors that Garrod and Pickering (2004) identiﬁed as fostering
successful conversation are reﬂections of the interpersonal coordi-
nations that occur when humans come together to engage in joint
activities.
This approach has promise for understanding interpersonal
language use in two ways that are relevant to themes in the
target article.
One is that the approach promises to obviate postulating the
multiple levels of repeated predictive modeling that characterizes
P&G’s account. Some perceptual information is prospective in
nature in signaling what will happen. Moreover, use of prospective
stimulus information (e.g., about nutrients at some distance)
occurs among organisms that lack a nervous system and hence
lack the means to construct forward and inverse models (see,
e.g., Reed 1996). Turning to humans, an outﬁelder for example,
does not need to predict where and when a ﬂy ball will become
catchable; structure in reﬂected light over time provides prospec-
tive information about the ball’s future trajectory (e.g., Michaels &
Oudejans 1992). Likewise, information in reﬂected light can signal
whether it is safe to cross a street in trafﬁc without pedestrians
having to predict whether or when a vehicle will cross their path
(e.g., Oudejans et al. 1996). In short, prospective information
can constrain action without intervening predictions being
made. In language, the prospective information can be pragmatic,
syntactic, lexical, semantic, phonological, and so on.
A second domain in which the ecological approach may have
promise for understanding language production and comprehen-
sion concerns the pervasive ﬁndings to which P&G allude of
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imitation or, less often, complementation in language use and
elsewhere. I suggest that imitation occurs pervasively in laboratory
research, because perception of the actions of someone else
essentially serves as instructions for imitation (e.g., Fowler et al.
2003). Therefore, it is often easy to imitate, and imitation can
be a default reﬂection of the disposition of humans to coordinate
with one another (e.g., Richardson et al. 2007). In general,
however, imitation is not always an adaptive response to the
actions of someone else. Nor is complementing what is perceived.
Missing from much research on “embodied cognition” are task
constraints that encourage anything other than default mirroring.
However, when imitation is discouraged, embodied responses to
language input may occur that are not imitative (cf. Olmstead
et al. 2009). In the context of tasks that make other kinds of inter-
personal coordinations relevant, imitative responses may not be as
pervasive as they are in typical laboratory research.
Indeed, an important issue for understanding public language
concerns how in general utterances constrain users’ behavior.
When someone shouts Duck! to a bicyclist obliviously approach-
ing a low-hanging branch, an adaptive response is, in fact, to
duck (not to imitate the utterance). Research using the visual
world procedure (e.g., Ferreira & Tanenhaus 2007), albeit
designed with other purposes in mind, suggests that language
can affect nonimitative adaptive action (in this case, by the eyes)
very quickly. Investigation of language use embedded in meaning-
ful contexts may help to reveal whether or not imitation is
fundamental.
Are forward models enough to explain
self-monitoring? Insights from patients
and eye movements
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Abstract: At the core of Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) theory is a monitor
that uses forward models. I argue that this account is challenged by
neuropsychological ﬁndings and visual world eye-tracking data and that
it has two conceptual problems. I propose that conﬂict monitoring
avoids these issues and should be considered a promising alternative to
perceptual loop and forward modeling theories.
At the core of Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) theory of language
production and comprehension is the monitor, a cognitive mech-
anism that allows speakers to detect problems in speech. The pro-
posal is that the monitor compares perceptual representations
from two channels, namely (a) a perceptual representation of
the semantics, syntax, and phonology that the “production imple-
menter” is producing; and (b) forward perceptual representations
of forward production representations of each linguistic level. If
there is a mismatch, the monitor has detected the problem and
so can begin a correction. Monitoring via forward models is part
of an elegant account that nicely integrates the action and
language literatures. But is this account compatible with ﬁndings
on speech monitoring?
The model shares with perceptual loop theories (Hartsuiker &
Kolk 2001; Levelt 1989) the assumption that monitoring needs
speech comprehension (i.e., to create a perceptual representation
of produced speech). It therefore shares the problems of other
models with a perceptual component. One problem is that
neuropsychological studies found dissociations between compre-
hension and monitoring in brain-damaged patients. A striking
example is a 62-year-old woman with auditory agnosia and
aphasia reported by Marshall et al. (1985). Although this patient’s
auditory system was intact, she was unable to comprehend familiar
sounds, words, or sentences and could not report number of syl-
lables or stress contrasts. Speech production was seriously
impaired, with speech often containing neologistic jargon. But
despite the patient’s severe comprehension problems, she pro-
duced a great many (often unsuccessful) attempts at self-correc-
tions of errors – in particular, her phonological errors (but not
her semantic errors). These ﬁndings suggest that error detection
can take place without perception.
Another patient that challenges perception-based monitoring
is G., a 71-year-old Dutch Broca’s aphasic (Oomen et al. 2005).
In a speech production task, G. produced many phonological
errors, of which he repaired very few, whereas he produced
very few semantic errors, which he usually repaired. G.’s pro-
duction difﬁculties hence mirror his monitoring difﬁculties.
Importantly, G.’s difﬁculty to repair phonological errors cannot
be attributed to a perception deﬁcit: In a perception task, he
detected as many phonological errors as a group of controls. It
therefore seems that G.’s monitoring deﬁcit is related to this pro-
duction deﬁcit and not to any perception deﬁcit. These data argue
against a forward model account, because the forward model is a
separate and qualitatively different system from the production
implementer. There is no reason why the monitoring deﬁcit
should mirror the production deﬁcit.
Our recent visual world eye-tracking data (Huettig & Hartsuiker
2010) also speak against both perceptual loop and forward
modeling accounts. When our subjects named a picture of a
heart, they gazed at the phonologically related written word
harp more often than at unrelated words, and this “competitor
effect” had the same time course as the analogous effect when lis-
tening to someone else (Huettig & McQueen 2007). These data
are not consistent with perceptual loop accounts, which predict
earlier competitor effects in production than in comprehension,
because the phonological representation inspected by the inner
loop precedes external speech by a considerable amount of time
(namely, the time articulation takes). Similarly, the represen-
tations created by forward models also precede overt speech in
time, so a monitoring with forward models account also predicts
an early competitor effect. After all, forward models are predic-
tions of what one will say, and ﬁxation patterns in the visual
world are strongly affected by prediction. One might object that
the predicted phonological percept is too impoverished to
create a phonological competitor effect. But this seems to contrast
with Heinks-Maldonado et al.’s (2006) magnetoencephalography
data showing reafferance cancellation with frequency-shifted
feedback, which implies a highly detailed phonological percept
that even includes pitch.
There are also conceptual issues with monitoring via forward
models. One is the reduplication of processing systems (Levelt
1989). Speciﬁcally, the production implementer creates semantic,
syntactic, and phonological representations whereas a forward
model creates corresponding representations. If the forward
model creates highly accurate representations at each level, we
have two separate systems doing almost the same thing, which
is not parsimonious. But if the forward model creates highly impo-
verished representations (e.g., only one phoneme), such represen-
tations are not a good standard for judging correctness. It then
becomes difﬁcult to see how speakers detect so many errors at
so many linguistic levels.
Additionally, if we assume the output of forward models,
although impoverished, is still good enough to be useful for the
monitor, then the monitor will have to “trust” the forward
model, just like P&G’s metaphorical sailor having to trust his
charted route. But there is no a priori reason for assuming that
the forward model is less error prone than the production imple-
menter; in fact, if forward models are “quick and dirty” they will
bemore error prone. Trust in the forward model will then be mis-
placed. But such misplaced trust has the undesirable effect of
creating “false alarms,” so that a correct item is replaced by an
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error. “Corrections” that make speech worse do not seem to occur
frequently, although some repetitions may in fact be misplaced
corrections (e.g., Hartsuiker & Notebaert 2010).
P&G brieﬂy mention an alternative to both the perceptual loop
account and the forward model account, namely, a conﬂict moni-
toring account (Botvinick et al. 2001; Mattson & Baars 1992;
Nozari et al. 2011). According to such accounts, monitoring
does not use comprehension, but measures the amount of “con-
ﬂict” in each layer of production representations, assuming that
conﬂict is a sign of error. Conﬂict monitoring has the advantages
of allowing error detection without perception and that a pro-
duction deﬁcit at a given level is straightforwardly related to an
error detection deﬁcit at that level. Such an account is consistent
with Huettig and Hartsuiker’s (2010) eye-tracking data and avoids
the reduplication of processing components. Finally, in a conﬂict
monitoring account, there is also no issue of which representation
to “trust.” It is worth therefore considering conﬂict monitoring as
a viable alternative to the perceptual loop and forward modeling
accounts.
Predictive coding? Yes, but from what source?
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Abstract: There is little doubt that predictive coding is an important
mechanism in language processing – indeed, in information processing
generally. However, it is less clear whether the action system is the
source of such predictions during perception. Here I summarize the
computational problem with motor prediction for perceptual processes
and argue instead for a dual-stream model of predictive coding.
Predictive coding is in vogue in cognitive neuroscience, probably
for good reason, and we are no strangers to the idea in the domain
of speech (Hickok et al. 2011; van Wassenhove et al. 2005). The
current trendsetters in predictive coding are the motor control
crowd who have developed, empirically validated, and promoted
the notion of internal forward models as a neural mechanism
necessary for smooth, efﬁcient motor control (Kawato, 1999;
Shadmehr et al. 2010; Wolpert et al. 1995). But the basic idea
has been pervasive in cognitive science for decades in the form
of theoretical proposals like analysis-by-synthesis (Stevens &
Halle 1967) and in the form of empirical observations like
priming, context and top-down effects, and the like. So Pickering
& Garrod’s (P&G’s) claim that language comprehension involves
prediction is nothing new. Nor is it a particularly novel claim,
right or wrong, that the motor system might be involved in recep-
tive language; it has gotten much attention in the domain of
speech perception/phonemic processing, for example (Hickok
et al. 2011; Rauschecker & Scott 2009; Sams et al. 2005; van Was-
senhove et al. 2005; Wilson & Iacoboni 2006) and has been a com-
ponent of at least some aspects of sentence processing models for
decades (Crain & Fodor 1985; Frazier & Flores d’Arcais 1989;
Gibson & Hickok 1993). What appears to be new here is the
idea that prediction at the syntactic and semantic levels can
come out of the action system rather than being part of a purely
perceptual mechanism.
This is an interesting idea worth investigation, but it is impor-
tant to note that there are computational reasons why motor pre-
diction generally is an inefﬁcient, or even maladaptive, source for
predictive coding during receptive functions. Here’s the heart of
the problem. The computational goal of a motor prediction in
the context of action control is to increase perceptual sensitivity
to deviations from prediction (because something is wrong and
correction is needed) and to decrease sensitivity to accurate
predictions (all is well, carry on). Hence, if motor prediction
were used in the context of perception, it would tend to suppress
sensitivity to that which is predicted, whereas an efﬁcient mechan-
ism should enhance perception. Behavioral evidence bears this
out. The system is less sensitive to the perceptual effects of self-
generated actions (unless there is a deviation) than to externally
generated perceptual events. Some of the “reafference can-
cellation” effects noted by P&G are good examples: inability to
self-tickle, saccadic suppression of motion percepts, and the
motor-induced suppression effect measured electrophysiologi-
cally. This contrasts with nonmotor forms of prediction, what
P&G referred to as the association route, which might include
context effects and priming and which tend to facilitate perceptual
recognition. Put simply, motor prediction decreases perceptual
sensitivity to the predicted sensory event, nonmotor prediction
increases perceptual sensitivity to the predicted sensory event.
Why, then, is there so much attention on motor-based prediction?
P&G argue that there is evidence to support a role for motor
prediction in language-related perceptual processes – a good
reason to focus attention on a motor-based prediction process.
There are problems with the evidence they cite, however. One
cannot infer causation from motor activation during perception
(it could be pure associative priming [Heyes, 2010; Hickok,
2009a]), the transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) evidence
in speech perception tasks is likely a response bias effect
(Venezia et al. 2012), and the studies showing effects of imitation
training on perception do not necessarily imply that imitation is
carried out during perception, which is the claim that P&G wish
to make.
There is a better way to conceptualize the architecture of the
system, one that ﬂows naturally out of fairly well-established
models of cortical organization (Hickok & Poeppel 2007; Milner
& Goodale 1995). A dorsal stream subserves sensory-motor inte-
gration for motor control; it is a highly adaptable system (Catmur
et al. 2007) that links sensory targets (objects in space, sequences
of phonemes) with motor systems tuned to hit those targets under
varying conditions. A ventral stream subserves the linkage
between sensory inputs and conceptual memory systems; it is a
more stable system designed to abstract over irrelevant sensory
details. Both systems enlist predictive coding as a fundamental
computational strategy (Friston et al. 2010), but both in the
service of what the systems are designed for computationally.
Motor prediction facilitates motor behavioral (but suppresses per-
ception) and “sensory” or “ventral stream” prediction facilitates
perception (Hickok 2012b).
P&G underline that their approach blurs the line between com-
prehension and production and thus rejects the “cognitive sand-
wich” view, whereas the alternative perspective just outlined
might be interpreted as preserving the comprehension-
production distinction. In this context, it is worth pointing out
that P&G do not actually blur the distinction between the two
slices of bread all that much. They are quite distinct compu-
tational and representational components as their c and p notation
attests, and they have even added some slices, an action
implementation system (p), a forward production model (p-
hat), a forward comprehension model (c-hat) and a perceptual
system (c), each of which generates phonological, syntactic, and
semantic representations – nearly a loaf of bread. They do
argue, correctly in my view, and consistent with many speech
scientists and motor control researchers as well as the classical
aphasiologists (despite P&G’s claims to the contrary), that com-
prehension and production systems must interact. We make the
same claims of our dorsal stream (Hickok 2012a; Hickok &
Poeppel 2007). But where P&G and others – including myself
(Hickok et al. 2011) – have gone wrong, in my view, is that they
are trying to shoehorn a motor-control-based mechanism into a
perceptual system that it was not designed to serve.
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Abstract: We present empirical evidence from dialogue that challenges
some of the key assumptions in the Pickering & Garrod (P&G) model of
speaker-hearer coordination in dialogue. The P&G model also invokes
an unnecessarily complex set of mechanisms. We show that a
computational implementation, currently in development and based on
a simpler model, can account for more of this type of dialogue data.
Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) programmatic aim is to develop an
integrated model of production and comprehension that can
explain intra-individual and inter-individual language processing
(Pickering & Garrod 2004; 2007). The mechanism they propose,
built on an analogy to neuro-computational theories of hand move-
ments, involves producing and comparing two representations of
each utterance; a full one containing all the structure necessary to
produce the utterance and an “impoverished” efference copy that
can predict the approximate shape the utterance should have.
Although not our central concern, there is a tension between
endowing the efference copy with enough structure to be able
to predict semantic, syntactic, and phonetic features of an utter-
ance and nonetheless making it reduced enough that it can be pro-
duced ahead of the utterance itself. To avoid a situation in which
the “impoverishment” proposed for the efference copy is just
those things not required to ﬁt the data, we need independently
motivated constraints on its structure.
Neuro-computational considerations might provide such con-
straints, but there are dis-analogies with the models of motor
control P&G use as motivation. Efferent copies were originally
proposed to enable rapid cancellation of self-produced sensory
feedback, for example, to maintain a stable retinal image by can-
celling out changes due to eye-movements. However, the claim
that we use an analogous mechanism to predict, and correct, lin-
guistic structure before an utterance is produced involves some-
thing conceptually different. The awkwardness of phrases such
as “semantic percept” highlight this difference; until the utterance
is actually produced there is nothing to generate the appropriate
sensory percept. Conversely, if the “percept” is internal we are
still in the cognitive sandwich.
These points aside, the target article provides a valuable overview
of the evidence that language production and comprehension are
tightly interwoven. P&G’s main target, the “traditional model”,
treats whole sentences, “messages” or utterances as the basic unit
of production and comprehension. However, there is evidence
from cognitive psycholinguistics and neuroscience to show that
language processing is tightly interleaved around smaller units.
The close interconnections between production and comprehen-
sion are especially clear in dialogue where fragmentary utterances
are commonplace and people often actively collaborate with each
other in the production of each turn (Goodwin 1979).
It is unclear if the interleaving of production and comprehen-
sion requires internally structured predictive models. Recent pro-
gress on incremental models of dialogue suggest a more
parsimonious approach. In our computational implementation
based on Dynamic Syntax (Purver et al. 2006; 2011; Hough
2011), the burden of predicting full utterances does not need to
be employed in parsing, as speakers and hearers have incremental
access to representations of utterances as these emerge. Contra-
rily, P&G’s approach to self-repairs is analogous to Skantze and
Hjalmarsson’s (2010), which compares string-based plans and
computes the difference between the input speech plan and the
current state of realisation. In our model, instead of having to
regenerate a new speech plan from scratch, we can repair the
necessary increments, reusing representations already built up
in context, which are accessible to both speaker and hearer. Cur-
rently, it is difﬁcult to distinguish empirically between a dual-path
model with predictions and a single-path incremental model
because both combine production and comprehension.
As the paper highlights, the “vertical” issue of interleaving pro-
duction and comprehension is independent from the “horizontal”
problem of accounting for how language use is coordinated in dia-
logue. Nonetheless, this article extends previous Pickering and
Garrod work (2004; 2007) in claiming that the model of intra-
individual processing can be extended to inter-individual language
processing (conversation). Unlike previous work, the new model
operates in different ways for speakers and hearers, and the
potential for differences between people’s dialogue contexts is
acknowledged (although not directly modelled).
The problem with this generalisation is that in dialogue we do
not just predict what people are going to say, we also respond.
Even if I could predict what question you are about to ask, this
does not determine my answer (although it might allow me to
respond more quickly). In terms of turn structure, all a prediction
can do is make it easier for me to repeat you. Repetition does
occur in dialogue but is rare and limited to special contexts.
Corpus studies (Healey et al. 2010) indicate that we repeat few
words (less than 4%) and little more syntactic structure (less
than 1%) than would be expected by chance. Crudely, a cross-
person prediction model of production-comprehension cannot
explain 96% of what is actually said in ordinary conversation.
One conversational context that seems to depend on the ability
to make online predictions about what someone is about to say is
compound contributions, in which one dialogue contribution con-
tinues another, as in this excerpt from Lerner (1991):
Daughter: Oh here Dad, one way to get those corners out
Father: is to stick your ﬁngers inside
Daughter: Well, that’s one way.
Although it is unclear whether a predictive model better
accounts for the father’s continuation than one in which he is
building a response based on his partial parse of the linguistic
input, the daughter’s response seems to be based on the mismatch
between what was said and what she had planned to say. Although
possible she was predicting he would say what she herself had
planned to, there is no need for this additional assumption.
Many cases of other-repair (Schegloff 1992) such as clariﬁcation
requests asking what was meant by what was said (e.g., “what?”)
also seem to require that any predictability used is impoverished
at precisely the level it might be useful.
In a study on responses to incomplete utterances in dialogue
(Howes et al. 2012), increased syntactic predictability led to
more clariﬁcation requests. Although participants made use of
different types of predictability in producing continuations, pre-
dictability was neither necessary nor sufﬁcient to prompt com-
pletion, and, in extremely predictable cases, participants did not
complete the utterance, responding as if the predictable elements
had been produced. Our assumption is that it is the things we
cannot predict that are the most important parts of conversation.
Otherwise, it is hard to see why we should speak at all.
Seeking predictions from a predictive framework
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Abstract:We welcome the proposal to use forward models to understand
predictive processes in language processing. However, Pickering &Garrod
(P&G) miss the opportunity to provide a strong framework for future
work. Forward models need to be pursued in the context of learning.
This naturally leads to questions about what prediction error these
models aim to minimize.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) are not the ﬁrst to propose that com-
prehension is a predictive process (e.g., Hale 2001; Levy 2008;
Ramscar et al. 2010). Similarly, recent work has found that
language production is sensitive to prediction in ways closely
resembling comprehension (e.g., Aylett & Turk 2004; Jaeger
2010). We believe that forward models (1) offer an elegant
account of prediction effects and (2) provide a framework that
could generate novel predictions and guide future work.
However, in our view, the proposal by P&G fails to advance
either goal because it does not take into account two important
properties of forward models. The ﬁrst is learning; the second is
the nature of the prediction error that the forward model is
minimizing.
Learning. Forward models have been a successful framework
for motor control in large part because they provide a unifying fra-
mework, not only for prediction, but also for learning. Since their
inception, forward models have been used to study learning –
both acquisition and adaptation throughout life. However,
except for a brief mention of “tuning” (target article, sect. 3.1,
para. 15), P&G do not discuss what predictions their framework
makes for implicit learning during language production, despite
the fact that construing language processing as prediction in the
context of learning readily explains otherwise puzzling ﬁndings
from production (e.g., Roche et al. 2013; Warker & Dell 2006),
comprehension (e.g., Clayards et al. 2008; Farmer et al. 2013;
Kleinschmidt et al. 2012) and acquisition (Ramscar et al. 2010).
If connected to learning, forward models can explain how we
learn to align our predictions during dialogue (i.e., learning in
order to reduce future prediction errors, Fine et al., submitted;
Jaeger & Snider 2013; for related ideas, see also Chang et al.
2006; Fine & Jaeger 2013; Kleinschmidt & Jaeger 2011; Sonder-
egger & Yu 2010).
Prediction errors. Deriving testable predictions from forward
models is integrally tied to the nature of the prediction error
that the system is meant to minimize during self- and other-moni-
toring (i.e., the function of the model, cf. Guenther et al. 1998).
P&G do not explicitly address this. They do, however, propose
separate forward models at all levels of linguistic representations.
These forward models seem to have just one function, to predict
the perceived linguistic unit at each level. For example, the syn-
tactic forward model predicts the “syntactic percept,” which is
used to decide whether the production plan needs to be adjusted
(how this comparison proceeds and what determines its outcome
is left unspeciﬁed).
Minimizing communication error: A proposal. If one of the
goals of language production is to be understood – or even to com-
municate the intended message both robustly and efﬁciently
(Jaeger 2010; Lindblom 1990) – correctly predicting the intended
linguistic units should only be relevant to the extent that not doing
so impedes being understood. Therefore, the prediction error that
forward models in production should aim to minimize is not the
perception of linguistic units, but the outcome of the entire infer-
ence process that constitutes comprehension. Support for this
alternative view comes from work on motor control, work on
articulation, and cross-linguistic properties of language.
For example, if the speaker produces an underspeciﬁed refer-
ential expression but is understood, there is no need to self-
correct (as observed in research on conceptual pacts, Brennan &
Clark 1996). This view would explain why only reductions of
words with low confusability tend to enter the lexicon (e.g.,
“strodny,” rather than “extrary,” for “extraordinary”). If,
however, the function of the forward model is to predict linguistic
units, as P&G propose, no such generalization is expected. Rather,
any deviation from the target phonology will cause a prediction
error, regardless of whether it affects the likelihood of being
understood. Similar reasoning applies to the reduction of morpho-
syntactic units, which often is blocked when it would cause
systemic ambiguity (e.g., differential or optional case-marking,
Fedzechkina et al. 2012; see also Ferreira 2008).
Research on motor control ﬁnds that not all prediction errors
are created equal: Stronger adaptation effects are found after
task-relevant errors (Wei & Körding 2009). Indeed, in a recent
perturbation study on production, Frank (2011) found that speak-
ers exhibit stronger error correction if the perceived deviation
from the intended acoustics makes the actual production more
similar to an existing word (see also Perkell et al. 2004).
This view also addresses another shortcoming of P&G’s propo-
sal. At several points, P&G state that the forward models make
impoverished predictions. Perhaps predictions are impoverished
only in that they map the efference copy directly onto the pre-
dicted meaning (rather than the intermediate linguistic units).
Of course, the goal of reducing the prediction error for efﬁcient
information transfer is achieved by reducing the prediction error
at the levels assumed by P&G. In this case, the architecture
assumed by P&G would follow from the more general principle
described here. However, in a truly predictive learning framework
(Clark 2013), there is no guarantee that the levels of represen-
tation that such models would learn in order to minimize predic-
tion errors would neatly map onto those traditionally assumed (cf.
Baayen et al. 2011).
Finally, we note that, in the architecture proposed by P&G, the
production forward model seems to serve no purpose but to be
the input of the comprehension forward model (sect. 3.1,
Fig. 5; sect. 3.2, Fig. 6). Presumably, the output of, for example,
the syntactic production forward model will be a syntactic plan.
Hence, the syntactic comprehension forward model takes syntac-
tic plans as input. The output of that comprehension forward
model must be akin to a parse, as it is compared to the output
of the actual comprehension model. Neither of these components
seems to fulﬁll any independent purpose. Why not map straight
from the syntactic efference copy to the predicted “syntactic
percept”? If forward models are used as a computational frame-
work, rather than as metaphor, one of their strengths is that
they can map efference copies directly onto the reference
frame that is required for effective learning and minimization of
the relevant prediction error (cf. Guenther et al. 1998).
Prediction plays a key role in language
development as well as processing
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Abstract: Although the target article emphasizes the important role of
prediction in language use, prediction may well also play a key role in
the initial formation of linguistic representations, that is, in language
development. We outline the role of prediction in three relevant language-
learning domains: transitional probabilities, statistical preemption, and
construction learning.
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Pickering & Garrod (P&G) argue forcefully that language pro-
duction and language comprehension are richly interwoven,
allowing for ﬂuid, highly interactive discourse to unfold. They
note that a key feature of language that makes such ﬂuidity poss-
ible is the pervasive use of prediction. Speakers predict and
monitor their own language as they speak, allowing them to
plan ahead and self-correct, and listeners predict upcoming utter-
ances as they listen. The authors in fact provide evidence for pre-
dictive strategies at every level of language use: from phonology,
to lexical semantics, syntax, and pragmatics.
Given the ubiquity of prediction in language use, an interesting
consideration that P&G touch on only brieﬂy is how prediction
may be involved in the initial formation of linguistic represen-
tations, that is, in language development. Indeed, the authors
draw heavily from forward modeling, invoking the Wolpert
models as a possible schematic for their dynamic, prediction-
based system. And although their inclusion is surely appropriate
for discourse and language use, these models are fundamentally
models of learning (e.g., Wolpert 1997; Wolpert et al. 2001).
Hence, the degree to which our predictions are fulﬁlled (or vio-
lated) might have enormous consequences for linguistic represen-
tations and, ultimately, for the predictions we make in the future.
More generally, prediction has long been viewed as essential to
learning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner 1972).
Prediction might play an important role in language develop-
ment in several ways, such as when using transitional probabilities,
when avoiding overgeneralizations, and when mapping form and
meaning in novel phrasal constructions. Each of these three
case studies is described, as follows.
Transitional probabilities. Extracting the probability of Q given
P can be useful in initial word segmentation (Graf Estes et al.
2007; Saffran et al. 1996), word learning (Hay et al. 2011;
Mirman et al. 2008), and grammar learning (Gomez & Gerken
1999; Saffran 2002). A compelling way to interpret the contri-
bution of transitional probabilities to learning is that P allows lear-
ners to form an expectation of Q (Turk-Browne et al. 2010). In
fact, sensitivity to transitional probabilities correlates positively
with the ability to use word predictability to facilitate comprehen-
sion under noisy input conditions (Conway et al. 2010). Moreover,
sensitivity to sequential expectations also correlates positively with
the ability to successfully process complex, long-distance depen-
dencies in natural language (Misyak et al. 2010). Simple recurrent
networks (SRNs) rely on prediction error to correct connection
weights, and appear to learn certain aspects of language in
much the same way as children do (Elman 1991; 1993; Lewis &
Elman 2001; French et al. 2011).
Statistical preemption.Children routinely make overgeneraliza-
tion errors, producing foots instead of feet, or She disappeared the
quarter instead of She made the quarter disappear. A number of
theorists have suggested that learners implicitly predict upcoming
formulations and compare witnessed formulations to their predic-
tions, resulting in error-driven learning. That is, in contexts in
which A is expected or predicted, but B is repeatedly used
instead: children learn that B, not A, is the appropriate formu-
lation –B statistically preempts A. Preemption is well accepted
in morphology (e.g., went preempts goed; Aronoff 1976; Kiparsky
1982).
Unlike went and goed, distinct phrasal constructions are vir-
tually never semantically and pragmatically identical. Nonethe-
less, if learners consistently witness one construction in contexts
where they might have expected to hear another, the former
can statistically preempt the latter (Goldberg 1995; 2006; 2011;
Marcotte 2005). For example, if learners expect to hear disappear
used transitively in relevant contexts (e.g., She disappeared it), but
instead consistently hear it used periphrastically (e.g., She made it
disappear), they appear to read just future predictions so that they
ultimately prefer the periphrastic causative (Boyd & Goldberg
2011; Brooks & Tomasello 1999; Suttle & Goldberg forthcoming).
Construction learning. Because possible sentences form an
open-ended set, it is not sufﬁcient to simply memorize utterances
that have been heard. Rather, learners must generalize over utter-
ances in order to understand and produce new formulations. The
learning of novel phrasal constructions involves learning to associ-
ate form with meaning, such as the double object pattern with
“intended transfer.” Note, for example, that She mooped him
something implies that she intends to give him something, and
this meaning cannot be attributed to the nonsense word, moop.
In the domain of phrasal construction learning, phrasal construc-
tions appear to be at least as good predictors of overall sentence
meaning as individual verbs (Bencini & Goldberg 2000; Goldberg
et al. 2005).
We have recently investigated the brain systems involved in
learning novel constructions. While undergoing functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), participants were shown short
audiovisual clips that provided the opportunity to learn novel con-
structions. For example, a novel “appearance” construction con-
sisted of various characters appearing on or in another object,
with the word order Verb-NPtheme-NPlocative, (where NP is noun
phrase). For each construction, there was a patterned condition
and a random condition. In the patterned condition, videos
were consistently narrated by the V-NPtheme-NPlocative pattern,
enabling participants to associate the abstract form and
meaning. In the random condition, the exact same videos were
shown in the same order, but the words were randomly reordered;
this inconsistency prevented successful construction learning.
Most relevant to present purposes, we found an inverse relation-
ship between ventral striatal (VS) activity and learning for pat-
terned presentations only: Greater test accuracy on new
instances (requiring generalization) was correlated with less
ventral striatal activity during learning. In other tasks, VS gauges
the discrepancy between predictions and outcomes, signaling
that something new can be learned (Niv & Montague 2008;
O’Doherty et al. 2004; Pagnoni et al. 2002). This activity may
therefore suggest a role for prediction in construction learning:
Better learning results in more accurate predictions of how the
scene will unfold.
Such prediction-based learning may therefore be a natural con-
sequence of making implicit predictions during language pro-
duction and comprehension. Future research is needed to
elucidate the scope of this prediction-based learning mechanism,
and to understand its role in language. Such investigations would
strengthen and ground P&G’s proposal, and would suggest that
predictions are central to both language use and language
development.
Communicative intentions can modulate the
linguistic perception-action link
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Abstract: Although applauding Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) attempt to
ground language use in the ideomotor perception-action link, which
provides an “infrastructure” of embodied social interaction, we suggest
that it needs to be complemented by an additional control mechanism
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that modulates its operation in the service of the language users’
communicative intentions. Implications for intergroup relationships and
intercultural communication are discussed.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) collapse the oft-made separation
between comprehension and production, and propose to concep-
tualise language processing in terms analogous to the ideomotor
account of action perception and motor action. In a nutshell,
the ideomotor principle (1) rejects the modular view of percep-
tion, cognition, and action, dubbed by Hurley (2008a) as the cog-
nitive sandwich, and (2) suggests that perception and action are
closely linked together, and cognition acts as a fallible control
mechanism that modulates and is modulated by the dynamic per-
ception-action link. P&G highlight the perception-action link and
reconceptualise language comprehension (≈perception) and pro-
duction (≈action) as highly dynamic and closely linked processes
that cannot be separated. In so doing, their proposal sheds an
intriguing light on the mystery of language-based social inter-
action – how humans can communicate with each other so efﬁ-
ciently and smoothly to carry out their joint activity despite
some obvious issues of occasional miscommunication and com-
munication breakdown.
We applaud their attempt to ground language use in the mech-
anisms of motor perception and action, and we endorse their the-
orizing that the perception-action substrate provides an
“infrastructure” of language-based social interaction. However,
we also believe that this infrastructure needs to be complemented
by an additional control mechanism that modulates its operation,
or cognition, the “ideo” part of ideomotor theory. We suggest that
one such mechanism is language users’ communicative intentions.
What are communicative intentions? Language is typically
used within the social context of joint activities (e.g., Clark
1996; Kashima & Lan, in press). As Bratman (1992) noted, com-
mitment to a joint activity and readiness to be responsive to the
intentions and actions of one’s partner are integral to an inten-
tional joint activity. The participants in a joint activity hold joint
intentions, or intentions to carry out their individual parts of the
joint activity to attain their joint goal while coordinating each
other’s actions (e.g., Bratman 1999; Pacherie 2012; Tuomela
2007). By communicative intentions we mean intentions to
carry out largely the linguistic part of the joint activity by perform-
ing illocutionary and locutionary acts to attain its goal.
Indeed, P&G brieﬂy alluded to the importance of joint inten-
tions in language use: “linguistic joint action is more likely to be
successful and well-coordinated than many other forms of joint
action, precisely because the interlocutors communicate with
each other and share the goal of mutual understanding” (target
article, sect. 3.3, para. 8). Echoing their sentiment and building
on it more explicitly, we argue that intentional communicative
mechanisms can partly regulate the comprehension-production
processes, and this can have signiﬁcant sociocultural implications.
Intentions and perception-action link. The modulation of
perception-action link by shared intentions was suggested by
Ondobaka et al.’s (2011) work. In this experiment involving a con-
federate and a naïve participant, the confederate ﬁrst performed
an action (e.g., selecting the higher of two numbers) on each
trial, and the participant performed an action congruent or incon-
gruent with the confederate’s action intention, that is, doing the
same thing (selecting a higher number) or the opposite (selecting
a lower number). However, the correct action for the participant
was motorically congruous with the confederate’s action in some
cases (selecting the number displayed on the same side), but
incongruous in others (selecting the number on the opposite
side). If the perception-action link is ﬁxed and not intentionally
modulated, the participant’s perception of an action should
facilitate a motorically congruent action, but interfere with a
motorically incongruent action regardless of action intentions.
On the contrary, this occurred only when action intentions were
congruous (i.e., the co-actors shared the same goal). When
action intentions were incongruous, congruity of motor actions
had no effect. These results are consistent with Carpenter’s
(1852) original proposal of the ideomotor principle, which goes
beyond perception-guided movement and stresses the impor-
tance of conceptual action intention and expectation in the gui-
dance of voluntary behaviour (see Ondobaka & Bekkering 2012,
for a recent review).
Analogously, communicative intentions may modulate the lin-
guistic perception-action link. For instance, conversants’ accents
often converge (e.g., Giles et al. 1991), and this can be interpreted
within P&G’s framework. However, there is evidence to suggest
that accent convergence depends on the conversant’s communica-
tive intentions. Bourhis and Giles (1977) examined bilingual
English-Welsh speakers’ accent change in a conversation with
an English interviewer. When their Welsh identity was threa-
tened, their accent depended on their personal goals. Those
who were learningWelsh to extend their careers showed a conver-
gence to the interviewer’s accent, whereas those who were learn-
ing the language because of their Welsh identity showed a
divergence, strengthening their Welsh accent. Babel’s (2010)
recent study partly replicated this ﬁnding. Native speakers of
New Zealand English listened to an Australian English speaker
and pronounced the same words (i.e., shadowed productions).
Despite the similarities between New Zealand and Australian
English dialects, there are detectable and systematic differences.
The participants who had more-negative implicit attitudes
towards Australia (vs. New Zealand) showed less convergence to
the Australian accent.
These ﬁndings in language use as well as nonverbal mimicry
(e.g., Castelli et al. 2009) suggest that communicative and action
intentions can modulate the verbal and nonverbal perception-
action link in joint activities. This raises at least two classes of criti-
cal questions. First, how do communicative and action intentions
regulate the embodied substrate of social interaction? What are
the mechanisms for the dynamic and mutual inﬂuences between
the conceptual strata of intentions and the embodied strata of per-
ception-action link? Second, what social and cultural processes
contribute to the shaping of the two strata, which in turn can
have a long-term impact on the evolution of macro structures
such as culture and society (e.g., Holtgraves & Kashima 2008)?
In particular, the interaction of intentions and embodiment may
play a critical role in intergroup differentiation (e.g., Welsh vs.
English; Australian vs. New Zealander), the maintenance and dis-
solution of the intergroup boundary, as well as intergroup and
intercultural communication and understanding.
Preparing to be punched: Prediction may not
always require inference of intentions
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) framework assumes an efference
copy based on the interlocutor’s intentions. Yet, elaborate attribution of
intentions may not always be necessary for online prediction. Instead,
contextual cues such as speaker gaze can provide similar information
with a lower demand on processing resources.
At several points in their target article, Pickering & Garrod (P&G)
suggest that prediction by simulation is based on determining a
conversational partner’s intention through perceiving the unfold-
ing action or speech, potentially combined with background
knowledge. On this basis, an efference copy of the intended act
is generated, enabling the prediction of upcoming behavior
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and the production of behavior or speech that complements
it. But how explicit do the attributed intentions need to be to
allow such prediction, and how might comprehenders derive
them?
Unfortunately, P&G do not deﬁne clearly what they mean by
“intention”: Whereas on the part of the actor or speaker, an inten-
tion seems to represent nothing more than an “action command”
(e.g., in the legend to Figure 3; target article, sect. 2.2), recogniz-
ing intentions on the part of the comprehender is more compli-
cated. According to P&G, it can involve considerations of past
and present behavior and of the speaker’s perceived state of
mind, as well as ongoing modiﬁcations of this interpretation. In
the literature, identifying others’ intentions is generally taken to
imply an additional step beyond action recognition, that of identi-
fying the goal of this action (see e.g., Levinson 2006; Tomasello
et al. 2005). A similar view underlies the HMOSAIC architecture
(Wolpert et al. 2003), which contains symbolic representations of
the task in the form of goals or intentions.
Elaborate attributions of intention based on the interlocutor’s
potential motivations in the current situation and on general
world knowledge are certainly useful for understanding speech.
They help to generate expectations about how the conversation
is likely to develop and can be used for what P&G call “ofﬂine pre-
diction.” Yet although such expectations have, in turn, been shown
to inﬂuence moment-by-moment language comprehension (e.g.,
Kamide et al. 2003; Van Berkum et al. 2008), they are presumably
not computed on a moment-by-moment basis and remain rela-
tively constant across extended periods of time.
The time-critical online simulations in P&G’s account of real-
time conversation must require intentions of a more basic
kind – some form of heuristic for anticipating others’ upcoming
actions. To use their example: It is unquestionably valuable if I
am quick to predict that someone is preparing to punch me
rather than to shake my hand, so I can prepare to move appropri-
ately. But if I start considering why they might wish to hurt me, I
will probably be too late in responding.
For real-time online prediction of upcoming words and sen-
tences, I would like to suggest that it may often be possible to
rely on contextual clues to a speaker’s upcoming actions that are
directly perceivable: A particular tone of voice, a facial expression,
a hand gesture, or a shift in the speaker’s gaze direction can all be
informative about how the speaker plans to continue a sentence.
In this sense, such cues are closely connected to the speaker’s
intentions. At the same time, they are often produced uninten-
tionally on the part of the speaker, and can be readily perceived
on the part of the comprehender. This is exactly what makes
them so efﬁcient: They can help to disambiguate the linguistic
signal without requiring deliberate consideration of intentions
(cf. Shintel & Keysar 2009, who refer to such processes as “non-
strategic generic-listener adaptations”; p. 269).
A prime example of this type of contextual cue is the direction
of other people’s gaze. Gaze is a salient attentional cue that
reliably causes viewers to shift their own attention in the same
direction (Emery 2000). This occurs even in the visual periphery
and without requiring conscious awareness (Langton et al. 2000;
Xu et al. 2011). Additionally, because speakers tend to look at
objects they are preparing to mention (e.g., Grifﬁn & Bock
2000; Meyer et al. 1998), gaze will often directly reﬂect the speak-
er’s action plan. Such referential gaze is therefore both easy to
detect and informative about upcoming sentence content. In
fact, comprehenders can and do make rapid use of the speaker’s
gaze direction to anticipate upcoming referents (Hanna &
Brennan 2007; Staudte & Crocker, 2011) and even to assign
thematic role relations (Nappa et al. 2009; Knoeferle & Kreysa
2012).
These beneﬁts of gaze-following in comprehension can be con-
ceived of as a form of prediction about what will be mentioned
next, similar to anticipatory ﬁxations of objects in the visual
world in eye tracking studies of spoken sentence processing
(e.g., Altmann & Kamide 1999; Knoeferle & Crocker 2006; for
recent reviews see Altmann 2011 and Huettig et al. 2011). It is
interesting to consider P&G’s classiﬁcation and to speculate on
whether this might be prediction by association (e.g., “people
who look at objects often mention them shortly thereafter”) or
even prediction by simulation (using one’s own gaze behavior as
a proxy, e.g., “if I had just looked at the kite, I’d refer to it
next”). Alternatively, it might be sufﬁcient that speaker gaze
attracts the comprehender’s attention to a location that is relevant
for understanding the unfolding speech utterance. In all three
cases, the end result is a coordination of the interlocutors’
attention on the same objects in the visual world. This is known
to beneﬁt problem solving (Grant & Spivey 2003; Knoblich
et al. 2005) and conversation in general (Richardson & Dale
2005; Richardson et al. 2007). Such beneﬁts may well be due to
a shared perspective and aligned representations of the situation,
but they need not imply awareness of the interlocutor’s intentions.
A developmental perspective on the
integration of language production and
comprehension
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Abstract: The integration of language production and comprehension
processes may be more speciﬁc in terms of developmental timing than
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) discuss in their target article. Developmental
studies do reveal links between production and comprehension, but also
demonstrate that the integration of these skills changes over time.
Production-comprehension links occur within speciﬁc language skills
and speciﬁc time windows.
Pickering &Garrod (P&G) have set out an argument for a possible
integration of language production and comprehension processes
in adults. However, charting how these two processes come to be
set up during development is critical in attempts to understand
their subsequent integration. An obvious problem when consider-
ing production/comprehension processes within a developmental
framework is that language production lags behind language com-
prehension. So, to reiterate P&G’s question, can silent naming use
the production system, if no word production has yet emerged?
Furthermore, the dynamic and nonmonotonic changes in the
development of children’s motor systems, as well as the speciﬁcity
of motor-language links during these stages, need to be integrated
into any such model. The need to examine developmental evi-
dence in building this theory is therefore critical.
Numerous links between production and comprehension occur
during language learning in childhood. These links have been
reported in developmental studies assessing gesture production
and language comprehension (Bates & Dick 2002; Iverson &
Thelen 1999). From an atypical development standpoint, there
is also a greater incidence of co-morbid motor coordination and
planning difﬁculties in children with language impairment
(Iverson & Braddock 2011). In support of P&G’s model, there
are studies speciﬁcally demonstrating how auditory perception/
language comprehension can also affect speech motor perform-
ance in childhood. For instance, perceptual ability can inﬂuence
the learning of motor gestures. Seemingly due to the complexity
of articulation, affricates are produced later in development for
English-speaking children. By contrast, for Putonghua-speaking
children, affricates are acquired very early, probably due to
their salience within the language (Dodd & McIntosh 2010).
Furthermore, for higher cognitive-linguistic demands as
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compared to lower ones, speech motor variability also increases
(reviewed in Goffman 2010), indicating that the production pro-
cesses are inﬂuenced by comprehension/perceptual processes.
Indeed, a catalyst to changes in motor control may be vocabulary
increases (Green & Nip 2010). Speech motor variability can also
act as an index of learning; kinematic analyses of motor move-
ments reveal that children receiving training for articulatory dis-
orders produce different motor gestures associated with
phonetic categories, which were imperceptible at the acoustic
level (Gibbon 1999).
However, it is important to note that these links do not extend
to all motor skills, and in particular, not to gross motor ability as
assessed by locomotion or play (Bates et al. 1979). In longitudinal
studies of infants, using parental reports, two orthogonal factors of
language comprehension and production seemed to exist (Bates
et al. 1988). Alcock and Krawczyk (2010) speciﬁcally investigated
the link between oral motor control, and other motor and
language abilities in 21-month-olds, and concluded that oral
motor control was signiﬁcantly associated with the grammatical
complexity of utterances and with language production ability
overall. They found no relationship between overall motor
control and language comprehension ability at this age. In our
study with school age children, oral motor control was linked to
the production of novel words, but did not predict individual
differences in the comprehension of syntactically complex sen-
tences (Krishnan et al., in press). This evidence may appear con-
tradictory, but taking a developmental perspective may provide
some explanation. First, there may be speciﬁc motor behaviours
that provide an opportunity to acquire and practise skills necessary
for language. For example, rhythmic hand banging peaks around
28 weeks of age, and this is also when children start to produce
reduplicated babbling (Iverson 2010). And, when rhythmic
banging is delayed, as is the case in the neurodevelopmental dis-
order Williams syndrome, babbling and subsequent comprehen-
sion and production are also delayed (Masataka 2001).
Understanding the speciﬁc skills that are likely to cause changes
in behaviour during a particular time-window may therefore be
necessary. P&G’s model fails to provide an account of how com-
prehension/production processes for learning language might be
integrated within speciﬁc skills over developmental time.
The second factor that must be considered in a model integrat-
ing comprehension/production processes is the nonmonotonicity
of these developmental trajectories, which are consistent across
children. For example, rhythmic banging is low in pre-babbling
children, increases sharply as infants start to babble, and then
declines as infants become experienced at babbling (Iverson
2010). Similar nonmonotonic trajectories are seen across other
speech motor skills, for instance, in the variability of lip and jaw
movements (Smith & Zelaznik 2004) or for the coordination of
upper and lower lip movements (Green et al. 2000). The combi-
nation of gestures and language during development may have a
similar nonmonotonicity, as event-related potential (ERP) evi-
dence suggests children infants younger than 20 months interpret
symbolic gestures and words similarly, but that gestures and words
take on divergent communicative roles when infants are 26
months old (Sheehan et al. 2007). Although P&G suggest that
experience may be important for learning inverse-forward
model pairing, their model lacks explanations of how these
kinds of trajectories might arise, how trajectories change with
time, and what kind of input may be necessary for change. For
example, these trajectories may arise due to some combination
of the changes in contextual support that are needed while a
skill is learnt, or the neural changes that occur during
development.
Therefore, in the model that P&G outline, I agree that integrat-
ing knowledge about the production processes may help us under-
stand more about language comprehension, but this would be
possible only if the speciﬁcity of production-comprehension
links and the developmental timing of their occurrence are
taken into account.
Integrate, yes, but what and how? A
computational approach of sensorimotor
fusion in speech
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Abstract:We consider a computational model comparing the possible roles
of “association” and “simulation” in phonetic decoding, demonstrating that
these two routes can contain similar information in some “perfect”
communication situations and highlighting situations where their decoding
performance differs. We conclude that optimal decoding should involve
some sort of fusion of association and simulation in the human brain.
In their target article, Pickering & Garrod (P&G) propose an
ambitious model of language perception and production. It is cen-
tered on three main ingredients. First, it considers the complete
hierarchy of layers of language processing, from message to
semantics to syntax to phonology and ﬁnally, to speech. Second,
it features predictive forward models, so that temporally extended
sequences, such as whole sentences and dialogues, can be pro-
cessed. Third, it features dual processing routes, the “association”
route and “simulation” route, so that auditory and motor knowl-
edge can be involved simultaneously, rejecting the classic dichot-
omy between perception and action processes.
In this commentary, we set aside the temporal and hierarchical
aspects, and focus on the domain of speech perception and pro-
duction, where sequences are typically short (e.g., syllable percep-
tion and production), and processing limited to phonological
decoding. Even in this more restricted ﬁeld, the age-old debate
between purely motor-based accounts and purely sensory-based
accounts of perception and production now appears to be a
false dilemma (Schwartz et al. 2012). Indeed, neurophysiological
and behavioral evidence strongly suggests a dual route account
of information processing in the central nervous system, with
both a direct, associative route and an indirect, simulation route.
The target article amply documents the evidence, we do not
repeat examples here.
In our view, the debate is now shifting toward the issue of the
functional role of each route and their integration. That is to say, a
central question of the debate asks what is integrated and how
integration proceeds in the human brain.
We would argue that conceptual models such as proposed in
the target article would unfortunately have a difﬁcult time bring-
ing light to these questions. To support this argument, we con-
sider the question of perceptual decoding of phonetic units, for
which we have developed a computational framework (Moulin-
Frier et al. 2012) based on Bayesian programming (Bessière
et al. 2008; Colas et al. 2010; Lebeltel et al. 2004). With this fra-
mework, various models of speech perception can be simulated
and quantitatively compared. One model is purely auditory,
exploiting what P&G call “association.” A second model is
purely motor, exploiting what they call “simulation.” A third one
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is sensory-motor, integrating the association and simulation
processes.
All of these models can then be implemented and compared in
various experimental conﬁgurations. Three major results emerge
from such comparisons.
1. Under some hypotheses, with perfectly identiﬁed communi-
cation noise and no difference between motor repertoires of the
speaker and the listener (i.e., when conditions for speech com-
munication are “perfect”), motor and auditory theories are indis-
tinguishable. Therefore, the “association” and “simulation” routes
provide exactly the same information in these perfect communi-
cation conditions. The reason is that, in our learning scenario,
the auditory classiﬁer is learned by association from data obtained
through a motor production process, and possesses enough math-
ematical power of expression.
This casts an interesting light on the question of what information
is encoded in the association and simulation routes: Labeling a box
as an “association” route, in a conceptual model, is not enough to
be certain that it is different, from an information processing point
of view, from another box of the model. Computational descrip-
tions however, by virtue of rigorous mathematical notation, have
to be precisely deﬁned, and their content can be systematically
assessed. This also explains why behavioral evidence has histori-
cally not been able to discriminate between motor and auditory
theories of perception and production: They are sometimes
simply indistinguishable. Unfortunately, we believe this difﬁculty
was not avoided in the target article, in particular when P&G
detail experimental evidence for their model (e.g., target article,
sect. 3.2.1, para. 7, “these four studies support forward modeling,
but they do not discriminate between prediction-by-simulation
and prediction-by-association”; and sect. 3.2.3, para. 6, “all of
these ﬁndings provide support for the model of prediction-by-
simulation […]. Of course, comprehenders may also perform pre-
diction-by-association […].”).
2. In the general case where “perfect conditions” for communi-
cation are not met, mathematical comparison of the models
emphasizes the respective roles of motor and auditory knowledge
in various conditions of speech perception in adverse conditions.
Therefore, the information provided by the “association” and
“simulation” routes is more or less distinct and prominent depend-
ing on the communication conditions. In other words, this demon-
strates that adverse conditions provide leverage for discriminating
hypotheses about the perceptual and motor processes involved.
This is convergent with recent ﬁndings from neuroimaging and
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies (D’Ausilio et al.
2012b; Meister et al. 2007; Zekveld et al. 2006), as well as compu-
tational studies (Castellini et al. 2011).
3. In any case, sensory-motor fusion provides better perceptual
performance than pure auditory or motor processes. Therefore,
complementarities of information provided by the “association”
and “simulation” routes could be efﬁciently exploited in the fra-
mework of integrative theories such as those hinted at in the dis-
cussion of the target article. It is now obvious in the ﬁeld of
audiovisual perception that auditory and visual cues are comp-
lementary, with a great deal of work already done on sensor
fusion. In our opinion, comparable work can now be done on
how to integrate auditory and motor processes in speech percep-
tion. In this view, the proposal by P&G that “comprehenders
emphasize whichever route is likely to be more accurate” (sect. 4,
para. 6) can be regarded as a ﬁrst candidate model, which
would have to be made mathematically precise and compared
with alternative explanations, possibly driven by neuroanatomical
ﬁndings (e.g., both auditory and motor processes are performed
automatically in parallel and compete, or they both bring infor-
mation in an ongoing fusion process, etc.).
An obvious challenge, of course, is to bridge the gap between
computational approaches such as ours, which are usually
restricted to isolated syllable production and perception, and con-
ceptual models as proposed in the target article, that tackle
continuous ﬂows of speech and consider semantic, syntactic and
phonology layers of processing.
However, in our view, the main challenge for future studies is
ﬁrst to assess what kind of information is present in “association”
and “simulation” routes, and second, to better understand how
computational fusion models, describing the integration of these
two routes, can account for experimental neurocognitive data.
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Abstract: Although we agree with Pickering & Garrod (P&G) that
prediction-by-simulation and prediction-by-association are important
mechanisms of anticipatory language processing, this commentary
suggests that they: (1) overlook other potential mechanisms that might
underlie prediction in language processing, (2) overestimate the
importance of prediction-by-association in early childhood, and (3)
underestimate the complexity and signiﬁcance of several factors that
might mediate prediction during language processing.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) propose a model of language proces-
sing that blends production and comprehension mechanisms in
such a way as to allow language users to covertly predict upcoming
linguistic input. They ascribe a central role to our production
system covertly anticipating what the other person (or oneself)
might be likely to say in a particular situation (prediction-by-simu-
lation). A second prediction mechanism, they argue, is based on
the probability of a word being uttered (given other input) in
our experience of others’ speech (prediction-by-association). We
agree with P&G that prediction-by-simulation and prediction-
by-association are important mechanisms of anticipatory language
processing but believe that they overlook other (additional) poten-
tial mechanisms, overestimate the importance of prediction-by-
association in early childhood, and underestimate the complexity
and signiﬁcance of several mediating factors.
Multiple mechanisms. If we consider predictive language pro-
cessing to be any pre-activation of the representational content
of upcoming words, then only multiple-mechanism accounts of
prediction that are even more comprehensive than P&G’s can
account for the multifarious phenomena documented in the
language processing literature to date. Schwanenﬂugel and
Shoben (1985), for example, have argued that more featural
restrictions of upcoming words are generated in advance of the
input in high as opposed to low predictive contexts. These featural
(e.g., semantic, syntactic) restrictions may then constrain what
words are likely to come up. In other words, pre-activation of rep-
resentational content is constrained by the featural restrictions
generated in particular contexts (e.g., via spreading activation in
a semantic network). Whereas such online generation of featural
restrictions may be compatible with prediction-by-simulation (as
P&G appear to point out), it is conceivable that such pre-acti-
vation can also happen independently of prediction-by simulation
and thus constitutes a third anticipatory mechanism.
Predictive language processing may also make use of certain
heuristics and biases (cf. Tversky & Kahneman 1973). Borrowing
the availability heuristic from decision-making research, upcom-
ing words may be pre-activated simply because of an availability
bias (certain words/representations may be very frequent or
have occurred very recently). The analogy to decision-making
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research is not as far-fetched as one may think: Tversky and
Kahneman introduced a simulation heuristic in the 1970s accord-
ing to which people predict the likelihood of an upcoming event
by how easy it is to simulate it. Other heuristics may well be
worth exploring (in line with the affect heuristic, emotionally
charged words, e.g., stupid, boring, may be predicted more
rapidly). Our point is simply that predictive language processing
is likely to be complex and may make use of a set of rather
diverse mechanisms (with many yet unexplored).
Importance of prediction-by-simulation in development. P&G
suggest that analysis of children’s prediction abilities might
throw light on the distinction between prediction-by-association
and prediction-by-simulation and place stronger emphasis on pre-
diction-by-association in young children: Prediction-by-associ-
ation might play a more important role when listeners and
speakers have little in common with each other, such as the
case of children listening to adults’ talking.
In a recent experiment examining 2-year-olds’ prediction abil-
ities, however, we found that, consistent with prediction-by-simu-
lation, only toddlers in possession of a large production vocabulary
are able to predict upcoming linguistic input in another speaker’s
utterance (Mani & Huettig 2012; see Melzer et al. 2012, for
similar results in action perception). Furthermore, if, as P&G
suggest, covert imitation is the driving force of prediction-by-
simulation, then 18-month-olds are equipped with the cognitive
pre-requisites for covert imitation: Covert imitation can modulate
infants’ eye gaze behaviour around a (linguistically relevant) visual
scene (Mani & Plunkett 2010; Mani et al. 2012) similar to adults’
behaviour (Huettig & McQueen 2007). Prediction-by-simulation
may also be an important developmental mechanism to train
the production system (Chang et al. 2006). In sum, prediction-
by-simulation appears to be crucial even early in development,
and hence prediction-by-association is not necessarily the simple
prediction mechanism which dominates early childhood.
Mediating factors. Finally, there are many mediating factors
(e.g., literacy, working memory capacity, cross-linguistic differ-
ences) involved in predictive language processing whose inter-
action with anticipatory mechanisms have been little explored
and whose importance, we believe, has been vastly underesti-
mated. Mishra et al. (2012), for instance, observed that Indian
high literates, but not low literates, showed language-mediated
anticipatory eye movements to concurrent target objects in a
visual scene. Why literacy modulates anticipatory eye gaze
remains to be resolved, though literacy-related differences in
associations (including low-level word-to-word contingency stat-
istics, McDonald & Shillcock, 2003), online generation of featural
restrictions, and general processing speed are likely to be
involved. Similarly, Federmeier et al. (2002) found that older
adults are less likely to show prediction-related beneﬁts during
sentence processing with a strong suggestion that differences in
working memory capacity underlie differences in predictive pro-
cessing. The inﬂuence of such mediating factors may greatly
depend on the situation language users ﬁnd themselves in: Antici-
patory eye gaze in the visual world, for instance, requires the
building of online models allowing for visual objects to be linked
to unfolding linguistic information, places, times, and each other.
Working memory capacity may be particularly important for
anticipatory processing during such language-vision interactions
(Huettig & Janse 2012).
More work is also required with regard to the speciﬁc represen-
tations which are pre-activated in particular situations. Event-
related potential studies have shown that even the grammatical
gender (van Berkum et al. 2005), phonological form (DeLong
et al. 2005), and visual form of the referents (Rommers et al.
2013) of upcoming words can be anticipated. Most of these
studies, however, have used highly predictive “lead-in” sentences.
It also remains to be seen to which extent these speciﬁc represen-
tations are activated in weakly and moderately predictive contexts.
Last but not least, languages differ dramatically in all levels of lin-
guistic organisation (Evans & Levinson 2009). These cross-linguistic
differences are bound to have substantial impacts on the speciﬁcs
(and degree) of anticipatory processing a particular language affords.
Future work could usefully explore the cognitive reality and
relative importance of the potential mechanisms and mediating
factors mentioned here. Even though Occam’s razor may favour
single-mechanism accounts, we conjecture that multiple-mechan-
ism accounts are required to provide a complete picture of antici-
patory language processing.
Toward a uniﬁed account of comprehension
and production in language development
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Abstract: Although Pickering & Garrod (P&G) argue convincingly for a
uniﬁed system for language comprehension and production, they fail to
explain how such a system might develop. Using a recent computational
model of language acquisition as an example, we sketch a developmental
perspective on the integration of comprehension and production. We
conclude that only through development can we fully understand the
intertwined nature of comprehension and production in adult processing.
Much like current approaches to language processing, contem-
porary accounts of language acquisition typically assume a sharp
distinction between comprehension and production. This assump-
tion is driven, in large part, by evidence for a number of asymme-
tries between comprehension and production in development.
Comprehension is usually taken to precede production (e.g.,
Fraser et al. 1963), although there are certain instances in
which children exhibit adult-like production of sentence types
that they do not appear to comprehend correctly (cf. Grimm
et al. 2011). Evidence for such asymmetries strongly constrains
theories of language acquisition, challenging integrated accounts
of development and, by extension, integrated accounts of adult
processing. Hence, it is key to determine the plausibility of a
uniﬁed framework for acquisition that is compatible with evidence
for comprehension/production asymmetries.
Although Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) target article may be
construed as a useful point of departure in this respect, P&G
pay scant attention to how such a uniﬁed system for comprehen-
sion and production might develop. As a result, they implicitly
subscribe to a different, questionable distinction often made in
the language literature: the separation of acquisition from adult
processing. In light of this, and given the tendency of develop-
mental psycholinguists to view comprehension and production
as separate systems, we brieﬂy sketch a uniﬁed developmental fra-
mework for understanding comprehension and production as a
single system, instantiated by a recent usage-based computational
model of acquisition (McCauley & Christiansen 2011; submitted).
Importantly, our approach is consistent with evidence for compre-
hension/production asymmetries in development, even while
uniting comprehension and production within a single framework.
Our computational model, like that of Chang et al. (2006),
simulates both comprehension and production, but it goes
beyond this and previous usage-based models (e.g., Borensztajn
et al. 2009; Freudenthal et al. 2007) in that (a) it learns to do so
incrementally using simple distributional information; (b) it
offers broad, cross-linguistic coverage; and (c) it accommodates
a range of developmental ﬁndings. The model learns from
corpora of child and child-directed speech, acquiring item-based
knowledge in a purely incremental fashion, through online learn-
ing using backward transitional probabilities (which infants track;
cf. Pelucchi et al. 2009). The model uses peaks and dips in
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transitional probabilities to chunk words together as they are
encountered, incrementally building an item-based “shallow
parse” as each incoming utterance unfolds. The model stores
the word sequences it groups together, gradually building up an
inventory of multiword chunks – a “chunkatory” –which underlies
both comprehension and production. When the model encoun-
ters a multiword utterance produced by the target child of a
corpus, it attempts to generate an identical utterance using only
chunks and transitional probabilities learned up to that point. Cru-
cially, the very same chunks and distributional information used
during production are used to make predictions about upcoming
material during comprehension. This type of prediction-by-associ-
ation facilitates the model’s shallow processing of the input. The
model’s comprehension abilities are scored against a state-of-
the-art shallow parser, and its production abilities are scored
against the target child’s original utterances (the model’s utter-
ances must match the child’s).
The model makes close contact with P&G’s approach in that it
uses information employed during production to make predictions
about upcoming linguistic material during comprehension (consist-
ent with recent evidence that children’s linguistic predictions are
tied to production; cf. Mani & Huettig 2012). However, our
approach extends P&G’s account from prediction to the acquisition
and use of linguistic knowledge itself; comprehension and pro-
duction rely upon a single set of statistics and representations,
which are reinforced in an identical manner during both processes.
Moreover, our model’s design reﬂects recent psycholinguistic
ﬁndings that have hitherto remained largely unconnected, but
which, when viewed as complementary to one another, strongly
support a uniﬁed framework for comprehension and production.
First, the model is motivated by children’s use of multiword
units in production (Bannard & Matthews 2008), which cautions
against models of production in which words are selected inde-
pendently of one another. The model’s primary reliance on the
discovery and storage of useful multiword sequences follows this
line of evidence. Second, the model is motivated by evidence
that children, like adults, can rely on shallow processing and
underspeciﬁed representations during comprehension (e.g.,
Gertner & Fisher 2012; Sanford & Sturt 2002). Shallow proces-
sing, supplemented by contextual information (e.g., tied to seman-
tic and pragmatic knowledge) may often give children the
appearance of comprehending grammatical constructions they
have not yet mastered (and therefore cannot use effectively in
production). The model exhibits this in its better comprehension
performance; through chunking, the model can arrive at an item-
based “shallow parse” of an utterance, which can then be used in
conjunction with semantic and pragmatic information to arrive at
a “good enough” interpretation of the utterance (Ferreira et al.
2002). On the production side, however, the model – like a child
learning to speak – is faced with the task of retrieving and sequen-
cing words and chunks in a particular order. Hence, asymmetries
arise from differing task demands, despite the use of the very
same statistics and linguistic units during both comprehension
and production.
Such an abandonment of the “cognitive sandwich” approach to
acquisition clearly has implications for adult processing. If, as we
suggest and make explicit in our model, children learn to compre-
hend and produce speech by using the same distributional infor-
mation and chunk-based linguistic units for both tasks, we would
expect adults to continue to rely on a uniﬁed set of represen-
tations. This is corroborated by studies showing that, like children,
adults not only rely on multiword units in production (Janssen &
Barber 2012), but also use multiword sequences during compre-
hension (e.g., Arnon & Snider 2010; Reali & Christiansen
2007). This evidence further suggests that prediction-by-associ-
ation may be more important for language processing than
assumed by P&G, not just for children as indicated by our
model, but also for adults. It is only by considering how the
adult system emerges from the child’s attempts to comprehend
and produce linguistic utterances that we can hope to reach a
complete understanding of the intertwined nature of language
comprehension and production.
What does it mean to predict one’s own
utterances?
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Abstract: Many authors have recently highlighted the importance of
prediction for language comprehension. Pickering & Garrod (P&G) are
the ﬁrst to propose a central role for prediction in language production.
This is an intriguing idea, but it is not clear what it means for speakers
to predict their own utterances, and how prediction during production
can be empirically distinguished from production proper.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) offer an integrated framework of
speech production and comprehension, highlighting the impor-
tance of predicting upcoming utterances. Given the growing evi-
dence for commonalities between production and comprehension
processes and for the importance of prediction in comprehension,
we ﬁnd their proposal timely and interesting.
Our comment focuses mainly on the role of prediction in
language production. P&G propose that speakers predict
aspects of their utterance plans and compare these predictions
against the actual utterance plans. This monitoring process
happens at each processing level, that is, minimally at the seman-
tic, syntactic, and phonological level.
Given the important role of prediction in comprehension and
the well-attested similarities between production and comprehen-
sion, the idea that prediction should play a role in speech pro-
duction follows quite naturally. Nevertheless, to us the proposal
that speakers predict their utterance plans does not have immedi-
ate appeal. This is because, in everyday parlance, prediction and
the predicted event have some degree of independence. It is
because of this independence that predictions may or may not
be borne out. It makes sense to say a person predicts the out-
comes of their hand or jaw movements, as these outcomes are
not fully determined by the cognitive processes underlying the
predictions, but depend, among other things, on properties of
the physical environment that may not be known to the person
planning the movement. Similarly, it makes sense to say that a lis-
tener predicts what a speaker will say because the speaker’s utter-
ances are not caused by the same cognitive processes as those that
lead to the listener’s prediction. Speaker and listener each have
their own, private cognition and therefore the listener’s expec-
tations about the speaker’s utterance may or may not be met.
We can predict our own utterances. For instance, based on
memory of past experience, I can predict how I will greet my
family. However, such predictions concern overt behavior rather
than plans for behavior, and they occur ofﬂine rather than in par-
allel with the predicted behavior. Just like predictions about other
persons, my predictions of my own utterances may or may not be
borne out, depending on circumstances not known at the moment
of prediction. I may, for instance, deviate from my predicted
greeting if I ﬁnd my family standing on their heads.
Such ofﬂine predictions of overt behavior differ from the pre-
dictions proposed by P&G. In their framework, speakers predict
their utterance plans as they plan them, with prediction at each
planning level running somewhat ahead of the actual planning.
Importantly, the predictions are based on the same information
as the predicted behavior, namely, the speaker’s intention
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(target article, sect. 3.1, “production command” in Fig. 5) and
involve closely related cognitive processes, although the plans
are more detailed than the predictions and can therefore be
created faster. With respect to the information encoded in both
representations, plan and prediction will be identical. Discrepan-
cies can only arise when the plan and/or prediction include a fault.
This is different from predictions a listener might generate about a
speaker’s upcoming utterance; no matter how well aligned
speaker and listener are in a dialogue, their intentions are not
identical, and their cognitive processes are not shared.
P&G invoke prediction during production to support self-moni-
toring. It is not entirely clear how the monitoring processes would
work and how beneﬁcial they would be. Key properties of the pre-
dicted representations are that they are more abstract and that
they are created faster than the speech plans and not necessarily
in the same order. This raises the issues of how it is decided
which information to include in the prediction and what to omit
and, given that planning and predicting need not follow the
same time course, whether and how the cognitive processes
leading to plans and predictions differ. It is also not clear why pre-
dictions would be more likely to be correct than plans, and how a
speaker detects errors concerning features of the utterance that
are not included in the predictions. Finally, as P&G point out,
there is strong evidence for the involvement of forward modeling
in motor planning, but there is as yet no empirical evidence
demonstrating that this approach scales up in the way they envi-
sion. Finding this evidence is likely to be extremely challenging,
as it will, for instance, involve separating the time course of plan-
ning and predicting and the properties of the planned and pre-
dicted representations.
The question of what and when to predict is also relevant for
prediction during comprehension. P&G assume, correctly in our
view, that in dialogue there is often not sufﬁcient information in
the mind of the comprehender to generate reliable predictions
at all conceptual and linguistic levels. This results in two possibili-
ties. One is that predictions are always made, but will often be
highly unreliable, creating a need for correction that would not
exist in the absence of prediction. The other option is that predic-
tion occurs only if there is sufﬁcient information for making a valid
prediction. P&G seem to favor the latter option (“comprehenders
make whatever linguistic predictions they can”; sect. 3.2, para. 1).
However, their model should then specify a mechanism or pro-
cedure that determines when to predict and when not to do so.
In passing, we note another gap in P&G’s proposal: According
to P&G, predictions can be generated via an association route
and a simulation route. But how are the contributions of the
two prediction routes weighted and integrated? What happens if
these predictions do not fully match?
In sum, we are not convinced that prediction plays a similar
crucial role in speech production as it does in comprehension.
Whereas my listener can at best guess (predict) what I might
say next, as a speaker I know perfectly well where I am heading,
and plans and predictions cannot be separated. Moreover, the
account of prediction in both production and comprehension
needs further speciﬁcation of what triggers the decision to
predict and of how predictions are derived.
Is there any evidence for forward modeling
in language production?
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Abstract: The neurocognitive evidence that Pickering & Garrod (P&G)
cite in favor of positing forward models in speech production is not
compelling. The data to which they appeal either cannot be explained
by forward models, or can be explained by a more parsimonious model.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) take production commands to be
conceptual representations that encode high-level features –
“information about communicative force (e.g., interrogative),
pragmatic context, and a nonlinguistic situation model” (target
article, sect. 3.1, para. 3). On their model, a production
command is input directly to the production implementer,
which outputs an utterance. But somewhere in between this
input and output, there must be, in addition, an intermediate rep-
resentation that speciﬁes the low-level features of the utterance,
for example, its phonological and phonetic features. In what
follows, we will call this low-level production command the utter-
ance plan. In the analogous motor control case, upon which P&G
base their model, an utterance plan corresponds to a motor
command, which speciﬁes the low-level features of the bodily
movement, and is output by the inverse model (Wolpert 1997).
We argue here that the evidence that P&G cite in favor of posit-
ing forward models in speech production is not compelling. More
speciﬁcally, the data to which they appeal either cannot be
explained by forward models, or can be explained by a more par-
simonious model, on which the utterance plan and the sensory
feedback are directly compared. On this alternative picture,
there is no need to posit forward models.
P&G appeal to Heinks-Maldonado et al. (2006) to support their
claim that forward modeling is used in speech production. They
argue that the suppressed M100 signal in the condition where par-
ticipants spoke and heard their own unaltered speech – compared
with conditions in which their speech was distorted or they heard
an artiﬁcial voice – is the result of the forward model prediction
“canceling out” the matching auditory feedback from the utter-
ance. They urge that “the rapidity of the effect suggests that
speakers could not be comprehending what they heard and com-
paring this to their memory of their planned utterance” (sect. 3.1,
para. 16). While this is indeed implausible, there is an alternative
hypothesis that is not ruled out by the data: The attenuation effect
results from a match between the utterance plan and auditory
feedback. Such a comparison would take no more time than the
purported comparison between the forward model prediction
and auditory feedback. The same point applies to P&G’s discus-
sion of the datum reported in Levelt (1983) concerning mid-
word self-correction.
Some theorists (e.g., Prinz 2012, p. 238) have insisted that what-
ever states enter into the comparison with sensory feedback must
have the same representational format as the feedback. Because
an utterance plan must encode the low-level features of the utter-
ance that it speciﬁes, it arguably meets this criterion.
P&G also appeal to the results reported in Tourville et al.
(2008), highlighting two features of that study. First, the compen-
sation that participants make in response to distorted auditory
feedback is rapid – “a hallmark of feedforward (predictive) moni-
toring (as correction following feedback would be too slow)” (sect.
3.1, para. 17). But rapid compensation can only be attributed to
forward modeling when the forward model prediction is used in
place of the auditory feedback during online control of behavior.
The idea is that, by using the putative forward model prediction of
the sensory feedback, the system need not wait for the auditory
feedback. However, this cannot be the case in the experiment
conducted by Tourville et al. (2008), because the distorted audi-
tory feedback is externally induced at random, and therefore
unpredictable. Participants must base their compensations on
the distorted auditory feedback itself, since no prediction would
be available in this type of case. Hence, however rapid their com-
pensation, it cannot reﬂect the operation of forward modeling.
The second feature of the Tourville et al. (2008) study to which
P&G appeal is that “the fMRI [functional magnetic resonance
imaging] results identiﬁed a network of neurons coding
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mismatches between expected and actual auditory signals” (sect.
3.1, para. 17). But while the fMRI results did identify a network
of neurons that has been shown to be activated when auditory
feedback from an utterance is distorted (Fu et al. 2006; Hashi-
moto & Sakai 2003; Hirano et al. 1997; McGuire et al. 1996),
the further claim that these neurons code mismatches between
forward model predictions (“expected” auditory signals) and
actual auditory signals is unwarranted by the available neuroima-
ging data. All such data are equally consistent with the more
parsimonious hypothesis that these neurons code mismatches
between the utterance plan and the auditory feedback.
Finally, we are skeptical of P&G’s interpretation of the data in
Tian and Poeppel (2010). The Tian and Poeppel study found acti-
vation in the auditory cortex in two conditions: after participants
actually produced a syllable and after they merely imagined pro-
ducing that same syllable. Following Tian and Poeppel, P&G
interpret such activation as evidence of forward modeling.
However, this activation may simply encode a general expectation
that a sound will be heard, rather than speciﬁcally encoding the
anticipated auditory feedback. Moreover, even if this activation
were shown to be a representation of speciﬁc auditory feedback,
it does not follow that the activation should be construed as a
forward model prediction. It could instead subserve a mere simu-
lation of the auditory feedback. In order to determine that this
activation subserves a forward model prediction, as against a
mere simulation, we would need evidence that it plays the rel-
evant functional role – that is, it is both based on an efference
copy and that it goes on to be compared to auditory feedback.
Tian and Poeppel provide no evidence for the latter condition.
Indeed, the relevant kind of forward model should not be operat-
ive in the passive listening condition of Tian and Poeppel’s study.
So the fact that auditory cortex activations were found to be
similar for listening passively to a sound and imagining producing
that sound does not support the claim that the latter reﬂects
forward modeling in particular. Finally, Tian and Poeppel’s
framing of the issue is itself suspect. They cast forward model pre-
dictions as conscious personal-level states –mental images of a
certain kind. One might reasonably doubt that such subpersonal
states are ever present in the phenomenology that accompanies
speech production.
Inner speech as a forward model?
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) consider the possibility that inner
speech might be a product of forward production models. Here I
consider the idea of inner speech as a forward model in light of
empirical work from the past few decades, concluding that, while
forward models could contribute to it, inner speech nonetheless
requires activity from the implementers.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) argue that coarse predictions from
forward models can help detect errors of overt speech production
before they occur. This error-detecting function is often assigned
to inner speech (e.g., Levelt 1983; Levelt et al. 1999; Nooteboom
1969): the little voice in one’s head, better known for its role in
conscious thought. It is therefore tempting to identify inner
speech as a product of these forward models, with p^ ! c^ provid-
ing what we know as the internal loop. In fact, conceiving of inner
speech as a forward model could elegantly address three key ques-
tions. First, why do we have inner speech at all? Inner speech is a
by-product of speakers’ need to control their overt verbal behav-
ior. Second, why does inner speech develop so long after overt
speech (e.g., Vygotsky 1962)? Inner speech develops as the
speaker learns to simulate their verbal behavior, which may lag
behind the ability to produce that behavior. And third, how are
people able to produce inner speech without actually speaking
aloud? If inner speech is simply the ofﬂine use of forward
models (p^ ! c^), then speakers never need to engage the pro-
duction and comprehension implementers (p ! c) that are the
traditional generators and perceivers of inner speech.
P&G’s framework would speciﬁcally address two more recently
demonstrated qualities of inner speech. First, inner speech
involves attenuated access to subphonemic representations.
When people say tongue-twisters in their heads, their reported
errors are less inﬂuenced by subphonemic similarities than their
reported errors when saying them aloud (Oppenheim & Dell
2008; 2010; also Corley et al. 2011, as noted by Oppenheim
2012). For instance, /g/ shares more features with /k/ than with
/v/, so someone trying to say GOAT aloud would more likely
slip to COAT than VOTE, but this tendency is less pronounced
for inner slips. As P&G note, this ﬁnding is predicted if the
forward models underlying inner speech produce phonologically
impoverished predictions (and thus might not reﬂect the pro-
duction implementer). Second, inner speech is ﬂexible enough
to incorporate additional detail. Although inner slips show less
pronounced similarity effects than overt speech, adding silent
articulation is sufﬁcient to boost their similarity effect, apparently
coercing inner speech to include more subphonemic detail
(Oppenheim & Dell 2010). Such ﬂexibility could be problematic
for models that assign inner speech to a speciﬁc level of the pro-
duction process (e.g., Levelt et al. 1999), but P&G’s account
speciﬁcally suggests that forward models simulate multiple
levels of representation, so it might accommodate the subphone-
mic ﬂexibility of inner speech by adding motoric predictions
( p^[sem,syn,phon,art]; forward models’ more traditional jurisdic-
tion) that are tied to motor planning.
But forward model simulations cannot provide a complete
account of inner speech. One would still need to use what P&G
would call “the production implementer” (target article, sect. 3,
para. 2). First, inner rehearsal facilitates overt speech production
(MacKay 1981; Rauschecker et al. 2008; but cf. Dell & Repka
1992), suggesting that some aspects of the production implemen-
ter are also employed in inner speech. Second, there is abundant
evidence that people easily detect their inner speech errors
(Corley et al. 2011; Dell 1978; Dell & Repka 1992; Hockett
1967; Meringer & Meyer 1895, cited in MacKay 1992; Oppen-
heim & Dell 2008; 2010; Postma & Noordanus 1996). But since
monitoring is described as the resolution of predicted and actual
percepts (from forward models and implementers, respectively),
it is unclear how one could detect and identify inner slips
without having engaged the production implementer. (Conﬂict
monitoring, e.g., Nozari et al. 2011, within forward models
might at least allow error detection, but its use there seems to
lack independent motivation, and still leaves the problem of
how a speaker could identify the content of an inner slip.)
Third, analogues of overt speech effects are often reported for
experiments substituting inner-speech-based tasks. For instance,
inner slips tend to create words, just like their overt counterparts
(Corley et al. 2011; Oppenheim & Dell 2008; 2010), and their dis-
tributions resemble overt slips in other ways (Dell 1978; Postma &
Noordanus 1996). And though inner and overt speech can
diverge, they tend to elicit similar behavioral and neurophysiolo-
gical effects in other domains (e.g., Kan & Thompson-Schill
2004), and their impairments are highly correlated (e.g., Geva
et al. 2011). Though more ink is spilled cautioning differences
between inner and overt speech, similarities between the two
are the rule rather than the exception (at least for pre-articulatory
aspects).
Given the impoverished character of P&G’s forward models, it
seems difﬁcult to account for such parallels without assuming a
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role for production implementers in the creation of inner speech.
Therefore, we could posit that inner speech works much like overt
speech production, recalling P&G’s acknowledgment that ofﬂine
simulations could engage the implementers, actively truncating
the process before articulation; forward models would supply a
necessary monitoring component. This more-explicit account of
inner speech allows us to question P&G’s suggestion that the sub-
phonemic attenuation of inner speech might reﬂect impoverish-
ment of the forward model instead of the generation of an
abstract phonological code by the production implementer.
Having clariﬁed the role of forward models as error detection,
their suggestion now boils down to the idea that inner slips
might be hard to “hear.” Empirical work suggests that is not the
case. Experiments using noise-masked overt speech (Corley
et al. 2011) and silently mouthed speech (Oppenheim & Dell
2010) showed that each acts much like normal overt speech in
terms of similarity effects (see also Oppenheim 2012). And, by
explicitly modeling biased error detections, Oppenheim and
Dell (2010) formally ruled out the suggestion that their evidence
for abstraction merely reﬂected such biases. Thus, better specify-
ing the role of forward models in inner speech allows the con-
clusion that the subphonemic attenuation of inner speech does
have its basis in the production implementer. More generally,
conceiving of forward models as components of inner speech
can wed strengths of the forward model account with the ﬁdelity
of implementer-based simulations.
Does what you hear predict what you will do
and say?
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Abstract: I evaluate the bottlenecks involved in the simulation mechanism
underpinning superior predictive abilities for upcoming actions. This
perceptual-motor state is characterized by a complex interrelationship
designed to make predictions using a highly ﬁne-tuned and constrained
motor operation. The extension of such mechanisms to language may
occur only in sensorimotor circuits devoted to the action domain.
One of the most inﬂuential current theories suggests that higher-
order socio-cognitive processes, such as mind/intention reading
and the compound aspects of language, may be primarily
“grounded” in sensorimotor brain (Barsalou 2008).
Inspired by multiple-duty cells originally discovered in the
monkey (di Pellegrino et al. 1992), neuroimaging studies have
proposed that the human brain is equipped with speciﬁc, rapid,
and automatic mechanisms that share action execution and per-
ception in a common representational domain (Aglioti & Pazzaglia
2010; 2011; Van Overwalle & Baetens 2009). According to Picker-
ing & Garrod (P&G), this inherent bidirectional, functional, and
anatomical link seems to monitor the perception of other
agents’ actions through predictive mechanisms. The authors
suggest that a simulative process might also run an internal gen-
erative representation that serves predictions in response to lin-
guistic input. Despite nearly two decades of intensive research
on the inextricable link between the perception and execution
of action, there are two key problems with action prediction
through simulation and, consequently, with its application to
language processing.
The ﬁrst bottleneck concerns neurophysiological and cognitive
constraints, as revealed by action predictive coding. Inferring the
intention of an action from a perceptual-motor code should imply
accurate, one-to-one perceptual motor mapping between the goal
and its respective kinematics (Kilner 2011). This is evident, for
example, with a speciﬁc set of “action-constrained” single-cell
recordings in monkeys, which ﬁred during grasping for eating
but not during grasping for placing (Fogassi et al. 2005). Upon
exploring the various ways in which humans can reach and
grasp, it appears that the kinematics precisely differ with
respect to compatibility, or incompatibility, with the goal (e.g.,
drinking vs. passing) (Tretriluxana et al. 2008). Crucially, activity
in the inferior frontal cortex of onlooking human individuals is
modulated differentially when a model exhibits different inten-
tions associated with the grasping action (Iacoboni et al. 2005).
In order to achieve this overall intention, an individual selects the
most appropriate movement that is compatible with the purpose
of the action. Within this framework, it is clear that the motor rep-
resentations are comparatively stable and can be arranged in a
limited, pre-wired motor chain that is functionally interpreted in
terms of motor intention (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2007).
Speech sound representations, however, are highly variable; the
linguistic message can be achieved with many speech sounds and,
more questionably, the same speech units vary with their position
within a word (Mottonen & Watkins 2009). In language proces-
sing, prediction by a simulation mechanism is plausible for articu-
latory representations consisting of a limited set of uniform
elements that mainly differ in their serial positions and require
precise selection and timing, and are at least pre-wired in two
units (noun and verb) to form a complete sentence. This type of
mechanism was reported for the hearing or reading of motor-
related words/sentences, for which a growing number of studies
have proposed a constant matching of input–output processes,
however action-system mediated (Buccino et al. 2005; Pulvermül-
ler & Fadiga 2010; Tettamanti et al. 2005). Moreover, several
studies have documented how a rapid simulation process supports
motor-related speech/language in the frontal motor cortex,
ranging from the spontaneous imagery mechanism of tracking
articulatory gestures to the complex motor aspects of action
verbs or tool words that grant them their meaning (Pulvermüller
2005). Hence, the motor counterpart enables the matching of
production and comprehension, extending motor-related sound
identiﬁcation to language (the “what” of speech recognition),
which in turn leads to predictive coding. Given the role of
motor system, it remains unclear whether language perception
occurs in a more general cognitive-motor domain or is an inde-
pendent representation interacting with the action system
(Fadiga & Craighero 2006). In addition, an intense debate exists
that intimately links language and action at the ontogentic
(Bates & Dick 2002) and phylogentic (Toni et al. 2008; Zlatev
2008) levels. From an evolutionary perspective, studies have pos-
tulated that language initially evolved from manual gestures in the
form of a system of manual skills, pantomime, and protosigns
(Arbib 2005; Leroi-Gourhan 1964; 1965). The subsequent con-
ventionalization of signs and the shift to vocal emblems has
enabled the transition to more symbolic, alternative, and open
systems of communication (Corballis 2009).
The second bottleneck refers to the controversial neural and
functional evidence reported by neuropsychological analyses. In
brain-damaged patients with signiﬁcant deﬁcits of execution, the
ability to predict and understand an observed/heard action may
be spared. Although recent studies indicated a positive correlation
between deﬁcits in perceived and performed actions (Buxbaum
et al. 2005; Nelissen et al. 2010), many studies fail to provide
straightforward evidence for direct matching between observed
and executed actions (Hickok 2009a). Precise perceptual-motor
coding, on which predictions must be planned, would explain
the input–output associations of the impairment, but not
the range of dissociations reported at both the group (Cubelli
et al. 2000; Halsband et al. 2001; Negri et al. 2007; Pazzaglia
et al. 2008a) or single-case (Pazzaglia et al. 2008b; Rumiati et al.
2001) level. Moreover, the published studies do not clarify
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whether or not neurologic patients are still able to infer the inten-
tion of an observed action (Fontana et al. 2012), despite the dis-
ruption in the ability to mentally simulate movements (Pazzaglia
et al. 2008a).
Although the dissociations between the neural and functional
aspects of matching among input–output still need to be clariﬁed
in aphasic and apraxic patients (Pulvermüller et al. 2005; Pazzaglia
2013), the plausible implications of anatomical and clinical diver-
gences cannot be ignored. Dissociation, rather than the associ-
ation of neuropsychological deﬁcits in brain-damaged patients,
continues to be a highly sensitive veriﬁcation technique that is
necessary to exclude vitiates and deﬁne the reliability boundaries
of empirically viable theories.
Therefore, the range of possible dissociations between pro-
duction and comprehension, which can occur in both action and
language, is rather multifarious. In this conception, such dis-
sociations are reliant upon higher-order sensorimotor experiences
manifesting in the computational brain, namely: the intention to
act; stable memory traces for different types of percepts; and
the ecological and cultural conditions in which gestural, linguistic,
and affective communication are implemented. Such processes
could probably also interact with unique, more basic, low-level
motor-resonance mechanisms (Mahon & Caramazza 2008). In
particular, this can include the automatic selection of symboliza-
tion on which judgments regarding communication and predic-
tions of appropriateness are based.
P&G discuss and emphasize studies that interweave the pro-
duction and recognition of actions. However, they too quickly
exclude the limits of prediction via the simulation of action. By
not looking closely at the crucial roles of the physiological
process (whereby predictions emerge through extremely ﬁne-
grained cognitive-motor operations) and the neurologic popu-
lation (behavioral and anatomical disease is fully dissociable),
the extension of such mechanisms to language may become
unwarranted in situations where language does not call on cogni-
tive-motor representations. A fruitful direction for tracking a com-
plete theory of language processing must not only recognize the
degree to which the processes underlying language and action
are similar but should also discuss the intertwined and integrated
aspects of this relationship, at least in a conceptual sense.
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) explain dialogue dynamics in terms of
forward modeling and prediction-by-simulation mechanisms. Their theory
dissolves a strict segregation between production and comprehension
processes, and it links dialogue to action-based theories of joint action.
We propose that the theory can also incorporate intentional strategies that
increase communicative success: for example, signaling strategies that
help remaining predictable and forming common ground.
We highly appreciate Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) theory for
four main reasons. First, P&G address dialogue from a joint
action perspective, rather than in isolation from action, percep-
tion, and interaction dynamics, as most linguistic theories do.
P&G’s theory thereby points toward the naturalization of linguis-
tic communication and might help our understanding of how it
develops on top of the nonlinguistic “interaction engine” of our
earlier evolutionary ancestors (Levinson 2006; Pezzulo 2011b).
Second, to explain how interlocutors predict one another and
monitor the ongoing interaction, P&G use the notions of forward
modeling and prediction-by-simulation (Dindo et al. 2011; Grush
2004; Wolpert et al. 2003). These notions are increasingly adopted
in cognitive and social neuroscience; language studies could
greatly beneﬁt from linking to the same mechanistic framework.
Note that P&G’s theory does not overlook the speciﬁcities of
language processing, and it assumes that such a processing is struc-
tured along multiple levels: semantic, syntactic, and phonological.
Third, P&G provide a theoretically soundmotivation for the use
of production processes in (language) comprehension and com-
prehension processes in (language) production, dissolving a
strict production-comprehension dichotomy. P&G’s analysis
links well to a large body of evidence documenting the inter-
actions between perception and production processes outside
linguistic communication (Bargh & Chartrand 1999; Frith &
Frith 2008; Sebanz et al. 2006a), making it an excellent entry
point to study dialogue within an action-based framework.
Fourth, P&G’s theory explains how prediction and covert imita-
tion increase communication success and produce the automatic
alignment of linguistic representations, which they have exten-
sively documented empirically (Garrod & Pickering 2004; Picker-
ing & Garrod 2004).
These four reasons notwithstanding, however, we propose not
only that producers and comprehenders predict and covertly
imitate their interlocutors, but also that they adopt intentional
strategies that make their actions and intentions more predictable
and comprehensible (D’Ausilio et al. 2012a; Pezzulo 2011c;
Sartori et al. 2009; Vesper et al. 2011). In other words, to increase
communication success, we propose that they facilitate another’s
predictive (but also perceptual, inferential, attention, and
memory) processes. For example, they can adopt signaling strat-
egies to remain predictable and form common ground.
There are various demonstrations in which producers modulate
their behavior (e.g., loudness, choice of words, speech rate) –
depending on contextual factors (e.g., amount of noise, prior
knowledge or uncertainty of the comprehender) – to help the com-
prehender’s predicting and understanding. A well-known case is the
exaggeration of the vowels in child-directed speech (“motherese,”
Kuhl et al. 1997). Not only are these modulations used during teach-
ing, but also when comprehension is difﬁcult, as is evident to those
ﬁnding themselves speaking more loudly and over-articulating in
noisy environments (the so-called “Lombard effect”).
Signaling strategies can be characterized in terms of efﬁcient
management of resources (e.g., articulatory effort, time) within
an optimization framework that optimizes the joint goal of com-
munication success (Pezzulo 2011c; Pezzulo & Dindo 2011); see
also Moore (2007). Signaling consists of the intentional modu-
lation of one’s own behavior (e.g., over-articulation) so that, in
addition to its usual pragmatic or communicative goals (e.g.,
informing the interlocutor), the performed action fulﬁlls the
additional goal of facilitating the interlocutor’s prediction and
monitoring processes (e.g., lowers the uncertainty or cognitive
load). Compared to an optimal action, this modulation comes at
a “cost” (e.g., a motor cost associated with over-articulation).
However, as signaling ultimately helps to maximize the joint
goal of communicative success, it is part of a joint action optimiz-
ation process and is not (necessarily) altruistic.
Within the optimization framework, a cost-beneﬁt analysis
determines the decision to signal or not. This implies that signal-
ing should be more frequent in uncertain contexts, when predic-
tion is harder. To assess the theory, we designed a (nonlinguistic)
joint task in which signaling determined a motor cost. We
reported that the producers’ signaling probability depended on
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the comprehenders’ uncertainty; producers stopped signaling
when it was low (Pezzulo & Dindo 2011). As this was the case
even when producers received no online feedback from the com-
prehender, we hypothesized that they maintained an internal
model of the comprehender’s uncertainty. Computational and
empirical arguments suggest that the choice of signaling was stra-
tegic and intentional (although not necessarily conscious) rather
than a by-product of interaction dynamics.
In repeated interactions, signaling and other forms of sensori-
motor communication help in sharing representations and main-
taining a reliable common ground, too (Clark 1996; Pezzulo &
Dindo 2011; Sebanz et al. 2006a). For example, by emphasizing
the change of topic during a dialogue, a producer can reduce
the comprehender’s uncertainty at the level of task represen-
tations (say, dialogue topics) rather than only relative to the
current utterance and so form a common ground (i.e., “align”
the task representations of the interlocutors). Considerations of
parsimony apply, also: Although costly to maintain, the common
ground facilitates the continuation of the interaction, as both
interlocutors can use it to predict what comes next. Furthermore,
alignment entails parsimony: The shared part need not be main-
tained in two distinct forward models (one for each interlocutor),
but the same forward model can be used as a “production model”
for one interlocutor and “recognition model” for the other. We
modeled the interplay between shared task representations and
online action predictions using a hierarchical generative (Baye-
sian) architecture in which the former provide priors to the
latter, and signaling strategies can be used to share task represen-
tations intentionally (Pezzulo 2011c; Pezzulo & Dindo 2011).
Our proposals on signaling and joint action optimization can be
expressed in the neurocomputational architecture of P&G’s
theory. For example, producers can modulate their behavior
online by using prior knowledge and a forward model of the com-
prehender’s comprehension processes (e.g., they can over-articu-
late if the environment is noisy or if they foresee prediction
errors). In turn, comprehenders can use the feedback channel
strategically to expose their mental states and uncertainty by
using a forward model of the producer’s prediction and monitor-
ing process. Furthermore, producers can use ofﬂine predictions
(brieﬂy mentioned in P&G’s theory) to maintain a model of the
comprehender’s prior knowledge and uncertainty, and to
foresee the long-term communicative effects of their intended
messages (a form of recipient design).
By incorporating these (and similar) mechanisms, P&G’s theory
can explain intentional strategies such as signaling that –we
argue – act in concert with automatic processes of alignment
and mutual imitation to facilitate prediction, align representations,
and form common ground.
Prediction is no panacea: The key to language
is in the unexpected
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Abstract: For action systems, the critical task is to predict what will
happen next. In language, however, the critical task is not to predict the
next auditory event but to extract meaning. Reducing language to an
action system, and putting prediction at center, mistakenly marginalizes
our core capacity to communicate the novel and unpredictable.
The ﬂuency and rapidity with which we make ourselves under-
stood, especially within the context of a dialogue, demands expla-
nation: It is astounding that speakers alternate with essentially a
0-ms gap between turns (Sacks et al. 1974). In their target
article, Pickering & Garrod (P&G) rise to this challenge and put
forward an interesting and cogent framework that addresses this
pace, built upon an intertwining of production and comprehen-
sion processes in the service of language as an action system.
This intertwining is the headline of their proposal, but the real
explanatory meat lies in how these processes are jointly used:
the creation and checking of forward models, also known as pre-
dictions, about upcoming linguistic events. These predictions
speed comprehension, speed production, and thereby contribute
to “the remarkable ﬂuency of dialogue” (target article, sect. 5,
para.1).
We agree that many aspects of language use (especially within
dialogue) rely heavily on prediction, and in particular rely heavily
on predictions about observable aspects of language, for example,
a speaker’s stops and starts. We therefore understand why P&G
might conclude that language is a form of action and action per-
ception, and why they then afford a central position to forward
models and their ability to predictively monitor and control
actions. But although we certainly concur that prediction plays
an important explanatory role for theories of language, we
cannot help feeling that the emphasis given to action-based pre-
diction in this model – and prediction in general throughout
much of recent psycholinguistics (Altmann & Mirkovic ́ 2009;
DeLong et al. 2005; Dikker et al. 2009; Hale 2001; Levy
2008) – is overstated. The truly unique and indispensible power
of language does not lie in its ability to quickly communicate
the foreseeable, but rather the unforeseeable; to rapidly transfer
information that is novel, surprising, and unpredictable. In
P&G’s example, The day was breezy so the boy went outside to
ﬂy a kite, the critical phenomenon to explain is not why the last
word kite is processed faster and more efﬁciently than the ﬁrst
word day, but rather how the initial phrase, The day was
breezy, is understood at all, given its completely unpredictable
location halfway through a paper on psycholinguistic theory.
Unfortunately, this phenomenon is left unexplained by the frame-
work of P&G, as it is not directly related to prediction or action
perception. No amount of forward modeling can produce the
meaning of this initial phrase, as this meaning is not predictable
from the preceding context in any substantive way.
By ignoring this crucial, and to our minds primary, function of
language – extracting meaning from novel expressions – P&G do
not allow their framework to get off the ground. As their examples
testify, their model works well when predictions about time t+1
are generated during the last stages of a sentence. We see little
evidence, however, that their model can explain what happens
when t = 0, at the beginning of a sentence: Prediction relies on
context, and within P&G’s prediction-centric framework, there
is no provision for the initial creation of a context.
Ultimately, we think that solving this problem requires P&G to
drop, or at least substantially soften, their characterization of
language comprehension as a form of action perception. Under-
standing linguistic expressions goes far beyond perceiving the
actions by which they are delivered, and often, as in the case of
reading, there are no actions to be perceived at all. Neurologically,
this dissociation between perception and understanding is clearly
demonstrated by transcortical sensory aphasia (Boatman et al.
2000; Lichtheim 1885), where patients can repeat words (i.e.,
use perception and production) without understanding them.
Language, then, cannot simply be an action system but rather a
system capable of productively transforming incoming perceptual
elements into complex internal mental representations that
convey meaning.
To their credit, P&G recognize this problem to a certain degree
and include “well-deﬁned levels of linguistic representation, such
as semantics, syntax, and phonology” (target article, sect. 1.3,
para. 9) in their proposed cognitive architecture. However, it is
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unclear how these levels operate within an action/action percep-
tion system, as P&G do not specify whether their attempt to
“reject the cognitive sandwich” (sect. 1.2, para. 3) entails collap-
sing action, perception, and cognition into one system (as
Hurley [2008a] proposed), or just action and perception. Either
way, linguistic representations are too marginalized within the
model and require considerable elaboration to capture the rich
communicative possibilities of human language. The insistence
that language is only an action system leaves P&G with a model
that, although possibly eliminating the “cognitive sandwich,”
limits any explanation of the core function of language.
We believe that accounts of language must ﬁrst and foremost
explain the understanding of novel expressions. In other words,
it is not the primary function of language to align turns in a dialo-
gue by facilitating the comprehension of predictable words, but
rather to enable a listener to understand the meaning of a
speaker. Any model of language must conform to this prioritiza-
tion and place understanding at the center, ﬂanked by supporting
processes such as prediction.
To be sure, the type of forward models proposed by P&G may
still play an important role within such a framework as control
systems. In the same way that forward models can help explain
how a dancer completes a complex fouetté en tournant without
tumbling over, they can help explain the surprisingly error-free
execution of complex, rapid, interlaced dialogues. But just as we
would not expect theories of motor control to explain acts of
motor creativity (such as how a dancer improvises), we should
not expect an analogous theory to explain the core creative
aspects of language: the algorithms by which an entirely unex-
pected sentence can be integrated and understood, or by which
a complex novel thought becomes articulated as a sentence.
In sum, we do not doubt that people make predictions during
language use, quite possibly through the construction and evalu-
ation of forward models. We just do not believe that these predic-
tions comprise the foundation stones of a psychological theory of
communication. Rather, we believe psycholinguists should focus
on the representations these forward models are computed
over, the representations that allow creative linguistic thought.
Memory and cognitive control in an integrated
theory of language processing
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) integrated model of production
and comprehension includes no explicit role for nonlinguistic cognitive
processes. Yet, how domain-general cognitive functions contribute to
language processing has become clearer with well-speciﬁed theories and
supporting data. We therefore believe that their account can beneﬁt by
incorporating functions like working memory and cognitive control into
a uniﬁed model of language processing.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) offer an integrated model of language
processing that subsumes production and comprehension into a
single cognitive framework, treating language as a form of
action and action perception (cf. Clark 1996). This model draws
on work linking prediction to language comprehension (e.g.,
Rhode et al. 2011) and production (e.g., Dell et al. 1997), and
ﬁts with the more general idea that we interpret our world not
only by analyzing incoming information, but also by initiating
proactive processes of prediction and expectation (Bar 2009).
Although memory processes are not explicit in P&G’s frame-
work, the model invokes the maintenance and evaluation of mul-
tiple predictions and percepts, and relies on the retrieval of
contextual information to create forward, anticipatory models of
individuals’ linguistic and nonlinguistic actions. Memory and
other cognitive functions are presumably an important part of
these processes. A large body of work has investigated how
language processing interfaces with other cognitive abilities but,
like most psycholinguistic research, this has progressed mainly
independently in studies of language comprehension and pro-
duction. Despite this divide, recent work is converging on
similar conclusions about the types of nonlinguistic cognitive
systems that are critically involved in language production and
comprehension. This suggests that the role of these cognitive
systems might fruitfully be included in the forward modeling pro-
cesses advocated in P&G’s framework. We highlight how a few
aspects of this framework might draw on other cognitive systems.
Generating a prediction (of one’s own or another’s speech)
relies heavily on memory processes. Indeed, anticipating how an
utterance or a discourse will unfold necessarily depends on the
rapid coordination of considerable linguistic and contextual evi-
dence (Altmann & Kamide 1999; Tanenhaus 2007). To predict
effectively (and hence avoid confusion or misinterpretation),
current input must be linked to representations in working
memory and in a longer-term store of prior experience. Moreover,
individuals must be able to update and override these represen-
tations as new input is encountered moment by moment.
In the case of prediction-by-association, language users must
retrieve situation-relevant information and schemas from
memory as well as encode relevant information for use in future
associative predictions. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the
ease with which interlocutors can successfully encode and retrieve
relevant associations in memory relates to how successfully they
can align their discourse models, both in terms of the utterance
choices that speakers make (Horton & Gerrig 2005) and the
interpretations that listeners reach (Brown-Schmidt 2009).
Prediction-by-simulation, too, likely relies on memory pro-
cesses. For example, the accessibility of information in memory
inﬂuences how and when information is produced (Slevc 2011),
and because prediction-by-simulation relies on internal pro-
duction mechanisms, memory-based accessibility must also inﬂu-
ence the prediction of others’ speech. This is indeed the case. For
example, anaphor resolution is sensitive to the cognitive promi-
nence of antecedents (Cowles et al. 2007), and more accessible
syntactic structures are easier to parse (Branigan et al. 2005).
Additionally, irrelevant information active in memory can inter-
fere with both production (Slevc 2011) and parsing (Fedorenko
et al. 2006), which in some cases could be construed as interfer-
ence with one’s successful prediction of upcoming material in
real time.
In a sense, memory underlies the generation of predictions –
linguistic and otherwise – and, conversely, it is when predictions
are not met that linguistic information is better learned or
encoded into memory (e.g., Chang et al. 2006). There is, there-
fore, a tight linkage of memory and language processes; in fact,
the processes of forward modeling involved in language proces-
sing may even be the foundation for much of our verbal
memory ability (cf. Acheson & MacDonald 2009).
But it is not just the act of generating predictions that relies on
nonlinguistic cognitive processes. Another crucial component of
P&G’s model is monitoring, that is, comparing predicted to
observed utterance precepts. This comparison presumably
involves a process of detecting mismatch (or conﬂict) and resol-
ving any discovered incompatibility. Mounting evidence suggests
that conﬂict detection and its resolution via cognitive control
plays an important role in both language comprehension and pro-
duction (Novick et al. 2009). During comprehension, conﬂict is a
natural by-product of incremental parsing: When late-arriving evi-
dence is inconsistent with a reader’s or listener’s current represen-
tation of sentence meaning, conﬂict resolution and cognitive
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control functions deploy to revise earlier processing commitments
(Novick et al. 2005). Presumably, this applies to the monitoring
function as well: Conﬂict resolution processes must adjudicate
when an utterance precept is inconsistent with a speaker’s or lis-
tener’s expectation.
Linguistic conﬂict resolution functions depend on the involve-
ment of the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), an area recruited
when conﬂict must be resolved during nonlinguistic memory
tasks (Jonides & Nee 2006). If conﬂict resolution underlies pro-
cessing in a shared production/comprehension system, then deﬁ-
cits in these conﬂict resolution functions (e.g., in patients with
circumscribed lesions to the left IFG) should yield both expressive
and receptive language deﬁcits when linguistic representations
conﬂict. This is indeed the case: Such patients are known to
have selective memory impairments when conﬂict/interference
demands are high (Hamilton & Martin 2007; Thompson-Schill
et al. 2002), and they also suffer concomitant production and com-
prehension impairments under similar conditions (Novick et al.
2009).
In sum, we believe that an important extension of P&G’s model
is to consider how language processing interfaces with other cog-
nitive systems such as working memory and cognitive control. This
raises a number of questions; for example, how general or speciﬁc
are the cognitive systems involved in prediction and monitoring?
If domain-general, which domain-general mechanisms are
involved – for example, what are the roles of implicit and explicit
memory, and do other executive functions contribute? Consider-
ation of these types of issues is likely to lead toward a more fully
integrated theory of language processing and of cognitive function
more generally.
The poor helping the rich: How can incomplete
representations monitor complete ones?
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod (P&G) propose that inner speech monitoring
is subserved by predictions stemming from fast forward modeling. In this
commentary, we question this alignment of language prediction with the
inner speech monitor. We wonder how the speech monitor can function
so efﬁciently if it is based on incomplete representations.
Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) integrated account of language pro-
duction and comprehension brings forward novel cognitive mech-
anisms for a range of language processing functions. Here we
would like to focus on the theoretical development of the
speech monitor in P&G’s theory and the evidence cited in
support of it. The authors propose that we construct forward
models of predicted percepts during language production and
that these predictions form the basis to internally monitor and if
necessary correct our speech. This view of a speech monitor
grounded in domain-general action control is refreshing in many
ways. Nevertheless, in our opinion it raises a general theoretical
concern, at least in the form in which it is implemented in
P&G’s model. Furthermore, we believe that it is important to
emphasize that the evidence cited in support of the use of
forward modeling in speech monitoring is suggestive, but far
from directly supporting of the theory.
In general terms, we question the rationale behind the proposal
that incomplete representations constitute the basis of speech
monitoring. A crucial aspect of P&G’s model refers to timing.
Because forward representations are computed faster than the
actual representations that will be used to produce speech, the
former serve to correct potential deviations in the latter represen-
tations. To ensure that the forward representations are available
earlier than the implemented representations, P&G propose
that the percepts constructed by the forward model are impover-
ished, containing only part of the information necessary to
produce speech. But how can speech monitoring be efﬁcient if
it relies on “poor” representations to monitor the “rich” represen-
tations? For instance, a predicted syntactic percept could include
grammatical category, but lack number and gender information.
In this example, it is evident that if the slower production imple-
menter is erroneously preparing a verb instead of a noun, the pre-
dicted representation coming from the forward model might
indeed serve to detect and correct the error prior to speech
proper. However, if the representation prepared by the pro-
duction implementer contains a number or gender error, given
that this information is not speciﬁed in the predicted percept (in
this example), then how do we avoid these errors when speaking?
If the predicted language percepts are assumed to always be
incomplete in order to be available early in the process, it is
truly remarkable that an average speaker produces only about 1
error every 1,000 words (e.g., Levelt et al. 1999). Therefore,
although prediction likely plays an important role in facilitating
the retrieval of relevant language representations (e.g. Federme-
ier 2007; Strijkers et al. 2011) and hence could also serve to aid the
speech monitor, a proposal that identiﬁes predictive processes
with the inner speech monitor seems problematic or at least
underspeciﬁed for now.
Besides the above theoretical concern regarding the use of
incomplete representations as the basis of speech monitoring,
also the strength of the evidence cited to support the use of
forward modeling in speech production seems insufﬁcient at
present. The three studies discussed by P&G to illustrate the
usage of efference copies during speech production (i.e.,
Heinks-Maldonado et al. 2006; Tian & Poeppel 2010; Tourville
et al. 2008), demonstrate that shifting acoustic properties of lin-
guistic elements in the auditory feedback given to a speaker pro-
duces early auditory response enhancements. Although these data
are suggestive and merit further investigation, showing that reaf-
ference cancellation generalizes to self-induced sounds does not
prove that forward modeling is used for language production
per se. It merely highlights that a mismatch between predicted
and actual self-induced sounds (linguistic or not) produces an
enhanced sensorial response just as in other domains of self-
induced action (e.g., tickling). As for now, no study has explored
whether auditory suppression related to self-induced sounds is
also sensitive to purely linguistic phenomena (e.g., lexical fre-
quency) or to variables known to affect speech monitoring (e.g.,
lexicality). This leaves open the possibility that the evidence
cited only relates to general sensorimotor properties of speech
(acoustics and articulation) rather than the monitoring of language
proper.
In addition, the temporal arguments put forward by P&G to
conclude that these data cannot be explained by comprehen-
sion-based accounts and instead support the notion of speech
monitoring through prediction are premature. For instance,
P&G take the speed with which self-induced sound auditory sup-
pression occurs (around 100 ms after speech onset) as an indi-
cation that speakers could not be comprehending what they
heard and argue that this favors a role of forward modeling in
speech production. But, the speed with which lexical represen-
tations are activated in speech perception is still a debated issue
and some studies provide evidence for access to words within
100 ms (e.g., MacGregor et al. 2012; Pulvermüller & Shtyrov
2006). In a similar vein, P&G rely on Indefrey and Levelt’s
(2004) temporal estimates of word production to argue in favor
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of speech monitoring through prediction. However, this temporal
map is still hypothetical, especially in terms of the latencies
between the different representational formats (see Strijkers &
Costa 2011). More generally, one may question why P&G
choose to link the proposed model, intended to be highly dynami-
cal (rejecting the “cognitive sandwich”), with temporal data
embedded in fully serial models. Indeed, if one abandons the
strictly sequential time course of such models and instead allows
for fast, cascading activation of the different linguistic represen-
tations, not only do the arguments of P&G become problematic,
but also the notion of a slow production/comprehension imple-
menter being monitored by a fast and incomplete forward
model loses a critical aspect of its theoretical motivation.
To sum up, we believe that theoretical development of the
speech monitor in P&G’s integrated account of language pro-
duction and comprehension faces a major challenge since it
needs to explain how representations that lack certain dimensions
of information can serve to detect and correct errors to such a
high – almost errorless – degree. Furthermore, it is important to
acknowledge that as it stands, the evidence used in support of
this proposal could just as easily be reinterpreted in other
terms, highlighting the need of direct empirical exploration of
P&G’s proposal.
When to simulate and when to associate?
Accounting for inter-talker variability in the
speech signal
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) theory could be modiﬁed to
describe how listeners rapidly incorporate context to generate predictions
about speech despite inter-talker variability. However, in order to do so,
the content of “impoverished” predicted percepts must be expanded to
include phonetic information. Further, the way listeners identify and
represent inter-talker differences and subsequently determine which
prediction method to use would require further speciﬁcation.
A hallmark of speech perception is that despite inter-talker variabil-
ity on dimensions including rate, pitch, and phonetic variation due to
accents, comprehension usually proceeds quickly and with little con-
scious effort. P&G’s theory provides a potential means of accommo-
dating this variability by including context in the inverse model
during comprehension; however, although the theory is potentially
compatible with ﬁndings on talker adaptation, in order to generate
testable hypotheses in this domain, it must more precisely specify
what information is included in listeners’ predictions and how listen-
ers assess talkers’ speech to determine which prediction route is
more appropriate for the current input.
According to P&G’s model, listener-generated predictions are
impoverished, which suggests that they do not include ﬁne-
grained phonetic detail. However, a large body of research
shows that not only do listeners use ﬁne-grained acoustic-phonetic
details online while processing speech (McMurray et al. 2009;
Salverda et al. 2003), but that this phonetic detail can also affect
listeners’ subsequent productions (Nielsen 2011). If P&G wish
to capture how listeners become phonetically aligned, allowing
improved perception of an individual’s speech over time, the deﬁ-
nition of “context” must be expanded to include phonetic details,
as well as listeners’ previous experiences with a particular talker or
group of talkers.
Another question raised by the model is how listeners’ use of
the prediction-by-simulation and prediction-by-association routes
would vary as a consequence of talker identity. Consider, for
example, an eye-tracking experiment from our laboratory
showing rapid comprehension of a regional accent (Trude &
Brown-Schmidt 2012). In this study, participants heard two
talkers: a male with American English dialect in which /æ/ raises
to /eɪ/ only before /g/ (e.g., tag [teɪg], but tack [tæk]), and a
female without this shift. On critical trials, participants viewed
four images: a /k/-ﬁnal target (e.g., tack), a /g/-ﬁnal cohort compe-
titor (e.g., tag), and two unrelated pictures. Participants clicked on
the image named by one of the talkers. The results indicated that
when listening to the male talker, participants ﬁxated tag less upon
hearing tack. Participants ruled the competitor out more quickly
because the way that the male talker would have pronounced its
vowel was not consistent with the input. Hence, we observed
that listeners mentally represented an unfamiliar regional accent
and used their knowledge rapidly enough to inﬂuence processing
of a single word (see also Dahan et al. 2008).
P&G argue that listeners rely more on simulation when the
talker is similar to them; however, the theory does not specify
what degree of similarity is necessary for listeners to be able to
use prediction-by-simulation during comprehension and when
prediction-by-association is necessary. Additionally, for this
model to generate testable hypotheses, it must specify how listen-
ers assess the input in order to determine whether to use simu-
lation or association, and the basis and frequency on which they
update their assessments. According to P&G, context is deter-
mined using “information about differences between A’s speech
system and B’s speech system” (target article, sect. 3.2, para. 3;
Fig. 6 caption), suggesting that listeners engage in a comparison
process. However, the details of that process, and how it aligns
with current theories of speech perception, are unclear.
At a phonological level, it is possible that our participants would
have been able to use the simulation route to predict the male’s
vowel shift since, as native English speakers, the vowel /eɪ/ is
part of their own phonological system. It could also be the case,
however, that our participants used the association route since
their own phonological representation of tag includes an /æ/,
rather than an /eɪ/. At the same time, because our talkers and
participants were all American English speakers, their speech
was quite phonologically similar. Would this similarity have
allowed our participants to use the simulation route most of the
time, perhaps switching to association only for the critical vowel
shift? Considering that the two talkers alternated randomly in
our study, and that certain features of their speech may have
been more or less like those of a given participant at different
points in a single word, it seems as if it would have been necessary
for the participant to constantly re-evaluate which prediction
route was more suitable from moment to moment. This process
would likely be too slow to implement and still produce
the rapid online adaptation effects that we, and others, have
observed.
A further question is whether listeners’ derived production
commands are actually the same representations governing
overt imitation in cases in which the talker’s and listener’s
speech vary. In the model, the listener’s derived production
command is generated after the percept has passed through the
inverse model (which includes context), and therefore should
include information about the talker’s voice; however, it appears
that this command is also used to generate overt imitation. If so,
it seems that listeners should be able to imitate whatever features
of the talker’s speech they are able to predict (except when phys-
iological differences prevent them from doing so). However, there
are many cases in which a listener may understand a talker’s
speech without readily producing certain features of it (Mitterer
& Ernestus 2008). The use of impoverished representations
during comprehension could explain listeners’ failure to overtly
imitate these features; however, the fact that listeners can use
ﬁne-grained acoustic detail during comprehension seems at odds
with this explanation. Furthermore, it has been shown that listeners
can accommodate sub-phonemic features during imitation (Nielsen
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2011), though they may do so to varying degrees (Babel 2012).
Therefore, it would seem the theory needs a mechanism account-
ing for the dissociation between listeners’ use of phonetic detail
during comprehension and production.
In conclusion, P&G’s theory can potentially explain talker-
speciﬁc adaptation during comprehension because it allows a
role for context while making predictions about a talker’s
speech. Furthermore, the rapid generation and implementation
of representations is consistent with work using online methods
that show talker-speciﬁc adaptation over the course of a single
word. However, there are many open questions that remain
about how listeners represent and predict the acoustic features
of individuals’ speech that must be addressed to make this a
useful model of talker adaptation.
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Abstract:We agree with Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) claim that theories
of language processing must address the interconnection of language
production and comprehension. However, we have two concerns: First,
the central notion of context when predicting what another person will
say is underspeciﬁed. Second, it is not clear that P&G’s dual-mechanism
model captures the data better than a single-mechanism model would.
We agree with Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) claim that models of
language use must take into account the fact that production and
comprehension processes are interwoven in time and intercon-
nected as in the case of split turns. Indeed, the most basic form
of language use is arguably conversation, in which interlocutors
act both as producers and addressees, and each type of act
involves elements of the other.
The importance of examining dialogic processes has become
apparent following a surge of interest in studying language in
natural settings (Pickering & Garrod 2004; Trueswell & Tanen-
haus 2005). This interest has generated new, signiﬁcant ﬁndings
in conversation including development of techniques for indepen-
dently quantifying and predicting the degree of coordination in
conversation (Richardson et al. 2007), as well as evidence that
coordinated contextual representations facilitate use of potentially
ambiguous referential expressions (Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus
2008). Similarly, experiments in noninteractive settings increas-
ingly focus on dialogue-relevant questions such as how represen-
tations of others’ mental states guide processing (Ferguson et al.
2010).
A central feature of language use is that it is produced and
understood with respect to a particular context that constrains
both what we say and how we say it. In conversation, the basic
context is often assumed to be the interlocutors’ common
ground (Clark 1996) with conversational efﬁciency increasing as
common ground grows (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark 1992). According
to P&G’s proposal, context plays a key role in circumscribing pre-
diction and, as a result, conversational efﬁciency.
According to P&G, listeners predict upcoming utterances using
one of two mechanisms, simulation and association. Listeners
use the simulation mechanism with familiar partners, and the
association mechanism when they perceive themselves as being
different from their partner, as in adult-child conversations, and
in reading, where the addressee does not typically speak. In
what follows, we argue that with both familiar and unfamiliar part-
ners, and in talking and reading alike, language users make soph-
isticated predictions about future language use, based on available
contextual information.
P&G argue that an addressee using the simulation mechanism
will predict an utterance using an inverse model and contextual
information – a prediction about what the speaker would say.
P&G do not specify the details of this contextual information.
However, to predict what the speaker would say requires assessing
the speaker’s context, where context must be broadly deﬁned to
include both local perceptual information as well as historical
information about the person’s dialect and past experience.
After all, depending on a person’s age and regional dialect, a
given semantic meaning might be expressed as great, rad, or
wicked. Similarly, in cases where a potential alternative referent
is occluded from the speaker’s but not the addressee’s view
(e.g., the speaker sees one cup whereas the addressee sees two),
the context would predict different referential expressions
depending on which perspective was used. We read P&G as
saying that in each of these cases, on the simulation mechanism,
the addressee would predict what the speaker will say from the
speaker’s perspective, predicting “wicked” or “the cup,” even
though “wicked” might connote a negative valance to the addres-
see (rather than the intended positive valance), and even though
“the cup” would be ambiguous from the addressee’s perspective.
Therefore, even though the prediction is executed using the
addressee’s production system, the entire prediction process
would have to be tailored to the addressee’s beliefs about the
speaker’s context.
In our view, the process would be no different on an association
view in which addressees predict based on previous perceptual
experience. P&G propose that association occurs when interlocu-
tors are dissimilar or the production system is not engaged (e.g., in
reading). However, even when unfamiliar interlocutors have
different perspectives, overwhelming evidence now suggests
that listeners do not progress egocentrically, but instead take
into account information about their partner’s context (e.g.,
Hanna et al. 2003; Heller et al. 2008). Similarly, as in live conver-
sation, readers make rapid predictions when reading (Federmeier
& Kutas 1999) and tailor referential interpretation based on rep-
resentations of the number of entities in the discourse context
(Greene et al. 1992; Nieuwland et al. 2007). Hence, it would
seem that prediction-by-association would have to be tailored to
the particular context of language use, just as in simulation.
What advantage, then, is gained by positing a second mechanism
to prediction? P&G suggest association might not afford rapid
turn-taking, however this seems less of an argument to posit this
mechanism than an argument against it, given that turn-taking
is, in fact, rapid. P&G also suggest that individuals might choose
to use either association, simulation, or a combination of the
two; however, it is unclear how these decisions would be made,
and how the outputs of these mechanisms would be integrated
during real-time processing.
In conclusion, we applaud P&G’s emphasis on the way pro-
duction and comprehension are interwoven in natural communi-
cation. However, in emphasizing the remarkable skill needed to
produce, for example, a split turn, the authors overlook potential
redundancy in the dual-mechanism proposal. Indeed, the evi-
dence suggests that in a large variety of circumstances, interlocu-
tors integrate context and common ground into processing
predictions. The accuracy, speed, and type of prediction seem
to be determined largely by factors such as the quality of the lis-
tener’s estimation of the speaker’s context, and whether attending
to one’s partner’s context is relevant to the communicative goals
(Yoon et al. 2012). Hence, the determining factor in the quality
of prediction should be seen as context-modeling, rather than a
decision to use one mechanism in a hypothesized processing
architecture. Understanding the mechanisms that determine the
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context of conversation, and the degree to which the contexts of
the speaker and listener are coordinated, then, would seem to
be a central goal for understanding dialogic processes.
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Abstract: Our target article proposed that language production
and comprehension are interwoven, with speakers making
predictions of their own utterances and comprehenders making
predictions of other people’s utterances at different linguistic
levels. Here, we respond to comments about such issues as
cognitive architecture and its neural basis, learning and
development, monitoring, the nature of forward models,
communicative intentions, and dialogue.
Our target article proposed a novel architecture for langu-
age processing. Rather than isolating production and com-
prehension from each other, we argued that they are
closely linked. We ﬁrst claimed that people predict their
own and other people’s actions. In a similar way, we
argued that speakers predict their own utterances and com-
prehenders predict other people’s utterances at a range of
different linguistic levels.
The commentators made a wide range of perceptive
points about our account, and we thank them for their
input. We have divided their arguments into seven sections.
We ﬁrst respond to comments about the relation between
production, comprehension, and other cognitive processes;
in the second section, we turn to questions about the neural
basis for our account. We said very little about learning and
development in the target article, and our third section
responds to those commentators who considered its impli-
cations for these issues. In the fourth section, we address
the more technical issue of the nature of the represen-
tations created by forward modelling and how they are
compared with implemented representations during moni-
toring. We respond, in the ﬁfth section, to the commenta-
tors who remarked on the nature of prediction-by-
simulation and its relationship to prediction-by-association.
Finally, in sections six and seven we look at broader ques-
tions relating to the scope of the account: the nature of
communicative intentions, and the implications of the
account for dialogue.
R1. Production, comprehension, and the
“cognitive sandwich”
Our account has the overall goal of integrating production
and comprehension. Our speciﬁc models in Figures 5–7
(target article) are incompatible with traditional separation
of production and comprehension as shown in Figure R1
(repeated here from the target article). Some commenta-
tors addressed the question of whether our proposal leads
to a radical rethinking of the relationship between the two.
In fact, there are two issues concerning Figure R1. One
is the extent to which production and comprehension are
separate. In terms of the cognitive sandwich, are there
two pieces of bread (rather than a wrap)? Our proposal is
that instances of production involve comprehension pro-
cesses (Fig. 5) and that instances of comprehension
involve production processes (Fig. 6). But production and
comprehension processes are nevertheless distinct – pro-
duction involves mapping from intention to sound, and
comprehension involves mapping from sound to intention.
The second issue is whether the bread is separate from the
ﬁlling. In other words, what is the relationship between
production/comprehension and nonlinguistic mechanisms
(thinking, general knowledge)? We propose that at least
some aspects of general knowledge can be accessed
during production and during comprehension, and more-
over that interpreting the intention involves general knowl-
edge. These aspects of general knowledge of course draw
on a variety of cognitive functions such as memory and
conﬂict resolution (see Slevc & Novick).
By interweaving production and comprehension, we
have proposed that our account is incompatible with the
traditional “cognitive sandwich” (Hurley 2008a) – an archi-
tecture in which production and comprehension are iso-
lated from each other. Because production is a form of
action, the use of production processes during comprehen-
sion means that comprehension involves a form of embodi-
ment (i.e., uses action to aid perception). We also suggested
that our account may be compatible with embodied
accounts of meaning (e.g., Barsalou 1999; Glenberg &
Gallese 2012). In contrast, Dove argues that we assume
different intermediate and disembodied levels of represen-
tation (e.g., syntax, phonology) that are not grounded in
modality-speciﬁc input/output systems. We agree that our
account is not compatible with this form of embodiment,
and we accept his conclusion that we retain some amodal
representations but abandon a form of modularity.
Our proposal for the relationship between production
and comprehension runs counter to traditional interactive
accounts which assume that cascading and feedback
occur during production. For example, Dell (1986)
assumed that a speaker activates semantic features and
that activation cascades to words associated with those fea-
tures and sounds associated with those words, and that acti-
vation then feeds back from the phonemes to the activated
words and to other words involving those phonemes.
Because this process involves several cycles before acti-
vation settles on a particular word and set of phonemes,
Dell regards early stages of this process as involving predic-
tion. In his very interesting proposal, cascading and feed-
back are internal to the implementer and are causal in
bringing about the (implemented) linguistic represen-
tations. This also seems to be the position adopted by
Mylopoulos & Pereplyotchik, who replace our forward
Response/Pickering & Garrod: An integrated theory of language production and comprehension
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:4 377
model with an utterance plan internal to the implementer,
and by Mani & Huettig, who regard it as a third route to
prediction. In contrast, our predicted representations are
the result of the efference copy of the production
command, and they are therefore separate from the imple-
menter. Our account of monitoring thus involves compar-
ing two separate sets of representations and so is very
different from both Dell and Mylopoulos & Pereplyotchik.
Bowers’ discussion of Grossberg (1980) also appears
similar toDell’s proposal and usefully demonstrates imple-
menter-internal prediction. He also queries why forward
modelling should speed up processing when its output is
subsequently compared with the output of a slower imple-
menter. The reason is that the comparison can be made as
soon as the implementer’s output is available (at any level).
Otherwise, it is necessary to analyse the implementer’s
output (as in comprehension-based monitoring; Levelt
1989).
R2. The neuroscience of production–
comprehension relations
A number of commentators consider our account in
relation to neuroscientiﬁc evidence. Some of this evidence
concerns monitoring deﬁcits associated with particular
aphasias. Hartsuiker discusses a patient who cannot com-
prehend familiar sounds, words, or sentences, but who is
nevertheless able to correct some of her own phonemic
speech errors. He argues that such a patient would be
incapable of monitoring her own speech by comparing
the output of the implementer (utterance percept) with a
forward model prediction (predicted utterance percept).
However, it is difﬁcult to draw clear conclusions from
such cases without knowing the precise nature of the deﬁ-
cits. For example, this patient might monitor propriocep-
tively to correct errors. In relation to this, Tremblay et al.
(2003) found that people can adapt their articulation to
external perturbations of jaw movements during silently
mouthed speech. In other words, they monitored and cor-
rected their planned utterances in the absence of auditory
feedback. Hartsuiker also discusses a patient who detects
phonemic errors in others but who does not repair his
own (frequent) phonemic errors. It is possible that proprio-
ceptive monitoring is disturbed (and that such monitoring
is particularly important for repairing his phonemic
errors), but outer-loop monitoring is preserved.
Other commentators point out that the classical
Lichtheim–Broca–Wernicke neurolinguistic model is
inconsistent with much recent neurophysiological data. In
fact, we believe that their proposals are likely to be quite
close to ours. Hickok assumes a dorsal stream which sub-
serves sensorimotor integration for motor control (i.e., pro-
duction) and a ventral stream which links sensory inputs to
conceptual memory (i.e., comprehension). Both systems
make use of prediction, with motor prediction facilitating
production and sensory prediction facilitating comprehen-
sion. Hickok’s position may not be so distinct from ours if
we equate motor prediction with prediction-by-simulation
and sensory prediction with prediction-by-association.
However, unlike Hickok, we suggest that both streams
may be called upon during comprehension. Dick &
Andric also argue against the classical neurolinguistic
model in favour of a dual-stream account. They suggest
that the motor involvement in speech perception may
only be apparent in perception under adverse conditions
(see sect. R4 for a fuller discussion on this point). Finally,
Alario & Hamamé point out additional evidence for
forward modelling in production (e.g., Flinker et al.
2010). We accept that current evidence does not allow us
to determine the neural basis of the efference copy, and
we hope that this will be a target for future research.
R3. Learning and development
Our target article did not explicitly discuss the role of
forward modelling in language learning and development.
However, we certainly recognise that our account is rel-
evant to the acquisition of language production and com-
prehension, particularly in relation to their ﬂuency. In
fact, both forward and inverse models were ﬁrst introduced
Figure R1. A traditional model of communication between A and B (repeated from target article).
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and tested as neurocomputational models of early skill
acquisition (e.g., Jordan & Rumelhart 1992; Kawato et al.
1987; 1990), and we therefore argue that they can be
applied to language. Accordingly, we are grateful to a
number of commentators for ﬂeshing out the importance
of such models in the development of language. We also
strongly agree that the use of forward and inverse models
in learning does not disappear following childhood.
Instead, it leads to adaptation and learning in adults, as
well as to prediction of their own and others’ utterances.
Hence, Johnson, Turk-Browne, & Goldberg
(Johnson et al.) point out the role of prediction in learning
to segment utterances, and in learning words and gramma-
tical constructions. Krishnan notes various interrelations
between production and comprehension abilities during
development. We endorse her goal of explaining the mech-
anisms underlying such developmental changes. Aitken
emphasizes the importance of the developmental perspec-
tive in accounting for communication processes in general,
and we agree.
Mani & Huettig point out that two-year-olds’ pro-
duction vocabulary (rather than comprehension vocabu-
lary) correlates with their ability to make predictions in a
visual world situation (Mani & Huettig 2012). This provides
important new evidence that prediction during compre-
hension makes use of production processes. In fact, it
suggests that two-year-olds are already using prediction-
by-simulation. Note that we speculated that adults may
emphasize prediction-by-association when comprehending
children; we did not suggest that children emphasize pre-
diction-by-association during comprehension.
From a computational perspective, Chang, Kidd, &
Rowland (Chang et al.) argue that linguistic prediction
is a by-product of language learning. We accept that it
originates in learning but note that it is critical for ﬂuent
performance in its own right. Their account of comprehen-
sion has some similarities to ours – in particular, that it uses
a form of production-based prediction. However, it
assumes separate meaning and sequencing pathways,
whereas we adopt a more traditional multi-level account
(semantics, syntax, phonology); future research could
directly compare these accounts. We do not see why it is
problematic to use syntax and semantics in supervised
learning (any more than phonology, which is of course
also abstract).
McCauley & Christiansen discuss a model of language
acquisition in which prediction-by-simulation facilitates the
model’s shallow processing of the input during learning.
They show how this model can account for a range of
recent psycholinguistic ﬁndings about language acquisition.
The integration of our account with the evidence for the
representation of multi-word chunks is potentially informa-
tive. We also agree that shallow processing during compre-
hension may help explain apparent asymmetries between
production and comprehension.
R4. Impoverished representations and production
monitoring
Many commentators discuss our claim that predictions are
impoverished. For example, de Ruiter & Cummins point
out that Heinks-Maldonado et al.’s (2006) ﬁndings are com-
patible only with a forward model that incorporates
information about pitch. More generally, Strijkers,
Runnqvist, Costa, &Holcomb (Strijkers et al.) question
how “poor” (predicted) representations can be used to suc-
cessfully monitor “rich” (implemented) representations,
and Hartsuiker similarly claims that impoverished rep-
resentations are not a good standard for judging correctness
(i.e., they will be particularly error-prone).
A key property of forward models is their ﬂexibility.
Their primary purpose (in adults) is to promote ﬂuency,
and therefore speakers are able to “tune into” whatever
aspect of a stimulus is most relevant to this goal. So long
as speakers know that pitch is relevant to a particular task
(or is obviously being manipulated in an experiment),
they predict the pitch that they will produce, and are dis-
rupted if their predicted percept does not match the
actual percept. People are able to determine what aspects
of a percept to predict on the basis of their situation,
such as the current experimental task (see Howes,
Healey, Eshghi, & Hough [Howes et al.]) Such ﬂexi-
bility clearly makes the forward models more useful for
aiding ﬂuency, but it also means that we cannot determine
which aspects of an utterance will necessarily be rep-
resented in a forward model. In Alario & Hamamé’s
terms, we assume that the “opt-out” is circumstantial
rather than systematic. Hence, predictions may contain
“ﬁne-grained phonetic detail,” contra Trude.
In fact, the question of what information is represented
in forward models of motor control (and learning) has
received some attention. For example, Kawato et al.
(1990) suggested that movement trajectories can be pro-
jected using critical via-points through which the trajectory
has to pass at a certain time, rather than in terms of the
moment-by-moment dynamics of the implemented move-
ment trajectory. Optimal trajectories can then be learnt
by applying local optimising principles for getting from
one via-point to the next. In this way, impoverished predic-
tions can be used to monitor rich implementations. In the
same way, language users might predict particularly crucial
aspects of an utterance, but the aspects that they predict
will depend on the circumstances.
More generally, Meyer & Hagoort question the value
of predicting one’s own utterance. They argue that predic-
tion is useful when it is likely to differ from the actual event.
This is the case when predicting another person’s behav-
iour or when the result of one’s action is uncertain (e.g.,
moving in a strong wind). But they argue that people are
conﬁdent about their own speech. Meyer & Hagoort
admit that they will tend to be less conﬁdent in dialogue,
and we agree. But more important, we argue that the be-
haviour of the production implementer is not fully deter-
mined by the production command, because the complex
processes involved in production are subject to internal
(“neural”) noise or priming (i.e., inﬂuences that may not
be a result of the production command). Assuming that
these sources of noise do not necessarily affect forward
modelling as well, predicted speech may differ from
actual speech. In addition, prediction is useful even if the
behaviour is fully predictable, because it allows the actor
to plan future behaviour on the basis of the prediction. In
fact, we made such a proposal in relation to the order of
heavy and light phrases (see sect. 3.1, target article).
Hartsuiker claims that our account incorrectly predicts
an early competitor effect in Huettig and Hartsuiker
(2010). His claim is based on the assumption that
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comparing the predicted utterance percept with the actual
utterance percept should invoke phonological competitors
in the same way that comprehending another’s speech
invokes such competitors. But the predicted utterance
percept of heart does not also represent phonological com-
petitors,1 and the utterance percept is directly related to
the predicted utterance percept (i.e., it is not analysed).
Hartsuiker favours a conﬂict-monitoring account (e.g.,
Nozari et al. 2011), but such an account merely detects
some difﬁculty during production, and it is unclear how it
can determine the source of difﬁculty or the means of cor-
rection. We accept that a forward modelling account
involves some duplication of information; a goal of our
account and motor-control accounts is to provide reasons
why complex biological systems are not necessarily parsi-
monious in this respect.
Oppenheimmakes the interesting suggestion that inner
speech might be the product of forward production
models. This is an alternative to the possibility that inner
speech involves an incomplete use of the implementer, in
which the speaker inhibits production after computing a
phonological or phonetic representation. Clearly, ﬁndings
that inner speech is impoverished would provide some
support for the forward-model account. But as Oppenheim
himself notes, it is hard to see how inner slips could be
identiﬁed without using the production implementer to
generate an utterance percept at the appropriate level of
representation (which is then compared to the predicted
utterance percept).
Jaeger & Ferreira argue that the output of the forward
production model (the predicted utterance) serves merely
as input to the forward comprehension model, and
suggest that the efference copy could directly generate
the predicted utterance percept. In fact, the motivation
for constructing the forward production model is to aid
learning an inverse model that maps backward from the
predicted utterance percept via the predicted utterance
to the production command, just as in motor control
theory (Wolpert et al. 2001). It is possible that sufﬁciently
ﬂuent speakers might be able to directly map from the pro-
duction command to the predicted utterance percept
(though there may be a separate mapping to the predicted
utterance). But this would prevent speakers from remain-
ing sufﬁciently ﬂexible to learn new words or utterances,
just as in the early stages of acquisition. In this context,
Adank et al. (2010) found that adult comprehension of
unfamiliar accents is facilitated by previous imitation of
those accents to a similar extent whether speakers can or
cannot hear their own speech. This suggests that adaptation
is mediated by the forward production model (though there
could also be an effect of proprioception). Note that the
inverse model is not merely used for long-term learning,
but is also used to modify an action as it takes place (e.g.,
to speak more clearly if background noise increases).
Finally, Slevc & Novick suggest that nonlinguistic
memory tasks and linguistic conﬂict resolution involve
common brain structures (the left inferior temporal
gyrus). Patients with lesions to this area show difﬁculty
with both memory tasks and with language production
and comprehension. We propose that both self- and
other-monitoring rely on memory-based predictions. One
possibility is that monitoring can involve automatic correc-
tion when the difference between the prediction and the
implementation is low, but monitoring requires extensive
access to general knowledge when there is greater
discrepancy.
R5. Prediction-by-simulation versus
prediction-by-association
We propose that comprehenders make use of both predic-
tion-by-simulation and prediction-by-association. In most
situations, both routes provide some predictive value, and
so we assume that comprehenders integrate the predictions
that they make. Both routes also use domain-general cogni-
tive mechanisms such as memory (see Slevc & Novick).
We made some suggestions about when comprehenders
are likely to weight one route more strongly than the
other. For example, simulation will be weighted more
strongly when the comprehender appears to be more
similar to the speaker than otherwise. Laurent, Moulin-
Frier, Bessière, Schwartz, & Diard (Laurent et al.)
describe how they have modelled the contributions of
association and simulation (in their terms, auditory and
motor knowledge) to speech perception under both ideal
and adverse conditions (both in the context of external
noise and when the comprehender and speaker are very
different). Under ideal conditions, association and simu-
lation perform identically, but under adverse conditions,
their performance falls off in different ways. However,
they note that integration of the two routes (i.e., sensory-
motor fusion) yields better performance, and we agree.
We strongly support their programme of modelling these
contributions (see also de Ruiter & Cummins) and
agree that experiments conducted under adverse con-
ditions may help discriminate the contributions of the
two forms of prediction. We agree that their modelling
results are consistent with ﬁndings from transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) studies which point to the contri-
bution of motor systems to speech perception, but only in
noisy conditions (e.g., D’Ausilio et al. 2011).
Yoon & Brown-Schmidt question the need for having
both prediction-by-simulation and prediction-by-associ-
ation in comprehension (i.e., dual-route prediction).
These commentators claim that comprehenders using
simulation would predict what the speaker would say
(i.e., allocentrically). In fact, we propose that comprehen-
ders use context to aid allocentric prediction, but that
they are also subject to egocentric biases (i.e., comprehen-
ders only partly take into account information about their
partner’s context). Yoon & Brown-Schmidt claim predic-
tion-by-association would also be allocentric, and therefore
question why we need two prediction mechanisms. We ﬁrst
note that prediction-by-association need not be allocentric,
as it might be biased by prior perception of oneself.
But more important, the two routes to prediction are dis-
tinct for reasons unrelated to the role of context. Perhaps
most important, prediction-by-simulation takes into
account the inferred intention of the speaker in a way
that prediction-by-association cannot (as it makes no refer-
ence to mental states). Hence, prediction-by-simulation
should offer a richer and more situation-speciﬁc kind of
prediction than prediction-by-association, and a combi-
nation of these predictions is likely to be more accurate
than one form of prediction by itself.
To what extent can prediction-by-simulation account for
speech adaptation effects? Trude and Brown-Schmidt
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(2012) showed that listeners could use their knowledge of a
speaker’s regional pronunciation to rapidly rule out compe-
titors in a visual world task (see also Dahan et al. 2008).
Trude asks whether such rapid incorporation of context
to aid prediction can be explained by prediction-by-simu-
lation and to what extent it suggests that listeners make
detailed phonetic predictions of what they will hear. As
we proposed here (see sect. R4), forward models must be
ﬂexible, and in experimental situations that highlight
detailed phonetic differences we would expect people to
predict such details. Of course there is still the question
of how rapidly a listener could incorporate the context
(i.e., relating to speaker identity) into their forward model.
However, it is interesting to note that Trude and Brown-
Schmidt found that competitors were ruled out earlier fol-
lowing increased exposure to previous words (e.g., hearing
point to the bag as opposed to just hearing bag). Trude
also suggests that listeners’ use of impoverished represen-
tations could explain difﬁculties in imitating those features.
But, in fact, we claim that listeners typically compute fully
speciﬁed representations using the implementer, so the
reasons for difﬁculties in imitation presumably lie elsewhere.
More generally, we claim that comprehenders use some pro-
duction processes but not necessarily all (e.g., they may be
unable to produce a particular accent).
Festman addresses issues relating to bilingualism. One
reason for the difﬁculty of conversations between a native
and a nonnative speaker is that their processing systems
are likely to be very different (in terms of both speed and
content) and so prediction-by-simulation is likely to be
adversely affected. (In addition, prediction-by-simulation
will be hindered by limited experience on which to learn
forward models.) Prediction-by-association does not
suffer from this problem. For example, most L1 (ﬁrst-
language) speakers have experience with L2 (second-
language) speakers, and hence can predict L2 speakers
even when they would behave differently from them. L2
speakers should also be able to predict L1 speakers (who
they tend to encounter regularly), but they may of course
not be able to make good predictions (e.g., if they do not
know words that the L1 speakers would use).
Rabagliati & Bemis argue that much of language is not
predictable and that its power is its ability to communicate
the unpredictable. We do not claim that prediction
underlies all of language comprehension. Rather, people
use prediction whenever they can to assist comprehension
(at different linguistic levels). But when an utterance is
unpredictable, they simply rely on the implementer. In
fact, failure to predict successfully serves to highlight the
unexpected, and therefore allows the comprehender to
concentrate resources.
R6. Communicative intentions and the production
command
Many of the commentators raise the issue of how our
account is affected by communicative intentions. In our
terms, this is the question of how the production
command is determined and used. We agree with
Kashima, Bekkering, & Kashima (Kashima et al.)
that communicative intentions do not simply underlie the
construction of semantics, syntax, and phonology, but
incorporate information such as illocutionary force. Most
important, we do not assume that covert imitation simply
involves copying linguistic representations (or that overt
imitation involves “blind” repetition). Instead, our proposal
(see Fig. 6, target article) is that comprehenders use the
inverse model and context to derive the production
command that comprehenders would use if they were to
produce the speaker’s utterance, and use this to drive the
forward model (or to make overt responses). In other
words, the forward model and overt imitation (or com-
pletion) are affected by the production command. Hence,
our account is compatible with ﬁndings such as those of
Ondobaka et al. (2011) because it proposes that imitation
can be affected by aspects of intentions such as the compat-
ibility between interlocutors’ goals. It can also explain how
accent convergence can depend on communicative inten-
tions (e.g., relating to identity).
We agree withEchterhoff that our account aims to inte-
grate a “language-as-action” approach to intention (rep-
resented as the production command) with the evidence
for mechanistic time-locked processing. We limited our
discussion of intentions for reasons of space, but agree
that their relationship to other aspects of mental life is
central to a more fully developed theory. He speciﬁcally
highlights the importance of postdictive processing in
determining nonliteral and other complex intentions, and
we agree. We see his proposal as closely related to the
use of ofﬂine prediction-by-simulation (see Pezzulo 2011a).
The HMOSAIC architecture is used to determine the
relationship between actions and higher-level intentions.
Commentators de Ruiter & Cummins query whether
this is possible for language because of the particularly
complex relationship between intention and utterance;
Pazzaglia also claims that the mappings between intention
and speech sounds are too complex for prediction-by-simu-
lation. We are not convinced that this relationship is more
complex than other aspects of human action (and inter-
action) and believe that this is simply an issue for future
research.
Kreysa points out that comprehenders may use gaze to
help predict utterances without deliberate consideration of
intention. As she notes, such cues may constitute a form of
prediction-by-association, though it is also possible that
comprehenders perform prediction-by-simulation but
with gaze constituting part of the context that is used to
compute the intention (see Fig. 6, target article). If this is
the case, gaze would help reduce the complexity of the
intention-utterance relationship. She also questions
whether anticipatory ﬁxation in the visual-world paradigm
involves prediction-by-association or simulation. In this
context, we note that Lesage et al. (2012) showed that cer-
ebellar repetitive TMS (rTMS) prevented such anticipatory
ﬁxations in predictive contexts (e.g., The man will sail the
boat), but not in control sentences (or in vertex rTMS).
As the cerebellum appears to be used for prediction in
motor control (Miall & Wolpert 1996), this suggests that
such ﬁxations involve prediction-by-simulation.
Jaeger & Ferreira ask about the precise nature of the
prediction errors that the system is trying to minimize. In
particular, do these relate to evaluations of how well
formed the output is or do they relate to evaluations of
its communicative effectiveness in the context in which it
is uttered? One possibility is that when speakers utter a pre-
dictable word, it means that they have forward modelled
that word to a considerable extent before uttering it.
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Hence, they weight the importance of the forward model
more than the output of the implementer and therefore
attenuate the form of the word. But alternatively, the
speakers realize that the error tends to be less for predict-
able than unpredictable words, and know that addressees
are less likely to comprehend words when the error is
great. They thus use a strategy of clearer articulation
when they realize that the error is likely to be great
(perhaps based on their view of the addressee’s ability to
comprehend).
Pezzulo & Dindo argue that producers use intentional
(signalling) strategies to aid their comprehenders’ predic-
tions. In other words, they make themselves more predict-
able to the comprehender. To do this, they maintain an
internal model of the comprehenders’ uncertainty.
Hence, the authors propose a type of allocentric account.
We suspect that speakers make their utterances predictable
for both allocentric reasons (e.g., lengthening vowels for
children) and egocentric reasons. For example, an effect
of interactive alignment (Pickering & Garrod 2004) is to
make interlocutors more similar (see sect. 3.3, target
article) so that comprehenders are more likely to predict
speakers accurately. Such alignment might itself follow
from an intentional strategy to align but need not. In
their penultimate paragraph, Pezzulo & Dindo make
several very interesting additional suggestions about ways
in which producers and comprehenders may make use of
prediction beyond those we addressed in the target article.
R7. Interleaving production and comprehension
in dialogue
Howes et al. criticise traditional models of production and
comprehension based on large units (such as whole sen-
tences), and we agree. Such models are clearly unable to
deal with the fragmentary nature of many contributions
to dialogue. Howes et al. propose an incremental model
that combines production and comprehension. This
model may be able to deal with incrementality and joint
utterances in dialogue but does not provide an account of
prediction, either of upcoming words in monologue (e.g.,
Delong et al. 2005) or ends of turns in dialogue (de
Ruiter et al. 2006). Moreover, Howes et al. argue that pre-
diction can only help speakers repeat their interlocutors,
but this is not the case. Overt responses based on the
derived production command for the current utterance
(iB (t)) lead to repetition, but overt responses based on
the derived production command for the upcoming utter-
ance (iB (t+1)) lead to continuations (see Fig. 6, target
article). In other words, we believe that our account pro-
vides mechanisms that underlie dialogue (Pickering &
Garrod 2004).
Fowler argues that we wrongly emphasize internal predic-
tive models when the same beneﬁts can be accrued by
directly interacting with the environment, most importantly
our interlocutors. We accept that the information in the
environment helps determine people’s actions, but argue
that predictions driven by internal models that have been
shaped by past experience allow people to perform better
(just as is the case for complex engineering). In the inter-
action process, overt imitation, completions, and comp-
lementary responses all appear to occur regularly, and all
are compatible with our account (see sect. 3.3, target article).
Echterhoff ﬁrst asks whether our action-based account
can generalize to noninteractive situations. Our models of
production and comprehension are explained noninterac-
tively and then applied to dialogue. In particular, we
propose that dialogue allows interlocutors to make use of
overt responses; in monologue, such overt responses are
not relevant, therefore language users focus more comple-
tely on internal processes. Echterhoff also argues that
shared reality (see sect. 2.3, target article) involves more
than seamless coordinated activity, but also has an evalua-
tive component. We propose that successful mutual predic-
tion (both A and B correctly predict both A and B)
underlies shared reality and is in turn likely to support
the alignment of evaluations of that activity. Mutual predic-
tions occur as a result of aligned action commands, and
action commands reﬂect intentions which of course
involve the motivations that, according to Echterhoff,
underlie shared reality.
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NOTE
1. This constitutes a sense in which the predicted utterance percept is
impoverished with respect to the utterance percept, but does not lose any
relevant information about the utterance.
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